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Abstract 
I. This study examines the value to financial analysts and investors generally in the 
UK of firms' accounting disclosures and other information contained in the annual 
report and accounts for share valuation purposes. 
2. Using daily share price data and a large sample of actively traded UK firms 
the relative information content of four major information releases, the prelimi- 
nary announcement, annual report and accounts, annual general meeting and the 
interim report, are examined. Three different models are employed, two of which 
involved the calculation of the market risk measure; the firm's beta. To increase 
comparability with previous studies, some of the tests were replicated using weekly 
data. 
3. Previous studies have shown a bias when calculating abnormal returns due to 
the size composition of the sample. Re-estimating the parameters using Ordinary 
Least Squares but including a size variable, showed virtually no effect on the mag- 
nitude of the estimated parameters. Neither the constant `alpha' nor the coefficient 
11 
of the size variable were statistically significant. The former is consistent with prior 
research. 
4. Infrequency of trading is largely associated with small companies and gives 
rise to a downward bias when estimating betas. Although the sample comprised 
actively traded mainly large companies, the betas were re-estimated using a method 
which takes into account thin trading. The results indicated that parameter esti- 
mates have to take into consideration thin trading even when using predominantly 
large actively traded stocks. The degree of stability in the betas over successive 
periods was low though the difference in the average betas of the two periods was 
negligible. The pooled betas were therefore used. 
5. The initial test was to ascertain the extent of the information content of 
the four events. The three different model formulations employed produced al- 
most identical results suggesting a naive model with beta=1 may well be adequate 
in many such event study situations. Therefore, all further tests were conducted 
using only the market model with adjusted betas. Of the four events, the prelimi- 
nary announcement and interim report, largely representing earnings and dividends 
announcements, had the highest information content, whilst little information in 
aggregate is conveyed to the market by the annual general meeting and the annual 
report and accounts. Similar results were produced using a different information 
measure and weekly data. No unusual share price activity was observed prior to 
111 
the event day or after event day plus one, which is consistent with the semi-strong 
form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
6. Evidence was found in tests of the market's reaction to `good' and `bad' news 
that, on average, they are given equal value except for the interim report where 
there is a sharper reaction to `bad' news. 
7. This study supports previous research showing an inverse relationship be- 
tween company size and the abnormal return on an event day. When variance of 
returns is included in the regression, the size coefficient albeit statistically signifi- 
cant becomes negligible in magnitude which suggests, like prior work, that size is 
probable a surrogate for absent firm specific variables. 
8. Using a control group of companies with low annual report and accounts 
abnormal returns but otherwise matching a sample of outlier companies with high 
annual report and accounts residuals, an analysis was made of both groups. Little 
difference was noted in the amount of statutory or voluntary information disclosed 
in the preliminary announcements of the groups. There was, however, significant 
evidence of greater price-sensitive information being provided in the annual reports 
and accounts of the outlier group. 
9. There was little evidence to suggest that one group was more closely followed 
by analysts than the other. Capital gearing and income cover were, on average, 
little different. Apparently what was driving the returns of the outlier sample was 
I 
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company specific information. The information seemed to be largely contained in 
two sections of the annual report 
, 
the balance sheet and the chairman's statement, 
which previous studies have shown to be valued by users. 
10. Tests of association between information content of the events produced con- 
flicting results but analysis of the press comments seemed to furnish some evidence 
of an informational relationship between the preliminary announcement and the 
annual report and accounts of the outlier group not observed in the control group. 
Press comments on the annual reports of the outlier group bear some relationship 
to the press comments on their preliminary announcements. 
11. No previous study has directly examined the informational value of the 
annual report and accounts for individual firms and used analysis of press comments 
to identify those parts of the annual report which seem to have information content. 
The value of this study lies in the new evidence that it provides suggesting the 
annual report and accounts does have some information value for the stockmarket 
for particular firms and in identifying those parts of the annual report found useful 
by investors. 
12. The implications of this study are that whilst, in aggregate, there seems 
to be an apparent lack of incremental information in the annual report and ac- 
couts, this is not a true reflection of its value to all market participants. Unless 
the stockmarket has access to this financial statement potential adverse valuation 
V 
consequences may be missed. This study suggests summary accounts are unsuitable 
for active stockmarket participants. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The study of Ball and Brown (1968) established that earnings announcements have 
information content highly prized by investors to determine security prices. Since 
then researchers have shown preliminary announcements, interim and quarterly 
earnings reports all to convey information about the underlying value of a security 
(Beaver, 1968; Kiger, 1972; Morse, 1981; Firth, 1981). However, the evidence 
relating to the usefulness of the annual report and accounts to investors, measured 
in terms of its impact on share prices, is sparse and further investigation is required. 
What limited research there has been to date (eg Foster, Jenkins and Vickrey, 
1986), tends towards a lack of useful information in the annual report for share 
valuation purposes. However, herein lies an anomaly: why is the report read so 
avidly by investors? The results of shareholder and professional analyst surveys are 
1 
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uniformly consistent in their findings, (e. g., Chang and Most, 1980; Lee and Tweedie, 
1981; Arnold and Moizer, 1984). They all reveal the perceived importance to the 
users of the Chairman's Statement, the Profit and Loss Account and the Balance 
Sheet for decision making. The main conclusion of Hines (1982) who attempted to 
resolve this anomaly, was that the annual report and accounts is useful to investors 
for long-term decision making. She gave two reasons. The annual report is the 
only audited information source available to investors and may be used by them 
to confirm or otherwise previously released information. Secondly, the additional 
information in the ARA could be used to assess the risk associated with a company 
and enable investors to adjust their portfolios to meet their desired risk and return 
preferences. Short-term market reactions would not, therefore, sufficiently capture 
the usefulness of the annual report to investors. 
The annual general meeting, which follows the publication of the accounts, gives 
the shareholders probably their only opportunity for a face to face confrontation 
with the directors of the company. However, only Firth (1981) appears to have 
addressed similar issues with regard to this event and found little aggregate market 
reaction. 
The amount of information about a company available to market participants is 
directly related to its size both in terms of the extent of information disclosure by the 
company itself (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Atiase et al, 1988) and the degree to which 
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it is followed by information intermediaries such as stockbroking analysts (Arnold 
and Moizer, 1984). As such most empirical studies agree on an inverse relationship 
between firm size and share price reaction to formal financial disclosures (Zeghal, 
1984 and Freeman, 1987). 
This study seeks to provide evidence on the incremental information content 
of four events, preliminary announcement (PA), annual report and accounts (ARA) 
annual general meeting (AGM) and interim report (IR). Particular attention is paid 
to the relative value to investors of the annual report and accounts in aggregate, a 
key issue to accounting policy makers and standard setters. Unlike earlier research; 
daily share price data is used; a traditional event study paradigm is adopted. 
Chapter Two discusses the Efficient Market Hypothesis as any work using share 
prices and abnormal returns is also a test of market "information efficiency". Chap- 
ter Three is a brief summary of informational studies germane to this study. Chapter 
Four describes the data set and methodology particular attention being paid to pa- 
rameter estimation (see Dimson and Marsh 1983,1986). Chapter Five provides the 
statistical results using daily data and comparative results using weekly data. 
Chapter Six is specifically concerned with the incremental information of the 
annual report and accounts. Tests in the previous chapter appear to confirm the 
annual report and accounts event as conveying little price-sensitive information, 
in aggregate, to the stockmarket. Nevertheless, there may well be specific price 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4 
relevant information disclosed by certain companies in their annual report and ac- 
counts, with impact swamped by the pooled firm sample, (see Standish and Ung, 
1982; Craswell, 1985; Prodham, 1986). Chapter Six seeks to identify the price- 
sensitive information contained in the annual report which may explain the greater 
share price movement of some companies. As it is not possible to determine causal- 
ity of share price movement directly, a procedure is adopted of analysing financial 
press comment on the annual report and accounts made at the time. 
In Chapter Seven the companies reflecting the highest share price movement, the 
outlier group, are matched on a one to one basis with companies with low abnormal 
returns which form a control group. The control group is subjected to the same 
analysis as described in Chapter 6. The association between information content, 
capital gearing and income cover is also investigated. 
In the final chapter the study results are summarised and discussed and the 
inplications for users of the annual report and accounts are examined. 
Chapter 2 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Capital markets exist to efficiently transfer funds between willing buyers and sellers. 
In a competitive market the equilibrium price of a security at a given point of time 
is such that the available supply of that security is equal to the aggregate demand. 
This price represents a consensus of all the participants in the market about the 
true value of that security based on all publicly available information. Or, to put 
it another way, "consensus beliefs are those beliefs which if held by everyone would 
produce the same set of prices", (Bernstein, 1975). 
The true worth of a security has been defined (Graham, Dodd and Cottle, 1962) 
as its intrinsic value; "that value justified by the facts". As Beaver (1981) pointed 
out "the term intrinsic appears to connote an objective concept, independent of 
subjective influences". Intrinsic value is generally defined as the discounted value of 
5 
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a security's future infinite stream of dividends 
so 
= 
00 Dt 
t_o 
(1) 
where So is the present value of the security, D the dividend paid at time t and k 
the market determined rate of interest. Fundamental Analysis is the usual method 
used to determine the intrinsic value, on the basis of such fundamentals as earn- 
ings, dividends, growth, capital structure and even management (Foster 1986 ch. 9). 
One of the means to evaluate these factors is the detailed analysis of accounting 
statements. This gave rise to models, such as 1 above using accounting information 
to estimate an intrinsic value. 
Beaver stated "it is unclear what is meant by the term market efficiency". In 
defining "efficient" in the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) sense, a distinction 
should be made between "efficient" as a description of the market in which share 
prices are set in a competitive environment and a broader definition which implies in 
a macroeconomic sense that share prices are established at "economically" correct 
levels which optimise capital allocation within the economy as a whole rather than 
simply within the quoted sector (Henfrey, Albrecht and Richards, 1977). It is the 
former with which the EMH is concerned. 
A definition of an efficient market appeared in Fama (1970) 
- 
"A market in 
which prices always `fully reflect' available information is called efficient". Beaver, 
however, found the words "fully reflect" and "available information" too vague. 
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He objected to the definition mainly on the ground that the term information was 
unclear as to whether it referred to every possible signal 
- 
the whole information 
system 
- 
or just to the signal under examination. He offered an alternative, more 
general definition "the securites market is said to be efficient with respect to some 
specific information if prices act as if everyone knows the information". 
George Foster (1979) associated the definition with a particular information set 
(a) "those concerned with aggregate market variables such as security returns and 
(b) those concerned with aspects of individual investors decisions, such as revision of 
portfolios". He placed Fama's definition in the former category. Foster maintained 
that knowledge regarding the relationship between individual investor behaviour 
and security prices is limited and that by implication our understanding of the 
relationship between various definitions of market efficiency is also limited. It is 
quite possible, he argues, to infer efficiency based on definition (a) and also to infer 
inefficiency based on definition (b). 
This study is concerned with individual investor decisions but in respect of the 
EMH, as an examination is made of the variable share returns, this study falls 
within Fama's market efficiency definition. 
There are many uncertainties about the future prospects of individual compa- 
nies. Because of these uncertainties the intrinsic values of shares will alter reflecting 
changes, in say the perceived earnings potential or in expected returns. Prices will 
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adjust as investors buy and sell securities based on their interpretation of new in- 
formation affecting share values. Once information is publicly available investors 
will try to buy those shares which they expect to show strong growth and dispose 
of those lacking this promise. Prices of the former shares will rise and those of the 
latter fall until equilibrium prices, the consensus prices, are reached. The paradox is 
that what keeps the market efficient is the activities of competing "decision takers 
who believe the market to be inefficient" (Henfrey et al. 1977). The real impor- 
tance of the EMH is whether it is sufficiently valid to provide a practical framework 
for studing the behaviour of share prices. The evidence in the US and in the UK 
suggests this to be the case. 
The EMH states that "new information is widely, quickly, and cheaply available 
to investors, that this information includes what is knowable and relevant for judging 
securities, and that it is very rapidly reflected in security prices" (Fama, 1970). If 
the market is efficient it is not possible to consistently obtain a better return, an 
abnormal return, than the market as a whole. Some investors do beat the market 
but the EMH holds such superior performance cannot be consistently maintained. 
In an efficient market, as each new piece of information becomes publicly available 
and is analysed, there is the possiblity of quick changes in equilibrium prices as 
they reflect the new information. The equilibrium prices will then hold until the 
next bit of information becomes available. It is the speed with which new, relevant 
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information is reflected in share prices which makes a market information - efficient. 
2.1 The Development of the Efficient Market Hy- 
pothesis 
2.1.1 The Fair Game Model 
The EMH postulates that for a market to be efficient prices must fully reflect 
information available at that time. Thus at the instant of market equilibrium share 
prices (or expected returns) will be conditional on the information available and on 
the risk associated with each security. This equilibrium condition can be expressed 
mathematically as: 
EýPit+1! #c) 
_ 
[1 + E(ri, t+il#e)lPjt, (2) 
where E (rj, t+lJ#c) is the equilibrium return on security j in period t+1. A tilde 
over a variable denotes that the variable is randomly distributed at time t. 
In conditions of market equilibrium based on the information set #, according to 
Fama (1970), it is not possible to make a profit or return in excess of the equilibrium 
expected profit or return. If 
xi, t+i = r,, t+i - E(ri, t+iI#t), (3) 
where xj, t+i is the excess market return of security j at time t+1 (it is the difference 
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between the actual return and the predicted return based on the information set # 
available at time t) and if the market is efficient and #t fully reflects the information 
on which the excess return is based, the excess return: 
E(xj, t+lI#t) =0 (4) 
Equation 3 is, therefore, a "fair game" model. One where on average, across a large 
number of samples, the expected return on an asset equals its actual return. 
In addition to the "fair game" model, two other theories of the time series 
behaviour of prices are usually associated with the EMH. They are (1) the random 
walk and (2) the martingale or submartingale. 
2.1.2 The Random Walk Model 
The random walk model is not exactly the same as either the efficient market model 
or the fair game model. Fama regarded it as "an extension of the 
... 
'fair game' 
efficient market model". The random walk model simply states that at a given 
point in time the size and direction of the next price change is random with respect 
to the total sum of knowledge available at that point of time. This does not mean 
that there is no reason or cause behind the changes. Frequently the information 
set concerning a particular security is updated and revised leading to changes in a 
share's price. An attempt has been made in this study to find the reasons or causes 
behind the changes in investors' decisions affecting individual share prices. 
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All the efficient market model implies is that the current price of a security is 
the best estimate of today's price given today's sum of knowledge. 
The conditions for random walks go beyond those for either of the other two 
models. A random walk requires all the parameters of a distribution (for example, 
mean variance, skewness and kurtosis) to be the same with or without an informa- 
tion structure, that successive rates of return are independent of one another, there 
is no serial correlation, and that they are identically distributed. If returns follow 
a random walk a fair game will result. It is, however, possible to have a fair game 
if returns are taken randomly from, say two normal distributions with zero means 
and different variances but this violates the random walk process as the drawings 
would not be taken from the same distribution. 
Notionally, the random walk model can be described as 
f (r3, t+l I#t) =f (ri, t+i), (5) 
where f (rj, t+lI#t) represents the probability distributions of returns for security j 
at time t+1 or 
Pt+i = Pt + Üt+l, (6) 
where O, the disturbance term, is an independently distributed random variable 
with E(Ut+i) =0 and Cov(Üt, Ut+, ) = 0, for states where s00. 
The model implies that the best forecast of tomorrow's return or price is today's 
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return or price and that past share price or return data are of no value in predicting 
tomorrow's return or price. 
2.1.3 The Martingale and Submartingale Models 
Given the definition of a fair game in Eq. 3 a submartingale is a fair game where 
tomorrow's share price is expected to be greater than today's price. Mathematically, 
a submartingale is 
E(pj, t+ll#t) > Pit. (7) 
This means that expected returns are positive. The model fits the description of a 
market where share prices tend to rise. 
A martingale is also a fair game with tomorrow's price expected to be the same 
as today's price. Mathematically, this is 
E(pa, t+iI#t) = P,, t (8) 
2.2 The Forms of the Efficient Market Hypothe- 
0 
sis 
By defining "relevant" information in different ways, Fama (1970) suggests three 
levels of market efficiency: the weak, the semi-strong and the strong form. 
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(a) Weak form efficiency. The information subset is past prices 
or returns. This form states that the information contained in past-share-price data 
is fully reflected in current prices. Returns in excess of the market average cannot 
be earned from a study of historical price patterns or financial ratios. 
(b) Seini-strong form efficiency. The information sub-set is 
publicly available information. Such information is speedily reflected in share prices. 
Current prices, therefore, fully reflect all public information about the company and 
excess returns cannot be made unless the investor has inside information. 
(c) Strong form efficiency. The information sub-set is all infor- 
mation whether publicly available or not. The strong form states that share prices 
not only reflect what is publicly known but also what is known only to a few. This 
form implies that because of the activities of analysts and others involved in the 
stock market, even before investors with inside information can trade based on the 
information possessed, share prices will have adjusted so that no substantial profit 
can be made from this inside information. Excess returns cannot consistently be 
made by investors who have inside or monopolistic information. 
2.3 Conditions for Market Efficiency 
(a) There are no transaction costs in trading securities; 
(b) all information is costlessly available to market participants, and 
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 14 
(c) all participants agree on the implications of current information 
for the current price and distributions of future prices of each security. 
The above assumptions are sufficient for market efficiency. It is obvious, how- 
ever, that the model is a simplification of real capital markets. Investors do incur 
transaction costs. 
There has been a considerable volume of empirical work carried out both in the 
UK and US to test the extent to which violations of the assumptions cause stock 
markets to be inefficient. Below is given a selection of tests relating to the three 
forms of market efficiency. 
2.4 Market Efficiency Tests 
2.4.1 Weak Form Tests 
Most of the research has concentrated on the weak forms of EMH with tests largely 
concerned with whether share prices follow a random walk. To do so all that is 
required is for today's price change to be completely independent of all prior prices 
in all respects. However, as pointed out by Dyckman, Downes and Magee(1975) 
the observation that large price changes tend to be followed by more large price 
changes, though not in a predictable direction, would violate the random walk, but 
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not the weak form of market efficiency. 
Evidence, therefore, that supports the random walk behaviour of security prices 
also supports the EMH. But the results which contradict the random walk do not 
necessarily contradict the EMH. 
In addition to the research findings of the UK a review of the tests carried out 
in the US are summarised below. Although the US studies, when using US data, 
cannot automatically be imputed to UK stockmarkets due to dis-similarities in the 
respective securities industries, there is sufficient similarity to enable the US tests 
to act as a guide for the UK research to follow and for comparative purposes. UK 
research has largely followed that of the US. 
Tests of the weak form can be divided into two groups. One group tries to 
prove the hypothesis by testing the degree of statistical independence of share price 
indicies and less frequently of share prices, while the other group tries to find a me- 
chanical trading rule which purports to be more profitable than a random selection 
of securities. Research in the UK largely falls into the first group with serial corre- 
lation of either price changes or differences in share price indicies as the standard 
series dependency test. Serial correlation is a measure of the association of a series 
of numbers separated by some constant period of time. 
Both Roberts (1959) and Osborne (1959) found successive price changes were 
uncorrelated whilst Kendall (1953) and Alexander (1961), both using the same 
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 16 
British indicies and weekly changes, found little serial correlation. 
A statistical weakness was noticed by Kendall and confirmed by Working (1960). 
When indicies are constructed, if the prices are not simultaneously collected spurious 
correlations may be present. There is a tendency for the movement in the index of 
one day to be repeated before actual trading starts the next day, causing a positive 
serial correlation in the index changes. Brealey (1970) using a "New Index" he 
constructed to overcome this problem, found no infringement of the random walk 
hypothesis. 
An example of the second type of test using a mechanical trading rule or filter 
test was conducted in the UK using UK indicies by Dryden (1970). The mechanical 
trading rule or filter test works by triggering buy and sell decisions when changes 
in a share's price or index reaches `x' per cent 
- 
the filter size. Dryden found some 
divergence from the random walk hypothesis. Therefore, his results obtained from 
the tests on indicies did not support the efficient market hypothesis whilst his other 
tests, based on individual shares did so. 
Dryden in his study using filter tests acknowledged he was using index num- 
bers of share prices and considered that further research was indicated to ascertain 
whether his results would extend to individual shares. Previously in the US Fama 
(1965) carried out tests which showed only small serial correlation. Using the same 
data, Fama and Blum (1966) made a filter analysis and produced results consistent 
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with prices following a random walk. 
A study which endeavoured to refute the random walk hypothesis was carried 
out by Kemp and Reid (1971) on UK individual share price changes. They said 
their results, "Strongly support the view that the random walk hypothesis has been 
over generalised". 
Their tests have not been accepted without reservations. Criticism has been 
made of their failure to take into account the effects of non-trading. In addition 
their sample seemed too small for the type of tests used and the share prices, being 
taken from the back pages of the Financial Times, are closing prices and these are 
not necessarily the ones at which one can actually deal. Nevertheless, they did reveal 
the significant effect of "no-change" data when included in tests of randomness. 
Accepting that the New York Stock Exchange is an efficient market and the US 
share price behaviour is consistent with a random walk concept, Solnik (1973) set 
out to compare the US with eight national European stock markets. Solnik found 
that only in the British market did prices behave similarly to the US stock prices 
but in all the European markets there was some departure from a random walk. 
This was more marked in daily returns but became less significant the longer the 
time interval. Solnik attributed the violations to: 
1. the thinness of the market (as compared with the US); 
2. the discontinuity of trading and 
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3. the longer time taken for the prices to adjust to new information. 
Brealey (1970) made the same observation regarding the delay in adjusting to 
new information in his study of UK price indices. Solnik's conclusions may have 
been different if he had used a more representative sample. 
A serial correlation study by Cunningham (1973) on two UK stock market in- 
dices revealed one index with sufficient predictability to formulate an investment 
strategy but only a small departure from randomness in the other. 
Evidence of non-randomness in share price behaviour was found by Girmes and 
Benjamin (1975). Similar to Solnik their results showed that the greater the time 
period between price readings the more random the price series. Generally the 
random walk shares prices tended to be. those of large companies in which there 
would be heavy dealing. For lesser known companies, whose shares would not 
be so actively traded, non-random results were obtained. Their findings can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. random share price movement was found more often in larger companies; 
2. there was a strong association between the size of a company and behaviour of 
a share; 
3. the amount of dealing in a stock affects its behaviour. 
Although the tests were thorough doubts have been raised concerning the quality 
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of the data used. These criticisms were two of those levelled at the Kemp and Reid 
study 
- 
the use of closing prices and neglect of non-trading effect. 
Spectral analysis is another technique used to find the relationship between share 
returns of different periods. It was used by Granger and Morgenstern (1963) whose 
results supported the random walk hypothesis. Ying(1966) also used the method to 
study the relationship between the direction of price movements and lagged volume 
figures. Although he found a significant relationship, Dyckman, Downes and Magee 
(1975) report that Downes replicated Ying's study but could not verify the results. 
Periodogram analysis is a test related to spectral analysis. Larson (1964) com- 
puted a periodogram for corn futures prices. Two tests using the periodogram gave 
conflicting results. Girmes and Benjamin (1975) applied periodogram analysis to 
the same daily share price data used in their previous study and found at the five 
per cent significance level only four per cent of the sample were non-random. 
A runs test sets out to examine whether the signs of successive changes in prices 
are independent. It examines the price changes to see if they exhibit a systematic 
pattern. A run is, therefore, a consecutive sequence of +'s and 
-'s where the symbols 
represent a positive and negative change respectively. There is also the no-change 
run. For stock prices there are three possible types of price changes and thus three 
different types of runs. The null hypothesis of this test is that the sequence of 
observations is random. The results of Fama (1965), Kemp and Reid (1971) and 
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Ball and Watts (1972) using run tests were mainly supportive of the random walk 
hypothesis. 
Practically all tests of the random walk model seem to indicate that past, historic 
share prices and share trading volumes do not contain any information which would 
enable the investor to obtain above-average earnings or returns. Any mechanical 
strategy used seems unable to do better than a simple buy-and-hold policy, partic- 
ularly if transaction costs are taken into account. 
2.4.2 Semi-strong Form Tests 
2.4.2.1 General Tests 
Tests of the semi-strong form of the EMH have usually taken the form of analysing 
the reaction of share prices to a financial announcement. If the semi-strong form of 
the EMH holds, and the announcement contains new information, one would expect 
the market share prices to react immediately, 
- 
there would be no time lag 
- 
and 
in an unbiased manner. There should be no possibility of an investor making an 
abnormal return after the information became public. 
This type of test was carried out by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), an 
early test of the semi-strong form. The method they used set the standard for 
much of the empirical work that followed. Fama et al. analysed the behaviour 
of abnormal price changes both before and after the announcement of stock-splits. 
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They found that "most probably" the information is almost immediately impounded 
in the share price. As predicted by the EMH, no abnormal return could be made 
based on the knowledge of the split. The work of Sasson Bar-Yosef and Lawrence 
D. Brown (1977) confirmed the findings of Fama et al. 
Scholes (191-2) studied the price reaction to secondary stock sales. Although 
there was a different reaction in the share price depending on whether the seller 
was an individual or a corporation, he found little association between the size of 
the sale and the value of the information contained in that sale. The price changes 
associated with the secondary distributions were completed in six days. The results 
gave further support to the EMH contention that the stock market reacts quickly 
to new information and in an unbiased manner. 
Another study whose results were consistent with the semi-strong form of the 
EMH was conducted by Kraus and Stoll (1972). They examined large block trades 
and their effect on share prices. To differentiate a purchase from a sale they looked 
at whether a transaction was made at above or below market price. The former 
being a purchase and the latter a sale. Where there was a fall or rise in price due to 
the block trade, it was only temporary and the share price soon recovered though 
not to its previous pre-block level. 
Grier and Albin (1973) found that a strategy of buying securities when a block 
trade was announced did not yield a profit sufficient to cover transaction costs. 
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The impact of announcements of large stock holdings in the UK was researched 
by Firth (1975). Similar to Grier and Albin, no positive investment strategy could 
be found with which to earn excess profits from using the announcement for share 
selection. On the day of the announcement there was also an increase in the number 
of bargains marked but Firth added a caveat that "the recording of bargains is an 
imperfect measure of investor activity". Sections 64 and 65 of the Companies Act 
1981 incorporated a recommendation made by Firth in his study. Any person 
acquiring an interest of any class of the voting share capital of a public company 
must notify that company within five days (previously ten days). Further research 
should reveal whether these amendments have made the market more information 
efficient. 
An interesting study of the semi-strong form was made by Firth (1972). Firth 
investigated the share recommendations of three popular UK investment analysts, 
two employed by national newspapers and the other by an investment journal, 
and other share recommendations in the UK. He concluded that although analysts 
played their part in correctly pricing securities they could not on average beat the 
market index. The information which their recommendations contained was incor- 
porated in the share prices almost immediately. Firth showed that recommended 
shares were highly correlated with the market index, mainly he suggested due to 
the number of recommended shares related to large companies and already well 
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researched. The efficient market hypothesis could not be rejected. 
Rather tentative support of the semi-strong form was given by the study of 
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978) into price changes due to temporary trading suspen- 
sions. The event "day" or "day 0" was deemed to be "the period from the close 
on the day prior to the suspension to the close on the day trading reopens". Their 
sample of 948 suspensions included 146 which were multiday suspensions. In addi- 
tion to the all suspensions group, they formed sub-groups on which tests were made. 
Although their results did not reject the semi-strong form, they suggested that if 
different criteria had been used for forming the sub-groups, other results may have 
been produced. 
Rights issues have also come under scrutiny. A UK study is that of Marsh 
(1979). The study is of interest in that Marsh used three different models, and, by 
adopting the trade-to-trade method for beta estimation, was able to use data for 
small, infrequently traded companies. 
Marsh also tested the Price Pressure Hypothesis (PPH) previously examined by 
Scholes (1972). The PPH asserts that if a company increases the number of its 
issued shares, there will be a fall in the share price. The assumption is that the 
demand for a company's shares is not elastic and therefore the demand curve would 
be downward sloping. To conform with the EMH, demand must be elastic so that 
an increase would have no effect on the share price. 
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The empirical results of the study showed that they were not wholly dependent 
on the methodology used. Marsh had difficulty in interpreting the results due to the 
pattern of the post-announcement abnormal returns but he conducted a number of 
tests to resolve the issue and concluded that the abnormal returns revealed after the 
announcement were the result of a failure to control for a factor strongly associated 
with company size and had nothing to do with the rights issue per se. Marsh found 
no evidence that the size of the issue affected share prices. A company making 
a rights issue did not have a downward sloping demand curve for its shares. He 
was unable to reject the hypothesis that in regard to rights announcements the UK 
market was efficient. Marsh thus confirmed a previous, similar UK test of the semi- 
strong form by Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) who used a smaller sample 
and did not identify the announcement dates. To test the PPH, the log of the 
size of the issue was regressed against the abnormal return over the week of the 
issue. The coefficients were not significantly different from zero. Marsh stressed the 
importance of having a large sample in his type of study, as he was able to test his 
results by using a subsample and a different methodology. 
White and Lusztig (1980), also studied the price effects of rights issues. Their 
conclusions were similar to Marsh regarding the semi-strong form of the EMH. 
A study by liess and Frost (1982) into the effect on the market of new issues 
did examine the relationship between the size of the issue and the market reaction. 
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Again their results supported the EMH, for not only did they find no evidence of 
an inverse relationship or correlation between the size of the issue and the rate of 
return, but the post-issue excess returns evident for six days after the issue date 
would not cover any transaction costs. 
The `chain letter' hypothesis, associated with mergers, states that the main 
sources of information relied on by investors are financial and accounting numbers 
which may be manipulated by accountants to mislead investors. The hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that capital markets are inefficient (see G. Mandelker, 1974). 
Mergers have, therefore, been put under the spotlight by researchers to gain some 
insight into market information efficiency. Firth (1976a) examined 190 takeovers 
of publicly quoted companies in the UK which were first announced in 1973 and 
1974. The market anticipated the mergers thirty days before the announcement 
with the largest average increase being on that day. Halpern (1973) found that in 
the US mergers were anticipated seven months before they were publicly announced. 
Firth's tests revealed the returns settling down to their normal relationship with the 
market six days after the announcement, thus giving strong support to the efficient 
market theory in the semi-strong form. 
Although the main purpose of the study was to obtain evidence regarding gains 
or losses in the UK brewery and distillery mergers between 1955 and 1972, Franks, 
Broyles and Hecht (1977) also found evidence consistent with the semi-strong form 
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of the EMH. Their study is of particular interest in that they allowed for "non- 
trading effects" by using the trade-to-trade method for the estimation of the mar- 
ket model parameters. This allowed them to use a sample which included small 
companies. When estimating the betas using all the prices the betas averaged only 
.5 approximately. Screening out all prices from the 
data which were more than 
fourteen days old raised the average beta to 
. 
533 and a further rise to 
. 
724 was 
accomplished when prices more than three days old were excluded. This indicates 
the downward bias in the estimation of betas due to the thinness of trading. 
According to their results, on average the market began to anticipate a merger 
at least three months before the announcement date. Over this period the gains 
averaged about 27% with the largest abnormal return being on the announcement 
date. After the announcement there was little opportunity for abnormal returns 
taking into account transaction costs. Almost all the gains from the mergers ac- 
crued to the shareholders of the company being acquired. They concluded that the 
movement of the share prices both before and after the announcement date showed 
that the market was fully reflecting in the share prices the benefits to be expected 
from the mergers. Related results were reported in the more general study of Firth 
(1980). He found a major transfer of wealth from the shareholders of the acquiror 
to the shareholders of the acquiree. However, the remuneration of the directors 
of the acquiror increased substantially. It should, however, be noted, that more 
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 27 
recent studies do not necessarily concur with losses to acquiror shareholders in an 
acquisition. 
2.4.2.2 Accounting Number Based Tests 
Ever since Ball and Brown (1968) studied the effect on share prices of annual earn- 
ings announcements, there have been a number of studies using financial accounting 
numbers. Investors are presumed to have already made assessments of what size 
the forthcoming accounting numbers will be and the risk attached to them. When 
the actual numbers are announced, should their assessments be affected share prices 
will change to reflect the change in expectations. 
Benston (1979), in his review of the stock market studies, cites four problems 
associated with studies of this type. First is the difficulty of determining when the 
investors first became aware of the new financial statements. The EMH states that 
for a market to be efficient, new information must be impounded into the share price 
as soon as it is publicly known. So unless the event date is known with reasonable 
accuracy, and the correct date used in the study, incorrect conclusions will result. 
This timing problem has not been taken seriously enough by some researchers. 
Most studies have concentrated on two dates; the announcement date and the date 
of publication. The inital date of announcement of the annual accounting numbers, 
or the Preliminary Announcement (PA) as it is called, usually only contains the in- 
formation necessary to comply with the requirements of the Stock Exchange. Where 
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the study is researching into specific accounting numbers used by investors, the later 
published more detailed annual report and accounts (ARA) is more relevant. 
In the US research has focused on the 10-K report filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) about the same time as the annual report and 
accounts is published (see Foster Jr. and Vickrey, 1978 for an account of the differ- 
ences between the two reports). While company directors largely control the data 
presented in the annual report and accounts to shareholders, the 10-K generally 
contains considerably more informatiomn that the annual report and accounts due 
to the SEC regulatory mandates. 
Events which occur simultaneously or around the event date create noise or 
confounding information effects, and make it difficult for the researcher to determine 
the exact effect of the' accounting numbers being studied. Then, when attempting 
to measure the change in investors' expectations, there is the added difficulty in 
measuring what the original expectations were. Finally, there is the possibility that 
accounting information released by one firm will have an impact on the share prices 
of similar type firms. 
Ball and Brown assessed the relationship of a company's annual earnings an- 
nouncement to the share price of that company when the announcement was made 
public by the Wall Street Journal. They found that of all information available 
about an individual firm, about one-half or more is captured in that year's reported 
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earnings figure; that of all the information contained by the income report only 10- 
15 per cent had not been anticipated by the time of the report; and that the reaction 
to good or bad news, measured by whether the actual earnings were in excess or 
not of the estimated earnings forecast, were as one would expect. It is important to 
note that investors are reacting to the announced annual earnings numbers, not the 
detailed annual report and accounts which are published at a later date. The study 
confirmed that the market reacted rapidly to earnings information in an unbiased 
manner consistent with the semi-strong form of the EMH. 
Beaver (1968) examined the price and volume reactions to annual earnings an- 
nouncements. Price changes, he observed, reflect changes in the market as a whole, 
whilst volume changes reflect changes in the expectations of individual investors. 
As Beaver was looking for price changes without regard to direction, he squared 
the residuals. This, unfortunately, does give a disproportionate weight to the few 
large residuals when price reactions are averaged across announcements (Oppong, 
1980). Two of Beaver's sample selection criteria led to the selection of large firms, 
the effect of which was to induce a bias against earnings reports as large companies 
are generally better researched and associated with a greater flow of information 
than small companies. His results showed that both volume and price changes were 
significantly higher in the announcement week and that "investors response appears 
to be very rapid". Both volume and share price activity quickly returned to their 
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prior announcement level, which satisfied one requirement for market efficiency. 
UK earnings announcements were also studied by Firth (1976). Firth inves- 
tigated their impact on the share prices of firms similar to that making the an- 
nouncement. Using sixty companies engaged in four activities his results showed 
that investors use the information contained in one company's results to evaluate 
similar, competing companies. Share prices in competing companies move in the 
same direction as that of the announcing company with between 50%-60% of the 
latter's share price change. Both higher dealing activity, measured by the num- 
ber of bargains recorded for each share, and a greater price change resulted and 
both took place on the day of the announcement thus giving further support to the 
semi-strong form of the EMH. 
A cosmetic change in the accounting procedure usually only comes to light on 
publication of the annual report and accounts (ARA). Although the preliminary 
announcement profit figure will reflect the change, rarely will any indication be given 
that an accounting procedure change has taken place. If the market is efficient in the 
semi-strong form, when the annual report is published there should be no significant 
reaction by the share price as investors will not have been taken in by what amounts 
to a cosmetic change and not a real change in the economic circumstances of the 
company. 
The mechanistic argument posits that the market is mislead by some accounting 
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methods (for an example see Briloff, 1972). Similarly the functional fixation view 
suggests individual investors are naive and unable to detect the true cash flow impli- 
cations of accounting data (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The extended functional 
fixation hypothesis proposed by Hand (1990) asserts that sometimes a firm's share 
price is set by either a sophisticated marginal investor or by an unsophisticated 
one. These three views are at variance with the efficient market hypothesis. Hand's 
conclusions, however, are questioned by Tinic (1990) who highlights "conceptual 
and empirical problems" in the study which need to be answered. 
Comiskey (1971) examined the impact of a change in depreciation accounting 
on the Price Earnings ratios of eleven steel companies. A switch from accelerated 
to the straight line method increases earnings, so, if the market is efficient, there 
should be a lowering in the P/E ratio of the changer. He found that investors 
were not fooled and there is a decline in the P/E ratios of those firms that made 
the change. The short-comings of his study, which Comiskey admitted, were that 
his sample came from one industry and the changers were the largest of the steel 
companies. Archibald (1972) looked at the same accounting change and came to 
the same conclusions. Again his work was criticised as he used a small sample of 
65 firms. 
If the accounting change is the only item of significance being observed, there 
may be other phenomena to which the market is reacting simultaneously with that 
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change, and the observed reaction cannot be ascribed solely to it. Unless in the 
method there are controls for the confounding events, it is usual to use a large 
sample on the assumption that the effects of the other information will be random 
with an expected value of zero (Zimmer, 1979). The assumption probably would 
not be valid for Archibald's study. 
The relationship between the changes to and from LIFO valuation for inventory 
with a firm's management changes, its industry and the firm's auditors were the 
subject of the work of Eggleton, Penman and Twombly (1976). They found an 
industry and auditor effect in a LIFO decision but only in the case where LIFO was 
discarded were there abnormal management changes. The fact that their results 
found multiple, simultaneous events to which the market was reacting confirms that 
unless such events are taken into consideration when examining accounting changes, 
the value of any conclusions reached must be downgraded. 
However, Ball (1972) used sample sizes varying between 267 to 430 accounting 
changes and in addition, to remove price movements not associated with the data 
source under study, he averaged the abnormal returns across the sample firms. His 
results were consistent with the semi-strong form of market efficiency. 
Kaplan and Roll (1972) had earlier found that share prices temporarily increased 
around the date when a firm announces, through the Wall Street Journal, earnings 
inflated by an accounting change. Ball thought the results were due to using, in one 
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case, a small sample drawn mainly from two industries thus giving rise to industry 
effects. In the larger sample they used, the accounting changes were clustered in a 
very short period and the results may have been affected by coinmunalities. Cassidy 
(1976) replicated the Kaplan and Roll study as well as using other models, but was 
unable to reach the same conclusions as they did. His results upheld the EMI. 
A more recent UK study by Brayshaw (1985) also examined the market response 
to inflation-adjusted accounts. No effect was found and the market was judged to 
have already discounted any information the accounts contained. 
The empirical studies of the behaviour of share prices on replacement cost dis- 
closure by Beaver, Christe and Griffin (1980), Ro (1980), Gheyara and Boatsman 
(1980) and Watts and Zimmerman (1980) were virtually unanimous in their inabil- 
ity to detect any significant association between security prices and the disclosure. 
There was little reaction around the date when the requirement was proposed, on 
the date the requirement became effective and lastly on the date when the replace- 
ment cost data was filed with the S. E. C. Different methodologies were used by the 
researchers adding weight to their findings. Ro, however, drew attention to the "size 
effect" problem. When using a control sample it should be matched in all respects 
(e. g. size, industry, risk etc. ) with the sample being tested. 
Banz (1981) and Reiganum (1981) both reported a substantial "size effect" on 
the share returns. Dimson and Marsh (1985) deliberately set out to test the size 
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effect. Their results were sensitive to both the choice of index and methodology. The 
size effect, they concluded, may explain some of the differences between conflicting 
studies. Unless the size effect is taken into account in the methodology where the 
following four factors are present, the results will be distorted. These factors are (1) 
returns calculated over long interval periods (studies using daily data would only 
slightly be affected), (2) size mis-matching 
- 
where the event securities are larger or 
smaller than the typical constituents of the index used, (3) where the size effect is 
large and/or volatile 
- 
event studies covering short periods or carried out in countries 
where the market equity value is represented mainly by a few companies are most 
likely to be affected by bias, and (4) CAPM-type methodologies are used. Although 
they found that CAPM-type methodologies were more prone to the size effect than 
the market model, they urged all researchers to estimate abnormal returns using a 
methodology which explicitly controls for size. 
Beaver et al. (1980) reported that their entire non-reporting (control) group con- 
tained "large" firms as defined by Banz and that the returns for the control firms 
were lower than the reporting group, although the differences between the returns 
of the two groups were statistically insignificant. The failure to control for the "size 
effect" does flaw the results of the three replacement cost studies mentioned above. 
One of the problems associated with testing the information content of dividends 
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is that dividend announcements are often closely made with earnings announce- 
ments. Both dividends and earnings are assumed to have important information 
concerning the future prospects of the firm, so when such announcements are made 
the information conveyed should, in an efficient market, be quickly reflected in the 
share price changes. 
Aharony and Swary (1980) using quarterly dividend and earnings announce- 
ments made in the same quarter but on different dates, found that quarterly div- 
idend disclosures did provide useful information over and above that provided by 
quarterly earnings figures. Where prices reacted to the information, almost all of 
the adjustment occurred on the dividend announcement day and the day previous. 
Their findings added further support to the semi-strong form. 
The intraday speed of adjustment of stock prices and dividend announcements 
was examined by Patell and Wolfson (1984). Patell and Wolfson pointed out two 
important differences in dividend and earnings announcements. Whereas dividend 
announcements may not be accompanied by the announcement of any other in- 
formation, earnings announcements usually are. Second, the most likely expected 
dividend amount for the current year is last year's dividend amount, therefore, if 
it changes there is an additional element of surprise. Earnings very rarely are the 
same from year to year. The first difference did not allow the researchers to reach 
any conclusions about the relative information content of earnings and dividends 
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per se. 
Their tests showed that within a few minutes of the earnings and dividends 
announcements there was a reaction but the opportunity for profitable trading 
disappeared in five to ten minutes. This train of events is consistent with the semi- 
strong form of the EMH. Whilst unchanged dividends had no effect on prices, where 
the dividend did change the price reaction was similar to the earnings announcement 
effect both in length of time and size. 
2.4.3 Strong-form Tests 
The strong-form of the EMH is the most controversial of the three forms. It asserts 
that not only is all public information reflected in share prices but all available 
information affecting the company is impounded in its share price, and that no 
investor can obtain a higher return than other investors based on his superior or 
private information. The strong-form is probably impossible to prove conclusively. 
Testing this form of market efficiency is difficult as first it is necessary to establish 
who is likely to have private, price sensitive information which has not already 
been discounted. The obvious candidates are the managers of unit trusts, share 
tipsters and company directors. Managers of unit trusts and share tipsters claim 
that through their superior skills and knowledge they can obtain for their clients 
abnormal returns. Directors usually engage in share dealing for personal benefit. 
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Although the EMH in its strong-form may not be strictly true in practice, never- 
the-less tests have been carried out on the three types of investors mentioned earlier 
to see whether any of them have made larger than average profits from their transac- 
tions. The first authorative work was conducted by Jensen (1968) in the US on 115 
mutual funds. Taking into account management fees and other charges, Jensen's 
work showed that an investor in a mutual fund would get a poorer return than by 
investing in a randomly selected portfolio of comparable risk, so providing "strong 
evidence in support of that (the strong-form) hypothesis". 
Virtually the complete population (118) of authorised UK unit trusts as at 31 
December 1965 was analysed by Moles (1982) over the period 1966 to 1975. The 
benefit to investors in unit trusts was found not to be abnormal returns as the trusts 
could not better the market on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Davies and Canes (1978) examined the effect on share prices when analysts' 
recommendations are published in the Wall Street Journal, having previously been 
sent to their private clients. The policy of the journal's column writer was to seek 
out cases where analysts had recently revised their recommendations. No editorial 
comment was made on the recommendation although, according to Davies and 
Canes, "The opinions of the analysts often are published with comments solicited 
from the corporation involved". The researchers attached no weight to that opinion. 
If the market is strong-form efficient the publication of the analysts' tips should have 
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no effect on the prices of the shares recommended as the market prices have already 
impounded all the information when the recommendations were received by the 
private clients. The results of Davies and Canes showed that both purchase and 
sell recommendations affected the share price, the former by less than 1 per cent on 
publication date and the latter by 
-2.374 per cent. Although the percentagees are 
small, tests showed them to be significant. 
Davies and Canes did concede that as on publication more than one analyst 
made a recommendation to buy or sell the same stock, the reader of the journal 
might only be aware of the opinion of the analyst to which he subscribed, and the 
other opinions were new information. A test confirmed this possibility. The price 
adjustment continued for a further two post-announcement days but the percentages 
involved were too small to allow any profitable trading. 
On the basis of their results they argued that the market was efficient in the 
semi-strong form as on publication the information was quickly impounded into the 
share prices and, taking into account transaction costs, there was no possibility of 
an investor earning an abnormal profit. Their study did not support the strong 
form as the information revealed to the private clients was not fully incorporated 
in the share prices. Contrary to other studies, they said that investors were getting 
some value for their money. 
Surprisingly, the researchers do not seem to have examined whether the opinion 
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expressed by management carried any weight with investors. Hoskin, Hughes and 
Ricks (1986) found strong market reaction to company officer comments on the 
prospects of their company. It is possible that the analysts' opinions were already 
known to the investors but not that of management to which the investors reacted. 
The small number of recommendations published without the management's opin- 
ions may have made such a test impracticable. 
An interesting and comprehensive UK study was made by Dimson and Marsh 
(1985a) of the forecasting ability of stockbrokers and the internal analysts of an 
institution. It was in their words "a prospective study of forecasting ability". The 
stockbrokers accounted for 80% of those making recommendations which mainly 
had a one year horizon. The results did not support the strong-form of market 
efficiency as there was evidence that the recommendations were useful but what 
share price reaction there was, was rapid and over within one month. 
Journalists will probably, in addition to public information, use private knowl- 
edge when making share recommendations. Dimson and Marsh (1986) analysed 
862 UK press recommendations to check whether they provided useful information 
to investors. If account is taken of the selection date and the publication of the 
selection which is made some days later, the abnormal return at the end of the 
publication month was only 4 per cent, which would be absorbed by transaction 
costs. Although the researchers attributed the abnormal returns to the journalists' 
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selection skills, when published the recommendations were of no value to investors. 
Returns were also found to be very sensitive to the size factor mentioned earlier. 
Rates of return earned by members of companies trading on their own account 
in their companies' shares were evaluated by both Pratt and De Vere (1968) and 
Finnerty (1976). Although excess returns were earned by both insider-buyers and 
insider-sellers, the former outperformed the latter in the study of Pratt and De Vere. 
Unfortunately this work has certain defects. Between 1960-66, the period over which 
transactions were extracted, no price per share for each transaction or precise date 
of the insider trading was reported to the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
until 1965. Finnerty also criticised the study for selection bias and failure to make 
explicit adjustment for risk. The time period for Finnerty's research ran from 1969 
to 1972; he used practically the whole population of "insider" dealings in that period 
and he used a risk adjusted model. His results, like the earlier work, tended to refute 
the strong-form. 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) studied insider trading prior to takeover announce- 
ments. Using daily share prices and the market model, they examined the price 
movements of 194 shares of companies eventually taken over. They found that 
trading on insider information seemed to start 25 days prior to the announcement 
date with about half of the total increase in share prices occurring before that date. 
There was substantial trading in the five to eleven days immediately prior to the 
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announcement. Their study also revealed a substantial increase in trading volume 
of the shares of aquired firms. Although the strong-form of the EMH did not hold, 
their results did support the semi-strong form as most of the price reaction occurred 
on the announcement day with a smaller reaction the day after. Keown and Pinker- 
ton attributed the one day longer price adjustment to some public announcements 
being made after the market was closed. 
2.5 Evidence Which Questions the Efficient Mar- 
ket Hypothesis 
It would be wrong to make a survey of the tests of the EMH in its various forms 
and leave the impression that it is only the strong-form where there are studies 
inconsistent with the EMH. 
Basu (1977) used price-earnings ratios to establish whether excess returns could 
be earned using price-earnings as indicators of future performance. If this were 
possible it would violate the EMH. No excess profits should be earned on publicly 
available information. His methodology, which covered risk, found evidence of excess 
returns being earned by investors over the period April 1957 
- 
March 1971, due 
to new information regarding P/E ratios not being quickly and fully reflected in 
share prices. Portfolios consisting of securities with low P/E ratios out-performed 
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securities with high P/Es. Traders and speculators, on the other hand, after taking 
into account costs, could not earn "abnormal" returns and for them the market was 
efficient. 
Brown (1978) examined the market adjustment to companies annual earnings 
announcements in the years from 1963 to 1971. His results indicated that the market 
took 45 market days after the announcement to absorb the information contained 
therein. Excess returns, which exceeded transactions costs, could be earned by 
purchasing those individual securities which had not instantaneously adjusted to 
the new information. The market, he suggested, was inefficient. 
Using quarterly earnings data, Watts (1978) observed market inefficiences in the 
1962-1965 period but not in the later period from 1965-1968. The excess returns in 
the early period could only be earned by someone who was exempt from transaction 
costs. To explain the difference in the efficiency classifications of the two periods, 
he suggested that although the market was inefficient from 1962-1968 it learned 
over time. The inefficiency in the early period probably explained Brown's results 
as Brown's years (1963-1971) incorporated nearly all of Watt's early period (1962- 
1968). 
To establish whether the market did become more efficient in the early sixties, 
Nichols and Brown (1981) using the same data as Brown, re-examined his study. 
They partitioned his period into an early period (1963-1967) and a late period 
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(1968-1971). The results for the two periods did not allow a definitive conclusion 
to be reached. 
In two studies of stock splits, Charest (1978) and Nichols (1978) also found 
market inefficiencies. Charest applied five trading rules (A-E) on the announcement 
of the stock splits and observed that the highest excess returns could be earned by 
trading rule B. The trading rules were classified by the length of time the sampled 
security was held after the announcement month. The excess returns occurred 
largely in the period 1956 to 1960. 
Nichols and Brown (1981) applied trading rules B and D (the rule with the 
longest period of holding) to the Nichols's data for the years 1960 
-1975. Again 
they sub-divided the period into two 
- 
1960 to 1967 and 1968 to 1975. Unlike the 
Charest study, market inefficiency was found only in the sub-period 1968-1975 using 
trading rule B and the supporting evidence was "not overwhelming". 
The diversity of the results can probably be attributed to the methods of sample 
selection and the methodologies used. 
Shiller (1981,1986) argued that if share price movements do forecast dividends 
as suggested by the efficient markets literature, then the volatility of prices and 
dividends over time should be similar. Shiller found share prices exhibited "excess 
volatility", which he attributed mainly to the market being "irrational and subject 
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to fads". The work of Kliedon (1986), however, calls into question Shiller's conclu- 
sions. Kliedon states that Shiller "confuses expectations with ex post outcomes". 
The difference in volatility is due to actual prices reflecting the value of expected 
dividends whilst Shiller's dividend series uses the present values of the ex post out- 
comes. Thus changes in share prices will occur as future dividend expectations 
change but no revision in the ex post dividend can take place as Shiller's series is 
based on ex post dividends. Shiller admits he does not know whether dividends 
follow a random walk (Marsh and Merton, 1986) and accepts "that if the dividend 
is a random walk, the simple variance inequalities that I derived would not be valid" 
(Shiller, 1986). 
Examples of market inefficiency and excess returns are attributed to the writings 
of Abraham Briloff. Professor Briloff, using information which appeared to be al- 
ready in the public domain, describes a number of cases where the market appeared 
to have been misled by accounting methods and disclosure policies in company 
reports with consequently firms' shares being incorrectly priced. Accounting for 
employee compensation, use of pooling accounting for acquisitions, consideration 
paid for acquisitions, understatement of costs etc. were criticised by Briloff. There 
was on average a permanent 8-11% drop in share price on the day such Briloff 
articles became publicly available (Foster, 1985). 
The stock market reaction to asset writedowns, per se, should be similar to other 
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bookkeeping adjustments. Investors will not be fooled and there will be no signif- 
icant reaction. Strong and Meyer (1987) discovered that usually asset writedowns 
are associated with management changes and that the larger the writedown the 
greater the excess return. In the ten days following the announcement, contrary to 
expectations, they observed a 3.89 per cent statistically significant abnormal return 
indicating a failure of the semi-strong form of market efficiency. 
A. V. Thaker(1987) in his discussion of the work drew a parallel with the findings 
on stock splits. He said he observed little evidence of market inefficiency. The 
abnormal returns were not due to asset writedowns themselves, but to the signals 
they were giving to investors of the restructuring to come. The stronger the signal, 
as evidenced by the larger writedowns, the greater the price reaction. 
A failure of the semi-strong form was indicated by the results of Murdock (1986). 
Previously Beaver and Landsman (1983) had concluded that historical cost data had 
highly significant incremental information content compared with accounting data 
prepared on alternative bases e. g. current cost and constant dollar etc. They defined 
information content "as the ability to explain changes in share prices". Murdock 
employed this definition in his research. Using returns on equity rather than simple 
returns, he set out to establish whether returns on equity calculated from purchasing 
power and three other accounting methods, had incremental information beyond 
returns on equity calculated from historical cost data. If the semi-strong form of 
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the EMH held, then there should be no significant incremental information. Only 
purchasing power returns on equity possessed incremental information beyond that 
provided by historical cost returns on equity which was inconsistent with the market 
being information efficient. 
A recent study by Pope, Morris and Peel(1990) analysed directors' share dealings 
in Great Britain. They reported results suggesting an investment strategy based 
on knowledge of directors' share sales could, in the absence of bid-ask spreads and 
transaction costs, be profitable. They suggested this indicated an informationally 
inefficient market. 
2.6 Summary 
The market efficiency studies cited above are only a few taken from a number 
which have raised doubts about the validity of the EMH. The Dychman and Morse 
(1986) and Lev and Ohlson (1982) reviews of the empirical evidence of informational 
market efficiency contain many more studies which question and support the EMH. 
Most major research has come down in support of the semi-strong form which 
implies acceptance of the weak-form though the evidence is not conclusive. But as 
Morris, Peel and Pope (1986) point out, the knowledge gained from informational 
market efficiency research can provide some evidence as to whether there is any real 
value to investors for the evaluation of securities in legislation which seems to be 
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more concerned with the extent and form of disclosure than with its substance. 
Chapter 3 
Informational Studies 
The study of Ball and Brown (1968) established that earnings announcements have 
information content highly prized by investors to determine security prices. Since 
that paper researchers have not only looked at the information content of financial 
statements but at alternative public, price sensitive information to gauge its impact 
on share prices. The studies have revealed the type of information to which prices 
react and the strength of the reaction. The next step was to ask investors, financial 
analysts and others concerned with the security market, which of the many infor- 
mation signals becoming available did they use in their pricing of shares and the 
weight they attached to them. Some of the studies examined both for information 
content and to see whether the EMH is supported. There are examples of these in 
the previously quoted tests of the semi-strong form of the EMH. Given below is a 
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brief summary of research studies important to this work. The studies are grouped 
under headings related to their findings. Some studies constitute tests of several 
hypotheses so they may be listed under more than one heading. 
3.1 Factors Affecting Information Content 
Before looking at the event studies carried out by researchers to identify information 
useful for share revaluation purposes, it is helpful to set out the factors which 
Foster (1986, page 376) thought necessary to be present if releases are to contain 
information useful for this purpose. There are three in all. 
Usually there will be uncertainty about the content or timing of a company 
release. In general, the more the uncertainty surrounding these two items "the 
greater the potential for a release to cause a revision in security prices". This 
uncertainty will be greater when there are few competing sources of information. 
There are many types of releases made by firms and, as he points out, one type 
of release, for example, relating to strikes, can effect market expectations of the 
content and timing of other releases, such as production-sales. 
Unless a release has an impact on "future cash flows (or other attributes valued 
by the capital market)", they will have a minimal information content. In general, 
according to Foster, "... the larger the relative revision in expected cash flows, the 
larger the security price revaluation of the release". It is these "other attributes - 
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valued by the capital market" which some researchers have endeavoured to find. 
Lastly the more the market accepts the veracity of the information source the 
greater the revaluation potential of the release. 
These three factors can be summarised in Foster's words as: 
1. The capital market's expectations as to the content and timing of the release. 
2. The implications of the release for the distribution of security returns. 
3. The credibility of the information source. 
This study is concerned with the information content of the annual report and 
accounts and not with its timing. However, as when those outlier companies with 
large residuals on annual report announcement are analysed there may be some 
reference in press comments to the timing of the release, event studies concerning 
the effect of the timeliness of the release on information content, will be briefly 
touched on. 
3.2 Timeliness 
Timeliness of financial information plays an important part in the decision-making 
process of investors. Beaver (1968) remarked that investors may delay their invest- 
ment transactions until the earnings report is published. If this is true, then the 
timeliness of the earnings report is important as it affects the market in a security. 
Bad news is reported late and very bad news very late is popularly held as a truism. 
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It is not surprising then that researchers have endeavoured to find out whether there 
is a relationshiip between the timeliness of an event and share price movement. 
Dyer and McHugh (1975) examined the timeliness of various stages leading up 
to the publication of the annual report and accounts for 120 Australian industrial 
and commercial companies and whether timeliness is related to company size. Their 
main conclusions were that although large firms take less time to report than small 
firms, probably due to greater resources and receiving closer scrutiny from interested 
parties, there was no difference in the timeliness of `good' or `bad' news. `Good news' 
and `bad news' was defined as the relative rate of return on equity capital. This 
latter result was confirmed by Garsombke (1977). 
Share price reaction to the interim report and preliminary announcement was 
shown by Chambers and Penman (1984) not to be related to the lag time between 
expected and actual report date except for relatively small firms reporting timely 
interim good news. Despite the length of time taken to publish the earnings figures, 
when made public the reports contain information not anticipated through other 
sources. Contrary to Firth(1981), they observed that the interim report had a 
greater price reaction that the preliminary announcement. 
Their results revealed that reports published earlier than expected generally 
contained good news and tend to have a greater price reaction relative to those 
published on time or later than expected. A report not published on its expected 
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day is interpreted as a signal of bad news and there is a price effect on the expected 
report day continuing nearly until the day of publication, when there is little price 
reaction. 
As previously shown, on average small firms report later than large firms and 
there is usually a greater share price reaction to their reports. In addition, for tech- 
nical reasons, in the US investors are more able to profit from `good news' than from 
`bad news', so probably more `good news' information becomes available relative to 
`bad news' prior to the publication of a report. Holding both size and nature of the 
news(good or bad) constant, Chambers and Penman found no relationship between 
lag and price effects except, as before, for small firms reporting timely, good news. 
The conclusions of these studies are largely consistent with Foster's first factor. 
There is more uncertainty associated with the releases of small firms as they do not 
get the coverage of the larger companies, so in their releases there is the potential for 
greater share price movement particularly if they are not published on the expected 
date. 
3.3 Firm Size 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) concluded that small firms, measured by total assets or 
number of stockholders, did not provide adequate disclosure of information in their 
annual reports to shareholders. Generally these firms were the less profitable ones 
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measured either by net profit margin or rate of return. The adequacy of disclosure 
was also related to whether the company was listed on a stock exchange and who 
were its auditors. 
Believing that the work of Singhvi and Desai had defects, Buzby (1975), using 
asset size, examined the degree of association between information disclosed by US 
manufacturing firms and their size. He found a "moderate" positive association 
which was not affected by whether the firm was listed or not. His results were not 
consistent with those of Singhvi and Desai. As Buzby's measure of disclosure was 
related to 39 items of data required by financial analysts to be shown in annual 
reports, different items and inclusion of other than manufacturing firms in the data 
base, and another surrogate for size, might have produced the different results. 
The paper of Verrecchia (1979) drew researchers' attention to using the market 
value of a firm as a surrogate for size and market participation. Other measures of 
market participation suggested were trading volume, number of shareholders and 
number of shares. Using these participation measures Verrecchia suggested that the 
greater the number of traders in a security, the more efficiently it will be priced. It 
follows that the shares of large, closely followed firms will be more efficiently priced 
than small firms. 
Firth (1979) found no association between the firm's auditors and the level of 
disclosure though his results supported the other conclusions of Singhvi and Desai 
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relating to the size of the company and whether the firm had a stockmarket listing. 
Using a two-day report period, Chambers and Penman (1984) also found an 
inverse relationship between firm size and the information content of its report, 
measured by the change in share price. 
Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), and Dimson and Marsh (1986), all reported 
a relationship between the size of the firm and the excess return earned by its 
stock, and, similar to Chambers and Penman, Banz found that size and return were 
negatively correlated. 
A further study was made by Firth (1981) using market capitalisation as sug- 
gested by Verrecchia. Firth found a negative association between size and returns 
generated by the preliminary announcement, interim report and annual report and 
accounts but not for the annual general meeting. The smaller the firm the larger the 
information content of the three releases which agrees with Verrecchia's findings. 
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982) reported large firms making a higher level of 
disclosure than small firms and Zeghal(1984) also reported an inverse relationship 
between firm size and the informational content of financial statements. 
Size, however, was considered by Haw and Ro (1990) not in itself to convey earn- 
ings information but to be a proxy for firm specific information variables. While 
they acknowledged a "number of limitations in the study", they concluded that 
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATIONAL STUDIES 55 
when consideration is taken of earnings releases reporting lags and industry mem- 
bership, "the firm size effect is minimal". 
Another aspect of the size effect emerges from studies of investor over-reaction 
to current, uncertain information. These studies appear to be related to the mean- 
reversion phenomenon. Share prices, including those of the UK, are said to have 
positive serial correlation over the short term and negative correlation over longer 
periods. That is, over the long term prices revert to their mean; prices are mean- 
reverting (Poterba and Summers, 1988). 
Studies which appear to be related to mean-reversion behaviour are those of 
Howe (1986) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985,1987). All produced similar re- 
suits. De Bondt and Thaler report that over a three year period a prior period's 
worst share return performers (losers) outperformed prior period winners. However, 
Zarowin (1990) re-examined De Bondt and Thaler's evidence and concluded that 
their results did not arise from investor over-reaction, except in the month of Jan- 
uary due probably to tax loss selling, but from the size phenomenon. When losers 
are smaller than winners, losers outperform winners. When winners and losers are 
matched for size, there is little evidence of any return difference. 
A UK study by Power, Lonie and Lonie (1991) produced results similar to 
those of De Bondt and Thaler but a note in the article indicates the paper was 
written before the Zarowin study was published. The Power et al. conclusions must, 
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therefore, be treated as tentative particularly as Brailsford (1992) found no evidence 
of the winner/loser effect in the Australian equity market. Moreover, Brailsford 
found no significant difference in average size of winners and losers consistent with 
the results of Zarowin. 
Contrary to Chang (1988) who found only the winner portfolio experienced 
a price reversal, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) observed extreme negative rates of 
return followed by larger than average positive returns over the two days following 
the event which is inconsistent with the EMH. 
The empirical evidence is generally strongly suggestive of a firm size effect. This 
needs to be taken into account explicitly in this study. 
3.4 Earnings 
Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver (1968) and Foster (1973) all found annual earnings 
announcements contained information. 
The work of Oppong(1980) is of interest not only for its results but also for its 
methodology. Oppong investigated the methodological problems associated with 
the clustering of annual earnings announcements and firm size on studies examining 
the information content of earnings reports. Oppong used only firms which had 
a December 31 year end. A large number of firms have 31 December as their 
year end and they are sometimes excluded from studies of information content 
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATIONAL STUDIES 57 
(e. g. Beaver, 1968 and May, 1971). The reason is that their preliminary announcements 
are generally made in the first quarter of the following year. Such heavy clustering 
of announcements may lead to high correlation between the residuals of those firms 
in the same industry due to the first firm's announcement affecting the market 
return. Firth(1976) confirms the importance of the industry factor in generating 
such co-movements. 
The clustering problem is not exclusive to the US. Barron(1984) reported 41% 
of UK companies in 1981 as having a December 31 year end. 
Firms with a December 31 year end tend to be large so there is probably a bias 
against the earnings report containing information as large firms are followed more 
closely by financial analysts and others than are small firms. 
As a measure of information content, Oppong used Vt = U" where Uztj is the 
.t 
absolute value of the residual U=t in the report week t, and 1Ü11 is the mean of the 
residuals or abnormal returns j Ujt j for the non-report period. If the announcement 
contains information Vt will be greater than one. Oppong also used the measure 
adopted by Beaver, which was to square the report week residual and divide by 
the sample variance of the non-report period residuals. Oppong maintained that 
squaring the residuals gives greater weight to a few large residuals when price an- 
nouncements are averaged across announcements. His results confirmed that the 
Vt measure was a more reliable indicator of information content than that used 
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by Beaver. Only the report week had a Vt value greater than one but it was not 
significant. A majority of the annual earnings announcements of the sampled firms 
had no information content. Although his tests showed clustering not to be a se- 
rious problem, it could not be ruled out entirely. Nor could the study be used as 
evidence to support the size effect as the issue was not directly examined. The 
results, however, did point in that direction. 
A study similar to that of Beaver (1968) was conducted by Morse (1981). Using 
daily share price and volume data he examined the market reaction to the an- 
nouncement of quarterly earnings in The Wall Street Journal. To circumvent the 
bias introduced by thin trading, his sample was limited to securities which were 
" 
traded relatively frequently. No reaction was observed by Morse until day minus 
one. The reaction then continued for a few days after the announcement. The 
market adjusted quickly but not instantaneously. Morse attributed the reaction on 
day minus one to the earnings figures being released on that day through different 
medium. 
Reported earnings were found by Lipe (1986) not to fully explain the variation 
in returns around the release date. Decomposition of earnings provided a small 
but significant amount of information which would be lost if only earnings were 
reported. 
Stice (1991) studied the market reaction to 10-K filings when followed by Wall 
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Street Journal(WSJ) quarterly earnings announcements. Usually the WSJ an- 
nouncement precedes the 10-K filing. His results suggest that contrary to the 
findings of Foster and Vickrey (1978), on average, there is no significant market 
reaction at the SEC filing date whereas there is at the WSJ date. The results, Stice 
indicated, were consistent with earnings announcements having information content 
and that information in the SEC disclosure is not fully reflected in prices until a 
subsequent disclosure in a different medium is made. 
The conflicting results of Stice and Foster and Vickrey for the 10-K filing are 
probably attributable to the different sample selection criteria. Stice's sample com- 
prised 211 mainly small firms experiencing financial difficulties which probably ac- 
counts for the untimely, significantly delayed WSJ announcement. Also the firms 
were not closely followed by analysts. The Foster and Vickrey sample comprised 
96 mainly manufacturing firms, which, they suggested were widely followed by an- 
alysts, therefore, the firms were probably mainly large. The different results are 
consistent with investors in small companies being mainly unsophisticated while 
the converse is true for large companies. 
3.5 Dividends 
Dividend announcements provide information incremental to earnings announce- 
ments with significant market reaction occurring on the announcement day and the 
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day previous (Aharony and Swary, 1980). 
Dividend announcements are said to be signals by management about future 
prospects of the firm. Dielman and Oppenheimer (1984) examined the excess re- 
turns of firms increasing or decreasing their dividends by at least 25%, or omitting 
or resuming dividend payments. With the exception of the 25% decrease, excess 
returns were found over the ten day period prior to the announcement particularly 
for resumptions and omissions. Unlike Aharony and Swary (1980), although on the 
announcement day there was a large reaction so was there on the day following, 
and apart from the omissions group, price adjustment, on a small scale, continued 
for about a month. Bad news contained in omissions and decreases resulted in the 
largest excess returns. The longer a firm had gone before previously omitting its 
dividend, the larger the impact. Like other researchers they admitted they could 
not determine the actual time of the announcement. The announcement may have 
been made on the assumed day after the market had closed hence the large excess 
returns on announcement day plus one for all four groups. 
3.6 The Audit Function 
A significant reduction in share prices for one day only after the release of the report 
was found for the following qualifications; asset value, going concern and general. 
There was no reaction to unqualified audit reports (Firth, 1978). 
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Dyer and McHugh (1975), Firth (1978), Whittred (1980) and Garsombke (1981) 
have between them shown that the audit function can delay the publication of an 
annual report and accounts and where the audit report is a qualified one, the more 
severe the qualification the longer the delay before publication. 
3.7 Specific Types of Accounting Numbers 
The types of accounting numbers studied can be illustrated by the study of Hoskin, 
Hughes and Ricks (1986). They examined a number of disclosures made concur- 
rently with annual earnings, i. e. US preliminary announcements, to assess whether 
the former had information content additional to that signalled by the announce- 
ment of earnings per se. The study is of interest not only for its findings but for 
the comments by L. D. Brown (1986) on the evidence supporting the conclusions and 
methodology, as his observations apply to other, similar works of this kind. 
Hoskin et al. found that the market reacted specifically to earnings components 
e. g. accounting changes, LIFO adoptions, and firm segmental operating results, also 
particularly to dividend increases, company officer comments on the firm's future 
prospects and to prospective operating data, for example, orders, contracts, capital 
spending etc. As previous research had found, there was no incremental information 
in stock splits. Disclosures, they maintained, made in addition to the earnings 
announcement, per se., had statistical incremental information even after controlling 
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for the combined effects of dividend increases, stock splits and earnings. 
Brown asked why if non-earnings information was of interest the study was 
restricted to disclosures made concurrently with earnings. The sample could have 
been larger and the focus, on the items under study, sharper, if disclosures on 
nonearnings dates had been analysed. Also why use a two-day holding period when 
Patell and Wolfson (1984) had shown that the market adjusts to earnings and 
dividend announcements within five to ten minutes, and they, Hoskin et al. had 
the time (hour and minute) of the announcements. There were other shortcomings 
mentioned which rather weakened the findings. 
A different approach was made by Board and Walker (1990). They examined 
the relationship of two measures of accounting rates of return, return on capital 
employed and return on opening market value, with abnormal returns over 18 years. 
They found significant variation in the relationship which they attributed partly to 
inflation. 
Non-earnings annual report numbers were also shown by Ou (1990) to contain 
information useful to investors. 
3.7.1 Segmental Data 
Assuming the most important single factor for the evaluation of a share price was 
the firm's stream of future earnings, then if the disclosure of segmental data assisted 
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investors in predicting future earnings, where diversified firms disclosed segmental 
data the fluctuations of their share prices should lessen due to the investor being 
better informed. Kochanek (1974) did a literature review to find those segmental 
items considered useful for investment purposes. The validity of his results rested on 
whether the firms were correctly classified as "good" or "poor" segmental reporters. 
The results did suggest that the disclosure of segmental data was useful in predicting 
future earnings and did help to lower the share price variability over time although 
there were more important factors in explaining price changes. It could be argued 
that larger firms are more diversified etc. and thus have more to disclose. 
A later study by Salaman and Dhaliwal (1980) showed that large (defined by 
asset size) diversified firms voluntarily disclosed segmental sales and earnings data 
more often than their smaller counterparts. Those firms that did so were most likely 
to raise capital through the capital market. 
Similar results are recorded by Swaminathan (1991) who in addition found that 
mandated segment data disclosure increased price variability around the release 
dates of the 10-K directly proportional to the number of segments. 
3.7.2 Asset Revaluations 
Noise from other signals, such as increased earnings, increased dividends and bonus 
issues plus a small sample makes the Australian study of Sharpe and Walker (1975) 
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less than satisfactory. They found that asset revaluations, an accounting change, 
had significant information content. A UK study by Standish and Ung(1982) sug- 
gested that revaluation alone did not produce a significant market reaction unless 
accompanied by other favourable signals. They also found that the abnormal return 
was not related to the size of the revaluation. More weight can be given to this 
piece of work as the sample was larger than that of Sharpe and Walker. Also 202 
of the 232 companies used in the study reported their revaluations at the time of 
the annual report and accounts when dividends are not usually announced and the 
earnings figure has already been made public in the preliminary announcement. 
3.7.3 Extraordinary Items 
In the annual report and accounts certain items classified as "extraordinary" have 
to be separately disclosed. Gonedes(1975) showed that it was not the type of the 
disclosed special item which conveyed information but whether the item increased 
or decreased reported income. 
3.8 Strength or Relative Strength of Event Signal 
Firth (1981) researched the relative strength of four releases by 120 firms in the UK. 
The events were the preliminary announcement(PA), the publication of the annual 
report and accounts(ARA). the annual general meeting(AGM), and the half yearly 
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interim report(IR). To overcome the thin-trading problem, firms used in the sample 
had to have a market capitalisation of over LlOm. 
Using weekly data for three years, 1976 to 1978, the information content of the 
events was measured in two ways. First using abnormal returns calculated by the 
Fama et al. (1969) method and second with volume of shares traded and deals 
transacted in the firm's shares. 
Researchers in the US have shown a definite relationship between an increase in 
volume and movement in share price. But even in the US where volume data is more 
readily available than in the UK, Dyckman, Downes and Magee (1975) point out 
that there is still a serious accuracy problem. The published data does not include 
the substantial volume of transactions executed outside the regular markets. These 
transactions vary with different stocks. This makes the conclusions drawn from 
volume analysis open to doubt. How much more difficult is it then to draw valid 
conclusions from results using UK volume data? The situation in 1991 may have 
changed with electronic trading on the UK Stock Exchange. 
Firth admitted "Because dealing information is not published by the United 
Stock Exchange, estimates had to be obtained from firms of jobbers". The fact 
that Firth was able to obtain estimates, however inaccurate, from jobbers may well 
have been because the firms in his sample were large companies about which jobbers 
would have more accurate and easily available information than for small firms. 
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An event in the study was deemed to have information content if the weekly 
residual (abnormal return) on the event day was greater than the average of the 
non-event days, the sign of the residual being ignored. To find the relative infor- 
mation content of the four events Firth ran three tests. The first used the weekly 
cross-sectional average abnormal returns which were ranked for each of the three 
years. For the second test an information statistic was calculated using the method 
previously mentioned in the study of Oppong (1980). Finally, the information 
statistic for each of the 52 weeks of the year was ranked to find how many times the 
statistics for the four events were placed in ranks 1 to 4 for each of the three years. 
All the tests showed that the greatest information signal was imparted by the 
preliminary announcement release with the interim report and annual report and ac- 
counts releases containing statistically significant above-average information though 
at a much lower level. The annual general meeting release contained no greater in- 
formation than the average of the non-event days. Surprisingly, there was little 
difference in the information content of the interim report and annual report and 
accounts. 
Tests using volume of shares traded and deals transacted showed similar results, 
with the exception of the preliminary announcement where there was some higher 
share-dealing in the week before the announcement. Only on the event day was 
share-dealing above average. 
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Firth also found that the information statistics for the preliminary announce- 
ment, annual report and accounts and interim report for a given firm for a given 
year were significantly related. Where the release of the preliminary announcement 
of a firm had a high impact on its share price, so did the release of its annual re- 
port and interim report. This, Firth concluded, provided further evidence that the 
annual report and accounts contained incremental information to that contained in 
the preliminary announcement. 
Firth's results concerning the annual report and accounts are interesting, for the 
generally accepted view is that when the annual report and accounts is published the 
market has already anticipated the information it contains from other more timely 
sources. This was certainly confirmed by Foster, Jenkins and Vickrey (1986). They 
conducted a series of tests, specifically controlling for extraneous news announce- 
ments. Foster et al. excluded any announcement which had previously been shown 
to contain price sensitive information e. g. earnings, dividends etc. Firms' 10-K 
reports had to be filed at least ten days after the publication of the annual report 
and accounts. 
The weekly returns were generated using the market model the parameters of 
which were obtained using three different techniques. The ordinary least squares 
method produced alpha and beta with mean values of 0.0025 and 0.86 respectively 
and a mean RZ of 0.16. To take into account possible bias due to thin trading 
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a modified version of Dimson's aggregated coefficients was also used. The results 
obtained using all three sets of parameters were not significantly different. 
Although their results implied that the annual report and accounts contained 
no incremental information at the aggregate level, nevertheless they suggested in- 
dividuals might still use the annual report for investment decisions. 
Anderson (1979), based on a questionnnaire sent to shareholders, had previ- 
ously found the annual report to be of only moderate importance to individual 
shareholders. 
A less subjective series of tests were conducted by Cready and Mynatt (1991). 
They employed both price and trading measures. The trading measures included 
trading volume and number of transactions. Transactions can be stratified by size 
which is particularly -useful when focusing on the individual investor. Cready (1988) 
identifies investor-type by transaction size; 100-200 shares he identified as a small 
individual trader, 300-900 as the wealthier investors and 2000 and over as institu- 
tional investors. 
The above 300 class are more likely to be sophisticated and have the resources 
to acquire information prior to publication of the annual report. They would place 
less emphasis on the annual report and accounts as a source of information than 
the individual, unsophisticated investor with limited resources. 
Parts of the Cready and Mynatt methodology are relevant to this study. As 
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATIONAL STUDIES 69 
their sample comprised mainly actively traded, shares, they employed ordinary least 
squares to estimate the parameters of the market model used to estimate the daily 
unexpected returns. Their decision to use ordinary least squares was based on the 
study of Brown and Warner (1985). 
When testing for price response to the annual report Cready and Mynatt, similar 
to this study, used the absolute value of the unexpected returns as Marais (1985) 
concluded that returns are not normally distributed and where normality is not 
present probably a more powerful test is obtained using absolute values rather than 
squared returns (Rohrbach and Chandra, 1989). 
Cready and Mynatt found no significant price or volume response to the pub- 
lication of the annual report and accounts. However, the transaction tests found 
significant trading response particularly for the individual investors. 
They summarized their findings by concluding that while "wealthier and more 
sophisticated investors rely on alternative predisclosure information sources in mak- 
ing investment decisions", as the trading response period extended from day 0 to 
day +7, with the heaviest- response occurring in days +5 and +6, this seems to in- 
dicate that individual investors do find annual reports informative but the majority 
delay their trading action. One can surmise that small investors await the financial 
press comment before making an investment decision. 
- 
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3.9 The Disclosure Requirements of Users of Fi- 
nancial Statements 
As this study examines the cause of the share price reaction on publication of the 
annual report and accounts for several firms, it is of interest to see what investors 
and other users of the annual report say they find valuable for share evaluation 
purposes. 
Individual investors, institutional investors and financial analysts all rate the 
annual report and accounts as an important source of information for investment 
decisions. In the UK, however, individual investors were found to place a higher 
value on newspapers and magazines and stockholder's advice (Chang and Most, 
1980 and Chang, Most and Brain, 1983). This may well reflect the lower degree of 
accounting knowledge of the UK individual investor compared with his US cousin. 
For ten items in the annual report and accounts there were different rankings 
of importance by individual and institutional investors and financial analysts. In 
the UK all three gave the balance sheet and income statement high ranking of 
importance. The institutional investors and financial analysts ranked third the 
"Statement of changes in financial position", while the individual investors chose 
"Summary of operations: 5-10 years". The different rankings of sources of informa- 
tion and annual report items by UK financial information users probably reflects 
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the wealth and sophistication of the users. 
Financial experts employed by insurance companies were found by Lee and 
Tweedie (1981) to read thoroughly the profit and loss account and the balance 
sheet. The overall finding of the study was that the annual report and accounts was 
regarded as of high value as a prime source of information. A low value was placed 
on the auditor's report. This is surprising in view of Firth's (1978) study which 
found share prices adjusted downward to "going concern" qualifications. This piece 
of information would seem of importance to all investors. 
Although the chairman's statement was ranked highly by the experts as a source 
of information both Still (1972), a UK study, and Courtis (1986) found that, on 
average, a shareholder might have difficulty in fully understanding it. This may 
well explain the findings of Chang and Most that the UK shareholder places more 
reliance on other information sources. 
Users answers to the question of the usefulness to them of the annual report seem 
to tie in well with the theory of investment. They are using the report to assess 
future earnings, the security of capital and prospective cash flows. Security analysts 
seem to give more emphasis to earnings than cash flow (Govindarajan, 1980). 
Arnold and Moizer (1984) used the questionnaire approach to examine the meth- 
ods and information used by UK individual analysts for share investment decisions. 
The primary appraisal method adopted by analysts was found to be fundamental 
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analysis. Similar to the findings of Lee and Tweedie (1981) the most important 
sources of information are the balance sheet and profit and loss account contained 
in the annual report and accounts. The chairman's statement and source and ap- 
plication of funds statement are also highly rated. Analysts commented on the 
disparity of information disclosed by individual firms and gave a low rating to the 
use of other analysts' forecasts. 
The lack of importance attributed to other analysts' forecasts is perhaps not 
surprising. In a US study, O'Brien (1990), the author attributed her findings, that 
on average there is no consistent difference in analysts forecasting ability, to analysts 
keeping in line with the forecasts of analysts they consider to be better informed. It 
is hardly likely in a written answer to a questionnaire an analyst will acknowledge 
he follows, in some cases, the forecasts of another better informed analyst. 
Earnings forecasts by investment analysts are said to contain new information 
even when preceded by other analysts forecasts or firms' accounting disclosures. 
Yet, despite all the information available to them, analysts earnings forecasts only 
explain about two thirds of the information conveyed by share price movements 
prior to the forecast release date (Lys and Sohn, 1990). In addition analysts seem 
not to fully revise their forecasts for the current year for the effect on earnings of 
changes in accounting method (Elliott and Philbrick, 1990). 
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Using a case study approach Gniewosz (1990) describes an Australian insti- 
tution's share investment decision process using fundamental analysis. Gniewosz 
observed the analysis of the annual report to dominate all other sources. "It is 
central to the whole information-use process in share investment decisions". The 
annual report is used not only to prepare forecasts but to evaluate the accuracy 
of prior forecasts and to ascertain how differences have arisen. The report also 
serves to identify those areas of the company's activities etc. which may require 
further investigation. Gniewosz classified the annual report information into four 
areas: growth prospects, significant financial market factors e. g. possible takover 
potential, investment parameters e. g. dividend and share price yield and investment 
strategy. The importance of the annual report was not confined to the time when it 
was initially received, its use extended throughout the year, sometimes as a proxy 
source of information and at other times in a confirmatory role. 
Perhaps, as Gyan (1974) remarked, why users do not find the annual report so 
useful as they would like, lies in the disagreement, as to what is useful information, 
between the preparers of the report and its users. Accounts are prepared by ac- 
countants and the majority of users have no accountancy training. Whatever its 
shortcomings, as Firth (1978) concluded, a properly specified annual report should 
be able to meet the needs of its various readers. 
Chapter 4 
Data and Methodolgy 
This study initially examines four firm financial report related events for their infor- 
mation content. The events are the preliminary announcement, the annual report 
and accounts, the annual general meeting and the interim report. The study then 
focuses on the results relating to the annual report and accounts to examine more 
closely its value to investors. 
If the event contains new information the share price reaction should yield an 
abnormal return or residual, the sign being ignored, higher than the average for the 
non-event days. 
Three return-generating models are used. Careful consideration is given to sam- 
ple selection to obviate any problems previous studies have encountered. The sample 
is selected and examined for factors which may affect the return generating process 
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or the results, e. g. firm size, thin-trading and both industry and event clustering. 
4.1 Sample and Share Price Data 
4.1.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
The sample consists of 337 companies which met the following selection criteria: 
1. Firms had to be fully listed on the London Stock Exchange as at 30.6.1981, 
and have daily share price data available for 125 trading days prior to the five 
day trading period commencing with the preliminary announcement (PA) and 130 
trading days thereafter. Daily return data was generously provided by Interactive 
Data Corporation to whom the author is considerably indebted, and covered the 
period from 1 May 1979 to 30 June 1981, both days included. For all but 15 cases 
the preliminary announcement event for each company occurred during calendar 
year 1980. 
2. Companies selected were restricted to those with a share marketability rating 
of one or two according to the London Business School, Risk Measurement Service 
journal Vol. No 3(1) January 1981. The rating shows how many days are likely to 
have elapsed since the previous market transaction: one = under 0.1 day, two = 0.1 
-1 day. 398 companies met both the first and this additional criterion. The shares 
in the sample being actively traded should help overcome the problem of thin trading 
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associated with the use of daily data. (Scholes and Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979; Dimson 
and Marsh, 1986 but see Morse, 1984 and Brown and Warner, 1985). 
3. A further requirement was that there had to be at least five trading days 
between each of the four events, the preliminary announcement, the annual report 
and accounts, the annual general meeting and the interim report, the event day 
being the first of the five trading day period. No company was permitted more than 
one event on each of the four main event days. Meeting these criteria reduced the 
sample size to its final 337 firms (see Appendix A). 28 of the 61 companies deleted 
had more than one event on an event day and the remaining 33 had insufficient data, 
largely due to share price suspension, the company being taken over or merged with 
another or going into receivership. 
4.1.2 Industry Classification and Size Distribution 
No. 
Industry of Firms 
Str. Mult 18 
Inv. Trust 25 
Mech. Eng 25 
Oil 12 
Food. Man 11 
Ind. Hold 25 
Various 221 
337 
Table 1: Distribution of sample firms by UK Stock Exchange industry classification 
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The Stock Exchange industrial classification has 85 different categories. Table 1 
shows that there were six industries with more than ten companies, accounting for 
116 firms in total in the sample 
. 
The remaining 221 companies are spread over 76 
categories, an average of approximately 3 firms per industry classification. As can 
be seen there is no preponderance of firms in the sample in any one industry; they 
are well diversified. 
The sample firms have a mean capitalization of £169m with a standard deviation 
of 
. 
C409m. The size distribution is negatively skewed with 262 firms smaller than 
the mean value. 75 companies have capitalizations above the mean figure of which 
66 are within the two standard deviations band, ß'987m. 
4.1.3 Year End Distribution 
The distribution of the fiscal year end months for the sample companies shown in 
Table 2 is virtually identical to the population based results for 1981 reported by 
Barron (1984)(see Financial Statement Analysis, 2nd Ed. 1986. G. Foster page 183). 
38.9% of the sample companies have a fiscal year end of December which could 
give rise to cross-sectional return correlation caused by the clustering of event dates. 
However, cross-section return correlation should not be a problem if the return 
metric investigated were calculated over a short time interval(Bernard, 1987) or if 
the firms are randomly selected rather than clustered by industry and the market 
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Month Fiscal No of Barron 
Year Ends Cos % % 
January 21 6.2 4.4 
February 11 3.3 2.4 
March 89 26.4 20.4 
April 9 2.7 4.3 
May 1 0.3 1.5 
June 
. 
14 4.1 6.4 
July 2 0.6 2.8 
August 8 2.4 1.7 
September 33 9.8 8.8 
October 12 3.5 3.5 
November 6 1.8 2.8 
December 131 38.9 41.0 
337 100.0 100.0 
78 
Table 2: Fiscal year ends of sample companies compared with UK %s reported by 
Barron (1984) for 1981 
model is used (Chandra et al., 1990). All three conditions are met by this study. 
Cready and Mynatt (1991), using a sample where only 30% of the firms did not 
have a December year end, considered event-date clustering as non-significant. This 
study uses a sample where 60% have a year end other than December. 
The 260 trading day period is centred on the PA. Where the 260 trading days 
included more than one interim report the first was omitted and another five trading 
days of data added. Due to data restrictions 38 interims are before the PA. This 
small number does not impact on the letter of the results. 
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The order of events is parsed in Figure 1 below: 
Company 
Financial 
Year 
End PA ARA IR ACM 
-125 0 134 Day 
Figure 1: Event Study Period 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Abnormal Return Metric 
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If the preliminary announcement, annuäl report and accounts, annual general meet- 
ing or interim report contain new information useful to investors for share evaluation 
purposes, a significant impact on the share price generating a large abnormal return 
should result. The abnormal return metric (Uýt) employed in this study is defined 
as: 
U)t 
= 
AR, t - ER3t, (9) 
where (U)t) = the abnormal return (residual) of firm j on day t, 
AR3t 
= the actual return of firm j on day t, 
ER3t 
= the expected return of firm j on day t. 
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4.2.2 Calculation of Abnormal Returns 
Brown and Warner (1985), adopting a simulation approach, tested different event 
study methodologies using daily data. Their results were consistent with those of 
their 1980 monthly data study in that methodologies based on the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) market model and, in some special cases, even more simple methods 
were as powerful at detecting abnormal returns as more elaborate procedures. 
To test the sensitivity of my results to the nature of the return generating 
process three models are employed; the market adjusted return model or simple, 
naive model, the market model and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
4.2.3 Model 1- The Market Adjusted Return Model' 
The market adjusted return model relates the performance of the sample companies 
to the market index. It sets coefficients a=0 and b=1, for the market model. 
Firth(1975) and other studies have found the 'a's to be virtually zero for all shares. 
There is the additional advantage in this formulation that potentially biased es- 
timates of betas, calculated from returns related to thinly traded shares, are not 
used. 
'Model 1 is thus ERjt = Rmt, where R,,, = = the market return. 
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4.2.4 Model 2- The Market Mode12 
This is the form of return-generating function used by Fama et al. (1969): 
4.2.5 Model 3- The Simple CAPM3 
4.2.6 Variable Derivation 
For each of the sample securities daily rates of return were calculated as: 
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ARjt 
= 
ln(P, t + D; t) - ln(P; t_1), (10) 
the actual continuously compounded return on security j in time t where Pjt = the 
closing price for security j on day t and Djt = net dividend on the ex dividend day 
t. 
The market return is derived as: 
R, 
n. t = ln(FTt * (1 + GY/260)) - ln(FTt_1), (11) 
where FTt = The Financial Times 
- 
All Share price index (a market-value weighted 
arithmetic index representing 750 of the largest UK companies) on day t and GY = 
The FT-All Share Index-Gross Dividend Yield which is converted to a daily yield 
basis for day t by dividing by 260 and 
Rft 
= 
ln(1 + (TBt/260)), (12) 
2Model 2 is ERjt 
= aj + bjRmj, where a1 and bj are the estimated parameters. 3Model 3- the simple CAPM is ER1i = (1 
- 
b1)Rj + b, Rmt where Rit is the risk free rate. 
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where T Bt = the 3 month Treasury Bill rate which is converted to a daily yield 
basis for day t. 
4.2.7 Parameter Estimation 
Model parameters a and b were estimated for firm j by regressing daily returns 
on the related market returns using conventional OLS regression. The coefficients 
were estimated for a pooled period of 200 daily returns, 100 on either side of the 
preliminary announcement 5 day trading period as well as for the pre and post 
periods relative to the PA using 100 returns in each case. Where other events 
occurred during the 100 day periods, such as rights and scrip issues and additional 
interim results etc., the associated 5 day trading periods were removed and an 
additional 5 returns added either to the beginning or to the end of the 260 day 
period, depending whether the other event occurred before or after the central 
preliminary announcement. Table 3 summarises the regression results, based on 
model number 2, using OLS, for the pre and post PA event periods as well as for 
the pooled period. 
Estimation 
`t' 
Period a b r stat 
Pre 
-. 
000228 
. 
813 
. 
459 9.4 
Pooled 
-. 
000289 
. 
806 
. 
411 8.3 
Post 
-. 
000303 
. 
810 
. 
379 7.5 
Table 3: Averages of the Estimated Parameters in the Pre, Pooled, and Post Time 
Periods using Ordinary Least Squares. (337 companies) 
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Dimson and Marsh (1986) among others indicate a size effect4 in addition to beta 
when calculating abnormal returns. To correct for this the pooled period data was 
recalculated using OLS including a (1n)size variable 
- 
the market capitalisation of the 
company. The results are shown in Table 4, where `c' is the coefficient of log(size). 
Taking the size effect into account has virtually no effect on the magnitude of the 
Estimation 
Period ab c 
Pooled 
-. 
000248 
. 
798 
-. 
000006 
Standard Dev 
. 
0025 
. 
320 
. 
0006 
Student `t' value 
. 
0143 45.838 
. 
0004 
Table 4: Averages of the Estimated Parameters in the Pooled Time Period using 
OLS including a size(log) variable. (337 companies) 
average estimated parameters. Neither the constant term `a' (as found in other 
studies) nor the coefficient `c' are statistically significant. 
We may speculate the reasons why firm size has little effect on the parameters 
are that the measurement interval is small, the firms in the sample are frequently 
traded and widely followed and the sample has been randomly drawn from the 
population. 
4The firms size effect here should be distinguished from the neglected firm effect e. g. argued by 
Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983). Arbel et al. considered firms whose shares are seldom held by 
institutions to be "neglected firms". They found a neglected firm effect in addition to a small firm 
size effect for both small and medium sized neglected firms. 
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4.2.8 Adjustment for Small Firm Bias 
The study sample comprises actively traded companies but many are still small 
and in addition we may posit a potential for bias, despite using actively traded 
shares, due to firm closing prices occurring at different trading times (see Dimson 
and Marsh, 1983). To test for bias due to non-synchronous data the parameters 
were re-estimated using the Scholes 
- 
Williams method which takes into account 
thin trading. The estimators are: 
b= (be-ý + bt + be-, )/(1 + 2Pm), (13) 
where bt_l, bt and bt+i are the parameters derived from regressions of observed re- 
turns on preceding, synchronous and subsequent market returns and pm is the au- 
tocorrelation coefficient for the market index. 
1 T-1 1 T-1 
a T-21: ARjt-bZº-2ERmt (14} 
c_a e=a 
The parameters were estimated using the 337 companies and the results are shown 
in Table 5. The need to adjust parameter estimates to take account of thin trading 
even in such an active stockmarket as the London Stock Exchange and with a 
sample of predominately large actively traded stocks is highlighted. (See Dimson, 
1979, and Dimson and Marsh, 1983, for detailed discussions on the Scholes and 
Williams method and thin trading bias using UK data respectively; also O'Hanlon, 
1988, who found evidence of thin trading in the FTSE 100 shares, the largest UK 
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Estimation 
Period a b 
Pre 
-. 
00052 1.0321 
(. 00182) (0.437) 
Pooled 
. 
00119 1.0276 
(. 00110) (0.356) 
Post 
-. 
00059 1.0410 
(. 00216) (0.504) 
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Table 5: Averages of the Estimated Parameters and their Standard Deviations (in 
parenthesis) using the Scholes and Williams method with OLS. (337 companies) 
shares by market value. ') 
4.2.9 Stability of Beta Estimates 
The average pre and post betas using the Scholes and Williams method were 1.032 
and 1.041 respectively. The pre betas were regressed on the post betas and the 
degree of association was low with an r2 of 0.061, although statistically significant 
at better than the one per cent level. Nonetheless, this should not deter us from 
using the pooled betas as the difference in pre and post average betas is negligible. 
Chandra et al(1990), however, using a simulation approach suggest researchers 
need not be overly concerned with non-stationarity in parameters using the market 
model (see also Brown, 1978 and Altman and Brenner, 1981). 
5 Using actively traded firms but still finding downwardly biased betas may not reflect thin trading, but the reverse of the neglected firm effect which shows the average beta increasing with neglect (Carvell and Strebel, 1987). 
Chapter 5 
Results 
This study is concerned with the degree of information contained in the preliminary 
announcement, the annual report and accounts, the annual general meeting and 
the interim report. The primary concern is with the magnitude of the measure of 
information content, therefore, the direction of the residual return is largely ignored. 
To determine the information content of the four events two methods are used, 
a cross-sectional analysis and a method adopted by Oppong (1980) using a trans- 
formed residual. The market behaviour around the event days is studied to ascertain 
the period over which any reaction takes place. A long period of adjustment after 
the event would not be consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
If the events do contain price sensitive information the extent to which the 
information content of one event is associated with the other events is examined. 
86 
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In addition the test results are analysed to ascertain whether they reveal an inverse 
relationship between company size and information content. 
The chapter concludes with a re-run of two tests, but using weekly data, to 
facilitate comparison with a prior UK study. 
5.1 Test 1: Information Content of Event Dis- 
closures 
- 
Analysis of Mean Cross-Sectional 
Return Data 
The first test of the information content of the preliminary announcement, annual 
report and accounts, annual general meeting and interim report involved calculating 
the cross-sectional absolute average abnormal return for each of the 260 days and 
ranking these by size. Event information releases on a particular day, however, 
may, in some cases, take place after the stock exchange officially closes, so that 
any associated price reaction will be reflected in the closing price for the following 
day. The day following the event day is, therefore, treated as an event day itself i. e. 
PA+1, ARA+1, etc. 
Each of the 337 companies contributed one daily abnormal return or residual 
U3t for each of the 252 non-event days and one each for each of the eight event 
days. There were always 125 non-event days preceding the PA day. The daily 
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cross-sectional absolute average residual for day t is defined as 
AU, 
=1 
337 
337 
1U'tl (15ý 
The results are set out in Table 6. 
A number of studies have measured price response to information using squared 
residuals rather than the absolute values adopted in this study. The problems 
associated with testing both measures are discussed in Patell (1976), Marais (1984) 
and Cready and Mynatt (1991). 
The validity of using the Patell test statistic Vet = UjtI Q Cjt, which standard- 
izes the absolute residual, is dependent on the accuracy of the variance estimate. 
Patell used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to obtain estimates a and b of 
the parameters a and 0 respectively. The regression also provided an estimate SjI 
of the variance of a firm's residuals, o3 during the non-event period. The residuals 
are OLS residuals not the predictive errors Ujt using the market model. 
One assumption of Vet is that the variance of Uzt in the report period equals the 
variance of the non-event period times a lag correction factor, C,, t, which reflects 
the increase in variance due to prediction outside the non-event period. The size 
of the correction factor is dependent on the number of observations in the non- 
event period. In this study the number of days is the same for all firms. If the true 
variance of U3t is underestimated by C, to2 then Vjt is biased towards rejection of the 
null hypothesis that Vat = 0. Patell (1976) reports the addition of C,, t reducing the 
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test statistic by an average of less than one percent. It does seem that omitting the 
variance adjustment factor, particularly using a large sample, would not materially 
affect the results. Cready and Mynatt (1991) also confirm that the addition of the 
Patell correction factor is not important for our purposes. 
Marais (1984), more importantly, suggests tests have shown Patell's Vet to be 
sensitive to non-normality, "Skewness causes two-sided tests to reject too often on 
one side and too seldom on the other side". In addition Marais shows a test statistic 
based on squared residuals suffers the same but stronger flaws as Vjt. By way of 
correction he suggests a nonparametric bootstrap method (but see comments of 
Burgstahler, 1984). However, it should be pointed out that data restrictions prevent 
the effective listing of the bootstrap method in this study. 
Cready and Mynatt (1991) confirm the earlier findings of Rohrbach and Chan- 
dra (1989) "... that absolute value returns outperform squared return metrics in 
detecting excess returns". In addition they reported the rejection frequencies using 
their method although higher than expected are "not so much higher as to raise 
major concerns regarding over-rejection". 
As Table 6 shows the three models in this study produced practically the same 
results, so only for the risk adjusted market model (model two) is the null hypothesis, 
that the information released on the event day is no different to that released on a 
non-event day, tested. A two-tailed z test where z= (AU; t -Y)/(S/fin) is employed 
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
Mo 
1 
Rank Day AR Day 
1 PA 
. 
0405 PA 
2 IR 
. 
0397 IR 
3 IR+1 
. 
0236 IR+1 
4 PA+1 
. 
0234 PA+1 
5 AGM+1 
. 
0182 AGM+1 
6 AGM 
. 
0175 AGM 
7 24 
. 
0171 24 
8 187 
. 
0160 187 
9 ARA 
. 
0159 ARA 
32 
38 
Mean 
Median 
ARA+1 
. 
0136 
ARA+1 
2 
AR Day 
. 
0407 PA 
. 
0399 IR 
. 
0236 IR+1 
. 
0234 PA+1 
. 
0180 AGM+1 
. 
0175 AGM 
. 
0169 24 
. 
0160 187 
. 
0159 ARA 
. 
0136 ARA+1 
. 
0127 
. 
0124 
3 
AR 
. 
0407 
. 
0400 
. 
0236 
. 
0234 
. 
0181 
. 
0175 
. 
0170 
. 
0159 
. 
0159 
. 
0136 1 
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Table 6: Rankings of Absolute Average Daily Abnormal Returns (AU,, t) and Model 2 260 day period mean and median values 
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where S/, / is the standard error of AU, t and Y is the mean of all the non-event 
days (Y 
=ßi3? 1Ü31/337 with l Üj l being the mean of the 252 non-event days for 
each company). At the 
. 
05 level only the ARA+1 is not statistically significant. 
The almost identical results for the three models in the test will be noted. This is 
probably because when using daily data the magnitude of beta is largely irrelevant 
as the impact of the event itself will swamp any possible systematic reaction to very 
small market movements. (Because of this all further results are reported only for 
the market model (model two) which is risk adjusted and a more powerful model 
than the other two (Chandra et al., 1990). However, such similar results are unlikely 
with weekly or monthly data. Table 6 shows that the PA had the highest abnormal 
return averaged across all firms at 4.1 per cent with the IR average abnormal return 
almost identical at 4.0 per cent. The IR+1 and PA+1 event days had average 
abnormal returns of 2.4 per cent and 2.3 per cent. There is only a small price 
reaction to the AGM and an even smaller one to the ARA with the annual report 
and accounts way down the table in 9th position (and ARA+1 variously in position 
32 and 38 depending on the model). 
We may postulate that these average returns reflect some spill-over of informa- 
tion effect into the following day from the event day, or alternatively that the high 
average values reflect the arrival of information to the market, as some firms prac- 
tice, on event day+1, i. e. after the market closes for the day. To investigate this, 
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Event day 
t t+(t+1) 
PA 
. 
0407 
. 
0457 
ARA 
. 
0159 
. 
0221 
AGM 
. 
0175 
. 
0263 
IR 
. 
0399 
. 
0489 
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Table 7: Absolute Average Abnormal Returns for the Two Day Period (Event Day 
t and event day t+ event day t+ 1) 
absolute average abnormal returns for the two day period (event day t+ event day 
t+ 1) are derived. Table 7 provides the results for the market model. 
All events provide increased absolute residuals providing some support for these 
arguments. This issue needs to be explored further. 
It would appear, prima facie, on a comparative basis little information in ag- 
gregate is conveyed to the market by the AGM and ARA information releases, an 
issue of fundamental concern to accounting policy makers. 
5.2 Market Behaviour Around Event Days 
Analysis, using the market model, was conducted to explore in more detail share 
price reaction around event days. Tables 8-11 provide average absolute abnormal 
return information for the four event periods studied and these results are plotted 
in Figures 2-5. 
Examination of the four graphs show no apparent unusual activity preceding or 
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Day 
Average Absolute 
Abnormal Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cready- 
Mynatt 
t-value 
-9 1.192 1.396 -1.011 
-8 1.172 1.558 -0.800 
-7 1.200 1.321 -0.280 
-6 1.209 1.282 -0.073 
-5 1.195 1.258 0.001 
-4 1.226 1.399 0.067 
-3 1.458 2.175 2.461 
-2 1.435 1.762 2.587 
-1 1.378 1.976 1.098 
0 4.078 4.607 11.227 
1 2.317 2.763 8.548 
2 1.495 1.792 2.423 
3 1.424 1.585 0.353 
4 1.529 2.069 1.549 
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Table 8: Analysis of Abnormal Returns in the Thirteen Day Period Surrounding 
the Preliminary Announcement (N 
= 
337) 
Figure 2: Preliminary Announcement 
- 
Average Absolute Abnormal Returns relat- 
ing to Table 8 
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Day 
Average Absolute 
Abnormal Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cready- 
Mynatt 
t-value 
-4 1.441 1.587 1.03 
-3 1.438 1.745 1.18 
-2 1.461 1.632 1.37 
-1 1.325 1.466 0.89 
0 1.591 2.188 3.56 
1 1.473 1.763 1.57 
2 1.550 2.311 2.43 
3 1.500 1.960 1.95 
4 1.489 1.960 2.18 
5 1.336 1.546 
-0.26 
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Table 9: Annual Report and Accounts 
- 
Analysis of Abnormal Returns in the Nine 
Day Period Surrounding Publication (N=337 
Figure 3: Annual Report and Accounts 
- 
Average Absolute Abnormal Returns 
relating to Table 9 
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Day 
Average Absolute 
Abnormal Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cready- 
Mynatt 
t-value 
-9 1.441 2.170 1.75 
-8 1.348 1.515 1.52 
-7 1.337 2.445 -0.95 
-6 1.306 1.673 0.64 
-5 1.276 2.456 -0.04 
-4 1.369 1.859 1.35 
-3 1.304 1.383 1.06 
-2 1.263 1.652 -0.14 
-1 1.320 1.593 0.68 
0 1.763 2.303 5.03 
1 1.801 2.435 5.17 
2 1.429 1.924 2.00 
3 1.299 1.463 1.47 
4 1.329 1.509 1.41 
5 1.170 1.267 
-0.21 
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Table 10: Annual General Meeting-Analysis of Abnormal Returns in the Fourteen 
Day Period Surrounding the Event (N=337) 
Figure 4: Annual General Meeting 
- 
Average Absolute Abnormal Returns relating 
to Table 10 
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Day 
Average Absolute 
Abnormal Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cready- 
Mynatt 
t-value 
-9 1.304 1.650 1.313 
-8 1.246 1.782 -0.076 
-7 1.288 1.384 -0.275 
-6 1.219 1.461 -0.084 
-5 1.179 1.304 -0.382 
-4 1.115 1.255 -1.839 
-3 1.435 1.452 3.360 
-2 1.485 1.905 2.351 
-1 1.391 1.673 2.049 
0 4.072 4.907 10.567 
1 2.359 3.181 6.909 
2 1.579 1.994 3.225 
3 1.595 1.980 1.867 
4 1.303 1.382 
-1.205 
5 1.455 2.164 
-0.227 
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Table 11: Interim Report-Analysis of Abnormal Returns in the Fourteen Day Period 
Surrounding Publication (N=337) 
Figure 5: Interim Report 
- 
Average Absolute Abnormal Returns relating to Table 
11 
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following the event day (day 0) in any case. The absolute average abnormal return 
for the PA day rises to 4.1% from 1.4% and drops to 2.3% for PA+1. Similarly for 
the IR, the rise is from 1.4% to 4.1% dropping to 2.4% the day after. In both cases, 
thereafter the share prices resume their normal relationship with the market. 
The ARA and AGM events show different responses. The abnormal return for 
the ARA blips up from 1.3% at t-1 to 1.6% on publication and is 1.5% at t+1. 
The AGM rises from 1.3% at t-1 to 1.8% at both t and t+1 and falls to 1.4% at 
t+2. In both cases the negligible apparent increases are immediately followed by 
stability. Most of the information released by the two events appears to have been 
anticipated by the market before the events took place. 
To test the significance of the average absolute abnormal returns shown in Ta- 
bles 8-11, Student's t-statistics were calculated using the method of Cready and 
Mynatt (19916. The full results are given in Appendix B. The problems associ- 
ated with the use of the standard deviation of the residuals as the denominator i. e. 
variance shift, and non-normality of residuals biasing test towards rejection of null 
hypothsis, are discussed in section 5.1. 
6The Cready and Mynatt (1991) method to test for price invariance adopts the absolute value 
of the abnormal return (ABUR) estimated on a daily basis as: ABURJ = (J AU , j- jABUR, 
\ 
where 
ABURJ is the mean absolute value of the residuals for firm j from the non-event period of 252 days; 
and SABR,,, the standard deviation of the absolute values of the residuals for firm j from same 
non-event period. The 252 non-event days are the 260 day period less day 0, the event day, and day 
+1 for each of the four events. The absolute value standardised abnormal returns are calculated to 
have an expected value of zero where there is no price response. The t-statistic is calculated using 
the conventional t-test with p=0 and n= 337. 
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For the PA, ARA and AGM the results reveal day 
-1 as non-significant although 
PA day 
-2 and day -3 are significant at the 5% level (two tailed test). After the event 
day the first non-significant day for the PA is day +3 and for the other three events 
day +5. The results seem to suggest the new information is not fully impounded 
in the share price on the release day. 
There is only a small difference in the size of the mean residuals from day 0 to day 
+4 for the annual report and accounts, but the calculated t-statistics for these days 
suggest the differences are unlikely to have arisen by chance. We may speculate the 
activities of smaller investors may be reflected in these significant abnormal returns 
after the event day, as they may be more dependent on the information contained 
in the annual report for their investment decisions and take longer to react to the 
new information (Cready and Mynatt, 1991). Alternatively we may have evidence 
of information diffusion generally not being instantaneous. 
5.3 The Effect of "Good" and "Bad" News 
Whilst the absolute average abnormal returns indicate the value of new information 
in aggregate, these represent a composite measure reflecting both "good" and "bad" 
news. "Bad" news would be followed by share prices moving downward giving a 
lower return than expected, hence a negative residual, whilst "good" news would 
have the reverse effect. To assess how investors react to "good" and "bad" news 
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the event day abnormal returns were divided into two groups comprising companies 
with negative abnormal returns and those with positive abnormal returns. Runs 
were then made for both the negative and positive groups similar to the runs made 
for the absolute average abnormal returns. The results are shown in Tables 12-15 
and cumulative abnormal returns are graphed in Figures 6-13. It should be noted 
that splitting residuals on any day into +ve and 
-ve groups will result in figures of 
a related shape to those plotted. 
The t-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the event day average ab- 
normal return for "good" and "bad" news are equal can be found by using the 
formula of Daniel and Terrell (1983) (see Liu et al., 1990, footnote 6, page 406). The 
t-statistics are preliminary announcement 0.05, annual report and accounts 0.02, 
annual general meeting 0.12, and interim report 0.22. Thus the respective null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected in any case. 
This method of splitting the event day residuals into positive and negative resid- 
uals was used effectively by Liu, Smith and Syed (1990) to examine the impact of 
the `Heard-on-the-Street' column of The Wall Street Journal. They analysed the 
column's buy and sell recommendations, the former resulting in a positive residual 
and the latter a negative residual 
- 
"good" and "bad" news. They found little dif- 
ference in reaction to a buy or sell recommendation. Their result is similar to the 
findings of this study. 
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Positive (N=207) Negative (N=130) 
Day Ave. Abn. Return (%) St. Dev Ave. Abn. Return(%) St. Dev 
-19 . 136 2.025 . 203 1.878 
-18 -. 138 2.055 . 144 1.556 
-17 . 173 1.882 . 162 1.500 
-16 -. 011 1.731 -. 047 1.096 
-15 . 086 1.958 -. 219 1.805 
-14 . 055 1.565 . 047 1.909 
-13 . 153 1.811 . 054 
2.031 
-12 -. 135 2.035 -. 098 1.567 
-11 -. 021 1.886 . 240 1.587 
-10 . 067 1.802 . 346 
2.189 
-9 -. 188 1.616 . 047 2.126 
-8 . 047 1.770 . 334 
2.178 
-7 . 159 1.805 -. 199 
1.728 
-6 . 041 1.847 -. 289 
1.591 
-5 -. 152 1.464 -. 030 2.086 
-4 -. 085 1.924 -. 142 1.744 
-3 -. 023 2.613 . 220 2.616 
-2 . 076 2.472 . 161 
1.902 
-1 -. 342 2.635 . 030 1.949 
0 4.067 3.894 
-4.095 5.558 
1 
-. 
108 2.774 
. 
475 4.606 
2 
. 
266 2.268 
-. 
146 2.407 
3 
-. 
214 2.058 
. 
166 2.218 
4 
-. 
197 2.443 
-. 
529 2.704 
Table 12: Preliminary Announcement-Cross-sectional Average Abnormal Returns 
for the Twenty Three Days Surrounding the Announcement 
J ýý 
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Figure 6: Preliminary Announcement 
- 
Cumulative Positive Average 
Abnormal Returns. Graphical Description of Table 12 (a) 
Figure 7: Preliminary Announcement 
- 
Cumulative Negative Average 
Abnormal Returns. Graphical Description of Table 12 (b) 
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Positive (N=176) (a) Negative (N=161) (b) 
Day Ave. Abn. Return(%) St. Dev Ave. Abn. Return(%) St. Dev 
-4 -. 289 1.233 
. 
279 1.873 
-3 
. 
071 2.204 
-. 
253 2.307 
-2 -. 052 2.247 -. 121 2.124 
-1 -. 032 1.953 
. 
435 1.952 
0 1.607 1.843 
-1.573 2.512 
1 
-. 
149 2.298 
. 
055 2.292 
2 
. 
302 2.333 
-. 
195 3.181 
3 
. 
183 2.015 
. 
203 2.869 
4 
. 
292 2.473 
. 
418 2.394 
5 
-. 
081 2.022 
. 
197 2.056 
Table 13: Annual Report and Accounts-Cross-sectional Average 
Abnormal Returns for the Nine Days Surrounding Publication 
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Figure 8: Annual Report and Accounts 
- 
Cumulative Positive Average Abnormal 
Returns. Graphical Description of Table 13 (a) 
Figure 9: Annual Report and Accounts 
- 
Cumulative Negative Average Abnormal 
Returns. Graphical Description of Table 13 (b) 
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Positive (N=169) (a) Negative (N=168) (b) 
Day Ave. Abn. Return(%) St. Dev Ave. Abn. Return(%) St. Dev 
-9 . 127 3.067 -. 121 1.987 
-8 -. 344 2.019 
. 
224 1.995 
-7 -. 169 3.569 
. 
111 1.649 
-6 -. 220 2.451 -. 203 1.704 
-5 . 382 3.493 . 098 1.715 
-4 -. 168 2.373 
. 
257 2.222 
-3 . 031 1.966 -. 274 1.811 
-2 -. 388 2.184 -. 220 1.918 
-1 -. 137 2.103 -. 040 2.030 
'0 1.490 1.892 
-2.038 2.625 
1 
. 
034 2.245 
-. 
149 3.647 
2 
. 
010 2.836 
-. 
128 1.849 
3 
-. 
127 1.884 
-. 
004 2.022 
4 
. 
183 2.186 
. 
277 1.787 
5 
-. 
061 1.762 
-. 
045 1.685 
Table 14: Annual General Meeting 
- 
Cross-sectional Average Abnormal 
Returns for the Fourteen Days Surrounding the Event 
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Figure 10: Annual General Meeting 
- 
Cumulative Positive Average Abnormal Re- 
turns. Graphical Description of Table 14 (a) 
Figure 11: Annual General Meeting 
- 
Cumulative Negative Average Abnormal Re- 
turns. Graphical Description of Table 14 (b) 
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Day 
Positive (N=159) 
Ave. Abn. Return(%) 
(a) 
St. Dev 
Negative (N=178) 
Ave. Abn. Return (%) 
(b) 
St. Dev 
-9 -. 078 2.372 -. 132 1.823 
-8 . 191 2.295 . 001 2.052 
-7 . 047 1.604 . 125 2.111 
-6 -. 125 1.696 
. 
092 2.065 
-5 -. 048 1.599 -. 065 1.887 
-4 -. 231 1.594 -. 131 1.732 
-3 -. 105 1.855 -. 039 2.193 
-2 -. 039 2.367 
. 
109 2.455 
-1 -. 001 1.896 
. 
062 2.398 
0 3.288 3.614 
-4.772 5.734 
1 
-. 
149 4.144 
-. 
201 3.781 
2 
. 
189 2.378 
. 
471 2.636 
3 
-. 
026 2.449 
. 
007 2.622 
4 
-. 
005 1.768 
-. 
057 2.009 
5 
-. 
075 2.056 
. 
088 3.014 
Table 15: Interim Report-Cross-sectional Average Abnormal Returns for 
the Fourteen Days Surrounding Publication 
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Figure 12: Interim Report 
- 
Cumulative Positive Average Abnormal Returns. 
Graphical Description of Table 15 (a) 
Figure 13: Interim Report 
- 
Cumulative Negative Average Abnormal Returns. 
Graphical Description of Table 15 (b) 
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5.4 Test 2: Test of Information Content Using Ra- 
do of Event Day Residual to Mean of Non- 
event Day Residuals 
Again in this test we are looking at the size of the event abnormal returns as a 
measure of information content not their direction. The information measure used 
in this test is that of Oppong (1980). Unlike squaring the residuals, the measure 
does not give undue weight to a few large abnormal returns when they are averaged 
across firms. 
The measure is: 
IUjtl V, t = l, l 
(16) 
where JU3tj = the absolute value of the abnormal return for the event day, and 
j Uj l= the mean of I U? t for the 252 non-event days. 
If the event has significant information content the ratio will be greater than 
1.0. Values of V; t were computed for each event for all companies. Table 16 reveals 
the number of times the event days exceeded 1.0. 
A Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test showed that the computed (U,, tI for 
the PA, PA+1, AGM+1, IR and IR+1 was significantly greater (p < 0.05 one tail test) 
than 17ji. 
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Event 
Model 
2 
Z 
(calc) 
PA 258 12.41 
PA+1 210 7.55 
ARA 155 1.47 
ARA+1 133 
-1.82 
AGM 162 1.56 
AGM-}-1 175 3.07 
IR 238 11.57 
IR+1 182 5.31 
Table 16: Number of Times Vat > 1.0 (N = 337) (Zo. o5 = 1.64) 
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Table 16 shows that the PA and IR had a high information content for around 
77 per cent and 70 per cent of the the firms respectively with the following day in 
each case also producing a reaction. Investors appeared to obtain insignificant new 
information from the ARA and AGM in approximately 50 per cent of the companies. 
These results reinforce the conclusions of Test 1. Again we have evidence supporting 
the hypothesis of lack of utility of the ARA for investment purposes. 
May (1971), Oppong (1980) and Beghin (1982) have all used the statistic z= 
(X 
- 
1.0)/(Sl j), where S/ J is the standard error and X is the mean value of 
V t, for where the sample size is large the distribution of the statistic is approxi- 
mately Normal. Consequently the parametric z-test was employed to test the null 
hypothesis, that the mean of the ratio Vet is equal to or less than 1.0. If the mean of 
the Vet is greater than 1, the mean residual for that day or event reflects the impact 
of significant information. The standard deviation of Vj may or may not suffer from 
the same problems of non-normality of residuals although this needs to be explored 
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empirically. 
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Table 17 shows the statistical significance of the mean of the V,, ts not only for 
the four event days but also for the day following the each event day and the other 
252 non-event days. The table shows 29 of the 252 non-event days containing 
statistically significant information at the levels indicated. 
Z> 
Day 
1.64 2.054 2.326 (One-tail test) 
5% 2% 1% 
PA 12.979 
PA+1 10.255 
ARA 3.794 
AGM 5.237 
AGM+1 5.672 
IR 12.592 
IR+1 6.372 
Non-event 16 67 
Table 17: Z-score Statistics for 8 Event Days and 252 Non-event Days (N=337) 
The other 231 non-event days, including ARA+1, were not statistically signifi- 
cant. 
The results are similar to those of the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test 
shown in Table 16 and to the Model 2 rankings in Table 6. One interpretation of 
the results is that all four main event days have information content. Inspection of 
Table 16 reveals that only about half of the Vjt's for the ARA, ARA+1 and AGM 
were greater than 1.0. Therefore, the high statistical significance of these three 
event days may be due to the extreme price reaction of a few firms. 
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All the days from PA-3 through to and including PA+2 were significant at 
the 5% level or below with the greatest reaction on days PA and PA+1. This is 
consistent with the size of the average absolute abnormal returns for these days 
shown in Table 8. 
5.5 Test 3: Degree of Association Between Infor- 
mation Content of Different Events 
The tests so far demonstrate the considerable new information conveyed by the 
preliminary announcement and the interim report as far as the stockmarket is con- 
cerned. If investors are mainly concerned with actual and prospective earnings and 
dividend numbers for equity valuation purposes then once the preliminary state- 
ment is released any incremental information conveyed by the annual report and 
the annual general meeting may be deemed by the investors to be relatively unim- 
portant. 
To test the incremental information content of the different events relative to 
each other a Spearman's rank correlation test was used to examine whether the 
Vet's for the PA, ARA, AGM and IR were related. Table 18 summarizes the results. 
Table 18 shows there is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
the PA and IR, and AGM and IR but between no other pairs of events which results 
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Model PA-ARA PA-AGM PA-IR ARA-AGM ARA-IR AGM-IR 
2 
. 
011 
-. 
032 
. 
121 * 
. 
050 
. 
026 
. 
116 * 
t: (. 20) (. 58) (2.25) (. 92) ' (. 41) (2.16) 
* These are significant at p<0.05 two tail test using Student's t test (t) 
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Table 18: Association Between Information Content of Events (Spearman's Rank 
Correlation Coefficients) (N=337) 
differ to Firth (1981). 
Firth, using weekly data, found a significant positive relationship between a 
firm's PA, ARA and IR. A firm having a high information content in the PA week 
also has a high information content in the ARA and IR weeks. This study reveals a 
similar relationship between the PA, AGM and IR. It is suggested that using weekly 
data Firth may have captured more of the impact of the information content of 
the ARA which was not accomplished by this study using daily data. The greater 
ARA abnormal returns generated by Firth would probably account for its positive 
relationship with the PA and IR. The inclusion of the AGM in this study's results 
may possibly be attributed to the sample used in this study containing more small 
companies than that used by Firth. The magnitude of the AGM abnormal returns 
would be greater accounting for the positive association. 
The results may seem to confirm the high value investors place on earnings and 
dividend figures. 
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5.6 Test 4: The Relationship Between Firm Size 
and Information Content of Different Events 
Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver (1968), Grant (1980), Firth (1981), Banz (1981), 
Reinganum (1981) and Dimson and Marsh (1986) have all reported an inverse re- 
lationship between the size of the company and the information content of the 
announcement of its results, though Oppong (1976) found no such association. It is 
hypothesised that as there is less information available about small firms, investors 
require a premium to compensate them for the higher risk associated with less re- 
searched small firms. The corollary to this is that as large firms are more actively 
researched by stockbroking analysts more information is available, and as the firm 
decreases in size so does the level of stockbroker attention and consequently the 
information about it to market participants (see Zegal, 1984). 
Company size, for the purpose of this study, is measured by market capitalisation 
as taken from the LBS Risk Measurement Service journal for March 1979. 
The abnormal returns (I U, I) for each event were regressed on company (1n)size. 
The results shown in Table 19 are consistent with prior studies as for all three 
models all event residuals had an inverse association with company size with only 
the AGM not statistically significant. The larger the firm the more information 
there is available on it so when its obligatory financial events occur there is less 
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Model PA PA+1 ARA ARA+1 AGM AGM+1 IR IR+1 
2 
-. 
257 
-. 
244 
-. 
158 
-. 
138 
-. 
065 
-. 
095 
-. 
198 
-. 
225 
* Note: All events are significant at p<0.05, one tail test using Student's t, 
save AGM. 
Table 19: Comparison of Firm Size with Event Information Content 
- 
Correlation 
Between IU)) and Firm Size (Market Capitalisation) 
share price reaction to the information released. In addition as firms become larger 
they become more stable so there is less "surprise" factor in their announcements. 
Size, however, may only be a surrogate for risk which is better measured by the 
variance of the returns. Variance is the correct measure of the total riskiness of an 
individual share. The abnormal returns (IUUj) for the four main events, were re- 
gressed on the variance of the company's returns and its (1n)size. Table 20 confirms 
the inverse relationship between company size and the absolute abnormal return on 
its stock. Whereas a change in the size of the company, when the variance is held 
constant, will have only a marginal effect on the return, a one per cent increase in 
the variability of the return, with constant company size 
, 
will in the case of the PA 
lead to an increase in the excess return of 8 per cent. This is in accordance with 
all previous research, as the variance of a share is largely related to the company's 
beta; that portion of the total variance which is correlated to the market (Copeland 
and Weston, 1988 page 199). Again only the AGM is not statistically significant. 
The results also seem to show that it is not only in earnings releases (Haw and 
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Ro, 1990) where size is a proxy for other firm-specific information variables. 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Event Variance (1n)Size `R' `t' 
PA 8.38 
-. 
008 
. 
311 5.98 
ARA 3.26 
-. 
002 
. 
216 4.04 
AGM 0.87 
-. 
001 
. 
075 1.37 
IR 6.18 
-. 
006 
. 
232 4.36 
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Table 20: Association Between Information Content, Return Variance and Firm Size ('R'=Pearson's Correlation Coefficient with Student's `t' Value. N=337) 
To examine further the relationship of the three variables and the explanatory 
power of the two independent variables analyses of variance were made of the regres- 
sions. The analysis of variance technique tests for the significance of the regression 
coefficients. The analysis examines the significance of the association between the 
three variables, information content, return variance and firm size, and whether 
including the two variables return variance and firm size in the regression increases 
its explanatory power. Table 21 shows the calculated F values and the degrees of 
freedom. 
For the PA, ARA, and IR events there is a significant association between the 
three variables; information content, return variance and firm size. The coefficient 
of firm size is significant and the inclusion of that variable significantly increases the 
explained variation. Similarly the variance variable and its coefficient are significant. 
Including the variance variable has a significant additional effect in increasing the 
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Calculated F Values 
Association Independent 
Between the Variable Variance Firm Size 
Event 3 Variables Residuals Coefficient Coefficient 
PA 17.84 15.78 11.30 19.05 
ARA 8.14 9.53 7.20 6.59 
AGM 
. 
94 
. 
70 
. 
44 1.17 
IR 9.49 5.18 7.71 11.03 
Degrees 
of Freedom 2,334 1,335 2,334 1,334 
Note: All Calculated F Values are Significant at Fo. os 
level except those for the AGM. 
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Table 21: Analyses of Variance of Association Between Information Content, Return 
Variance and Firm Size. (N=337 
correlation. None of the calculated F values for the AGM event is significant at the 
5% level. The analysis confirms the results shown in Tables 19 and 20. 
The evidence further indicates that in the case of the AGM if virtually no new 
information is being conveyed then little relationship with firm size may be expected 
and for the annual report and accounts investors may regard the information it 
contains as of value only for equity investment purposes in small companies. 
Firth (1981) suggests that a small company is one with a market capitalisation 
under £10m. In this sample of 337 companies 32 (9.5%) fall into this classification. 
Table 22 provides the breakdown for the 36 firms with PA residuals (absolute re- 
turns) one standard deviation or more from the mean of the PA sample residuals 
and 29 firms whose ARA residuals were similarly positioned from the ARA sample 
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mean. 
PA ARA Standard Deviations from PA and 
No of Cos. No of Cos. and ARA means (absolute residuals) 
2 2 >5 
2 
- 
4-5 
5 1 3-4 
5 5 2-3 
22 21 1-2 
36 29 
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Table 22: Companies with PA and ARA residuals more than one Standard Devia- 
tion from the Sample PA and ARA mean 
The 36 PA and 29 ARA companies each contained 8 small firms of which two 
were the same companies. Thus 22% of the PA companies and 27.6% of the ARA 
companies are small according to this definition. These figures respectively represent 
2 and 3 times the proportion of small companies in the whole sample (9.5%). Z 
tests, using the weighted mean of the sample proportions, were conducted between 
the sample proportion of small firms 9.5% and the PA and ARA proportions and 
between the PA and ARA proportions. The Zca, tc are 2.49,2.99 and 0.52 respectively. 
The PA and ARA proportions at the Z0.05 level are significantly different to the 
sample proportion but the difference between the PA and ARA proportions (Zcaic= 
0.52) may be due to chance. 
The frequency of small companies with large' abnormal returns provides further 
evidence of the inverse relationship between the size of the company and the excess 
return earned by its stock. 
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5.7 Weekly Data 
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A comparable study by Firth(1981) used weekly data and this may have affected the 
results reported. If the impact of the information event does not occur on a single 
day but spreads over several days, using daily abnormal returns will not capture 
the full effect of the information. The daily mean abnormal return will be biased 
downward because of this failure. 
To test for any potential bias introduced by using weekly data certain of the 
above tests were re-run using weekly data. This was derived by adding together the 
logarithmic residuals for five consecutive trading days and, where indicated, taking 
the absolute value. Because of data restrictions the number of companies dropped 
from 337 to 325. 
This study Firth 
Daily Weekly Weekly 
PA 
. 
0407 
. 
0554 
. 
0641 
IR 
. 
0399 
. 
0549 
. 
0562 
AGM 
. 
0175 
. 
0383 
. 
0378 
ARA 
. 
0159 
. 
0357 
. 
0501 
Table 23: Absolute Average Abnormal Returns Daily and Weekly Data for this 
Study and Weekly for Firth(1981) 
Evidence of the downward bias for daily average residuals is shown in Table 23. 
It can be seen that the ARA average weekly residual (. 0501) of Firth's results is 3 
times greater than the daily mean residual (. 0159) of this study and the AGM daily 
average residual (. 0175) is half the size of Firth's weekly average abnormal return 
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Model 2 
Rank Week WAR 
1 PA 
. 
0554 
2 IR 
. 
0549 
3 AGM 
. 
0383 
4 36 
. 
0367 
5 ARA 
. 
0357 
6 25 
. 
0341 
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Table 24: Rankings of Absolute Average Weekly Abnormal Returns (N=325) 
(. 0378). 
5.7.1 Test 1: Information Content of Event Disclosures 
- 
Analysis of Mean Weekly Cross-Sectional Return 
Data 
Table 24 provides the cross-sectional ranking of absolute average weekly abnormal 
returns. There are no event days plus one as shown in Table 6 for daily data as the 
residuals for these days are absorbed in the event week residual. The rankings of 
the event week are similar to Table 6 with the PA and IR ranking first and second 
respectively followed by the AGM. The ARA is pushed down one rank by a non- 
event week with a larger residual, but the ARA's rank of five does indicate that the 
annual report has information content. 
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5.7.2 Test 2: Degree of Association Between Information 
Content of Different Events 
Model PA-ARA PA-AGM PA-IR ARA-AGM ARA-IR AGM-IR 
2 
. 
195 
. 
055 
. 
116- 
. 
116 
. 
215 
. 
152 
(3.565) (. 966) (2.107) (2.092) (3.962) (2.763) 
Table 25: Association Between Information Content of Events Using Absolute Val- 
ues of Weekly Residuals (Pearson's Correlation Coefficients with Student's `t' Values 
in Parenthesis)(N=325) 
To examine whether the weekly residuals for the PA, ARA, AGM and IR for a given 
firm are related, the firms' residuals for one event were regressed on their residuals 
for the other events. The correlation coefficients in Table 25 show the degree of 
association between the information content of the four events. 
Unlike Table 18, Table 25 shows small, statistically significant positive relation- 
ships between all events except the PA and AGM. These results differ with those 
for daily data revealed in section 5.5 and with the results of Firth (1981). Firth 
found no evidence of a significant relationship between the AGM week and the PA, 
ARA and IR weeks. 
One would not expect an association of information content between the prelim- 
inary announcement and the annual general meeting as another event, the annual 
report and accounts, intervenes. The significant associations seem to suggest a firm 
experiencing a high information content on its preliminary announcement will also 
experience a high information content for all its other three events. This differs from 
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the daily data results where the correlation coefficients between the annual report 
and accounts and the other events were all non-significant. We may argue that the 
inclusion of the annual report and accounts in these results is due to the weekly 
data capturing a greater amount of information impact as explained in section 5.5. 
and the inclusion of the annual general meeting is caused by the sample firm size 
factor as suggested in that section. 
Generally if the association between all events is positive, as it is in this analysis, 
the results are suggestive of some companies being well followed and some not. 
Dowen (1989), Bhushan (1989) and O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) suggest such 
factors as institutional demand for information, analyst forecast error, firm industry, 
size and declining return volatility are among the determinants of analyst following. 
Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) posit a neglected firm effect leading to inefficient 
pricing for a period. Thus, we may speculate the differences in reaction with respect 
to daily (section 5.5) and weekly data (section 5.7) might be a function of lags 
of information dissemination reflecting this neglected firm effect. This hypothesis 
requires further investigation. 
If the regression is conducted using actual, signed weekly residuals there is a sig- 
nificant inverse association between events PA and ARA, and a significant positive 
association between the AGM and IR as shown in Table 26. We can only speculate 
on the causes of the inverse and positive correlations between the PA and ARA 
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 122 
and the AGM and IR respectively. The inverse association may be due to investors 
correcting any over-reaction to the preliminary announcement. The positive asso- 
ciation between the AGM and the IR may possibly be attributable to the firm size 
effect i. e. the larger firms in the sample releasing more information at both events. 
While all three tests in this study are consistent in revealing, perhaps not un- 
expectedly, no relationship between the PA and AGM, the two tests using weekly 
data show a significant association between the PA and ARA not evidenced when 
using the daily information statistic (Vjt) possibly for the reason given above i. e. 
the failure of the daily data to capture most of the impact of the event. 
Model PA-ARA PA-AGM PA-IR ARA-AGM ARA-IR AGM-IR 
2 
-. 
139 
. 
005 
. 
016 
-. 
037 
-. 
015 
. 
130 
(2.517) (. 087) (. 292) (. 662) (. 275) (2.347) 
Table 26: Association Between Information Content of Events Using Actual Values 
of Weekly Residuals (Pearson's Correlation Coefficients with Student's `t' Values in 
Parenthesis) (N=325) 
5.8 Summary 
The analyses reported in this chapter indicate the preliminary announcement and 
the interim report using daily data have the highest information content, while there 
seems to be only a small price reaction to the annual general meeting and an even 
smaller one to the annual report and accounts. The results support the hypothesis 
of lack of utility of the annual report and accounts, in aggregate, for investment 
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purposes. 
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There is little price reaction prior to an event but there appears to be some 
spill-over of information into the day following the event day which may be due to 
events occurring after the Stock Exchange closes, therefore part of the impact of 
the event information is reflected in the following day's share price. As normality 
resumes in day+2 the results are consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
as the information is "rapidly reflected in security prices" (Fama, 1970). 
The results seem to show investors reacting in the same manner to "good" and 
"bad" news. Although similar to other studies an inverse relationship is found 
between information content and firm size, there is some evidence that size may 
only be a proxy for some other firm-specific information variable. 
Finally, firms with a high information content preliminary announcement seem 
to have an annual report and accounts with a similar information content. The 
results seem to indicate investors in the main using the annual report and accounts 
to adjust their previous investment decisions. 
Chapter 6 
The Incremental Information of 
the Annual Report and Accounts 
This study appears, on a face value basis, to confirm the lack of apparent value of the 
annual report and accounts to market participants as an information source com- 
pared with what are in effect the straight dividends and earnings announcements 
conveyed in the preliminary and interim statements. However, such an interpreta- 
tion may be an oversimplification. Such research methodologies as those employed 
in this study so far have limited goals focusing on whether the event in question 
appears in aggregate to convey price sensitive information to the market. But how 
does the information event impact on individual firm returns? 
In considering the incremental information content of the annual report we 
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should note the evidence may still be consistent with certain firms experiencing large 
abnormal returns associated with the information release but not others. There may 
well be specific price relevant information in particular annual accounts such as as- 
set revaluation data (e. g. Sharpe and Walker, 1975 and Standish and Ung, 1982) or 
perhaps audit qualifications (e. g. see the survey of extant research in Craswell, 1985). 
This study may perhaps be viewed as essentially focusing implicitly on outliers 
rather than mean returns or information anticipated by the market in aggregate. 
The latter is more to do with investor rational expectations than the content of the 
annual report and accounts. Focusing on those firms with high absolute residuals i. e. 
the outliers, may reveal a pattern present in the release of information in the annual 
report and accounts incremental to that provided in the preliminary statement. 
In support of the hypothesis that for certain companies the annual report and 
accounts does contain price sensitive information it is unlikely that the information 
which triggered the abnormal returns can be identified with certainty as being 
contained in the annual report. Ideally, to determine causality of the share price 
movement, one would have to identify at the time the investors made their decisions, 
the reasons they used for making them. This is clearly impossible after the event. 
In an ex-post event situation, from comments made around the time of the event 
can probably be assembled a number of pointers to the information found useful 
by investors. If it can be seen that this information was most likely to be found in 
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the annual report and accounts it is reasonable to infer that the annual report and 
accounts for that company may contain price sensitive information which was useful 
for decision making. It has to be emphasised, however, -that by an analysis of the 
comments, it can only be surmised that certain identified factors may be consistent 
with the magnitude of the outlier residuals and their signs but not possible to prove 
causality. It is recognised that working backwards and looking, as it were, at the 
`entrails' is not very scientific but in the circumstances it is the best that can be 
done. 
The first objective then is to identify price sensitive information contained in the 
annual report and accounts which may explain the greater share price movement 
of the outlier companies. This information is then compared with the information 
found by previous studies 
, 
reported in Chapter 3, of the usefulness of the annual 
report and accounts to investors for share evaluation purposes, to see whether the 
findings of this study are similar to those of previous researchers. 
As stated it is not possible to directly observe which parts of the preliminary 
announcement and annual report and accounts are used by investors so an alter- 
native method has to be used. Ho and Michaely(1988), an American study, found 
newspaper commentaries highly read by investors particularly those who had not 
acquired quality information and who traded largely in small shares. It should be 
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noted that journalists report stockbrokers' circulars. Chang and Most (1980) re- 
ported UK shareholders placing great reliance on newspapers and magazines, so it 
is reasonable to infer that where a writer in a financial newspaper or journal at the 
preliminary announcement stage refers to information he will be looking for in the 
annual report and accounts, that section of the annual report and accounts where 
the information is found will be read by investors. This applies also to comment 
made after the publication of the annual report and accounts. Provided the com- 
mentators are consistent, their comments after publication of the annual report and 
accounts, should contain some references to their previous remarks and indicate the 
relevant weight they attach to those parts of the annual report and accounts where 
the information they were awaiting is contained. 
The articles of the financial journalists used for the above purpose were taken 
from the influencial Financial Times (FT) newspaper, the Investors Chronicle (IC) 
journal and from press cuttings from McCarthy Information Ltd. The FT is a daily 
financial newspaper and mainly comments on the preliminary announcement with 
occasional comment in its highly regarded "Lex" column. The IC is published every 
Friday and comments on both the preliminary announcement and annual report 
and accounts events. Unfortunately, between 19 April and 22 May 1980, both days 
inclusive, there was a national printing dispute. The IC was not published in this 
period and neither was the FT on the 5th and 14th of May. Some company events 
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occurred during the dispute, so the comment on the events, particularly on the 
annual report and accounts, was either sparse or non-existent. 
Although the Dimson and Marsh (1986) study concerned UK press recommenda- 
tions and mainly focused on the distorting impact of company size on event studies, 
it started with the premise that "many investors follow press advice closely". 49 
per cent of the press recommendations they used came from the Investors Chroni- 
cle which emphasises the importance of this journal as a source of information for 
investors. 
To investigate directly whether information conveyed at the annual report and 
accounts stage is driving the extreme share price reaction in the outlier sample, 
a comparision with a matched control group of firms with low residuals is made. 
This second objective is accomplished by selecting a control company with a low 
abnormal return and matching the outlier by industry, size and LBS rating. The 
control company can then be investigated to see if similar information is disclosed 
or not at the annual report and accounts stage. If a similar information set is 
disclosed in the annual report and accounts of the control group as in the outlier 
sample, then we may be forced to conclude that the annual report and accounts 
may not be driving the outlier group residuals, or at least we cannot find evidence 
supportive of this hypothesis in the data. However, if the information sets differ 
materially in the hypothesised direction we may well be on firmer ground in arguing 
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All industries covered Manufacturing Construction 
Weight 1000 697 182 
1978 110.3 104.0 104.9 
1979 113.0 104.3 101.3 
1980 105.8 95.4 95.9 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Economic Trends, December 1982, p. 26 
Table 27: Index of Industrial Production. 1975=100 seasonally adjusted 
the information content of the annual report and accounts for certain firms. 
No investigation into the use investors make of the annual report and accounts 
would be complete without taking into account the economic climate in which 
British companies were operating in the late 1970s. It was a traumatic period 
particularly for manufacturing companies. 
As can be seen from Table 27, Economic Trends, December 1982, manufacturing 
and construction accounted for 88 per cent of all industrial production. At the end 
of 1980 manufacturing was still shrinking having already fallen 8.5 per cent in that 
year. 
The Bank of England Minimum Lending Rate was reported in that same issue 
of Economic Trends (p. 66) to have been 17 per cent at the end of 1979, the highest 
rate for over a decade. The rate started to fall in July 1980 and was down to 14 
per cent at the end of the year. 
Further evidence of the abnormal situation prevailing during this period is con- 
tained in the Investors Chronicle "Annual Review of 1979", 4th January 1980 issue. 
"It was a bad year for the economy. Industrial strife sharply curtailed growth in 
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the first quarter, and higher oil prices meant that the recovery has been weak. Over 
the year, output is likely to have shown only a small increase". The review also 
showed the Financial Times All Share Index having reached an all time high of 283 
in May 1979 and had then fallen to 219 by November 1979; that the bank clearing 
rate was 18 per cent and of the main industrialised countries the UK inflation rate 
was only exceeded by that of Italy. 
The issue dated 2 January 1981 contained a "Review of the economy" for 1980 
which included the following comment, "After marking time in the first quarter, 
the economy plunged into what looks like being the deepest recession since the 
Thirties... Manufacturing output is likely to have fallen by 10 per cent in 1980". 
Many companies, both large and small, were slowly recovering from the 1974 
oil crisis only to face another in 1980. Some were fighting just to survive. High 
inflation coupled with a strong pound found most firms engaged in cost cutting and 
improving liquidity. The monthly average of unemployment had risen from 1.3m in 
1979 to 2.6m in 1981. (Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics 1982, 
page 28). Share prices had collapsed and the market capitalisation of even large 
companies was well below the net asset value. It is against this background that 
the actions of investors have to be judged. 
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6.1 Comparison of the Annual Report and Ac- 
counts with the Preliminary Announcement 
Standard Deviations Frequency 
-. 
75--. 50 94 
-. 
50--. 25 76 
-. 
25-M 44 
M-0.25 44 
. 
25-0.50 27 
. 
50-0.75 14 
. 
75-1.00 9 
1.00-1.25 10 
1.25-1.50 3 
1.50-1.75 6 
1.75-2.00 2 
2.00-3.00 5 
3- 3 
337 
Mean (M) 
= 
. 
0160049 
Standard Deviation 
=. 
0219404 
Table 28: Frequency, in Standard Deviations, of the 337 Company ARA Residuals (absolute values) from the Mean of the ARA Residuals 
Table 28 lists the frequency distribution of the 337 company annual report and ac- 
counts residuals (absolute values). The ranges are measured in standard deviations 
(SDs) from the mean. 
Figure 14, is a histogram of the frequency distribution. As can be observed from 
the distribution, 91 per cent of the annual report and accounts residuals lie between 
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Frequency 
100 
90 
80 
70 
6C 
5c 
6 
3 
Figure 14: Frequency, in Standard Deviations, of the 337 Company ARA Residuals 
(absolute values) from the Mean of the ARA Residuals. Graphical Presentation of 
Table 28 
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-0.75 SD and +1 SD 
.A total of 29 residuals lie more than one SD from the mean. 
Although the histogram shows the number of companies in the class intervals after 
1.25 SDs dropping sharply, the size of the residual at one SD is 0.0378 which is 
relatively large when compared with the mean 0.016. It was, therefore, decided to 
make the cut-off point for the outlier group one SD. This allows a larger sample to 
be analysed and the probability of missing any company annual report and accounts 
which contains price sensitive information will be reduced. 
Table 29 lists the names of the 29 outlier companies. Also listed is the mar- 
ket sector in which the company operated, its LBS share marketability rating 
and market capitalisation 
- 
the market value of the company's ordinary shares. 
The market capitalisation and share marketability rating are taken from the Lon- 
don Business School, Risk Measurement Service journals Vol. 1. No. 2. April 1979 and 
Vol. 3. No. 1. January 1981 respectively. 
Table 30 lists the same companies and tables the dates of their financial year 
ends, the dates of the PAs and publication of the ARAs together with the signed 
residuals for the two events. Table 30 shows that for 13 companies the sign of the 
i 
residual, either positive or negative, is the same at the PA as at the ARA. The 
remaining 16 have a reversal of sign; 6 change from negative at the PA to positive 
at the ARA and 10 do the reverse. The reversal of signs is consistent with the 
findings in Chapter 5. 
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LBS Market 
Company Sector Rating Cap. 
1 Audiotronic Hldgs Str Mult 2 2 
2 Hambros Ltd Mrch Bank 2 42 
3 Carrington Viyella Cotn & Syn 2 65 
4 Hawtin Ltd Clothing 2 6 
5 Beecham Group Ltd Phm Prod 1 1161 
6 First National Finance Corp Hire Purch 2 9 
7 Bellhaven Brewery Brewery 2 5 
8 European Ferries Shipping 1 165 
9 Bassett (G) Hldgs Food Man 2 14 
10 Vickers Mech Eng 1 83 
11 Attock Petroleum Oil 2 3 
12 Assocd. Leisure Leisure 2 25 
13 Borthwick(T) & Sons Ovse. Tdr 2 40 
14 British Petroleum Oil 1 4538 
15 Raybeck Ltd Str Mult 2 44 
16 Barker & Dobson Food Man 2 9 
17 London Scottish Marine 0 Oil 1 87 
18 Berec Group Lgt. Elec 2 91 
19 Acrow Ltd Mch. Hand 1 17 
20 Comfort Hotels Int Ltd Hotl & Cat 2 14 
21 Inveresk Group Pack & Pap 2 9 
22 Hill, Samuel Group Mrch Bank 2 64 
23 Birmid Qualcast Mech. Eng 2 37 
24 Brocks Group Ltd Lgt. Elect 2 8 
25 Assocd. Biscuit Manfrs Mill & Flour 2 59 
26 Automated Security Unclass 2 11 
27 Dunlop Hldg Ltd Mtr Comp 1 99 
28 Hepworth J& Son Str Mult 2 36 
29 Scottish & Newcastle Brewery Brewery 1 179 
134 
Table 29: Industry Sector, LBS Rating and Market Capitalisation of 29 Companies 
with an ARA Residual >_ one Standard Deviation from the Mean of the 337 ARA 
Residuals (absolute values 
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Year PA ARA PA ARA 
Company end dates dates residuals residuals 
1 Audiotronic Hldgs 1 03 80 17 10 80 1 12 80 
-. 
3344 
-. 
2826 
2 Hambros Ltd 31 03 80 16 06 80 30 06 80 
-. 
0306 
. 
1592 
3 Carrington Viyella 31 12 79 20 02 80 10 03 80 
-. 
0746 
. 
0923 
4 Hawtin Ltd 31 01 80 8 05 80 5 06 80 
-. 
0711 . 0767 
5 Beecham Group Ltd 31 03 80 29 05 80 8 07 80 
. 
0509 
-. 
0702 
6 First National Finance Corp 31 10 79 10 01 80 1 02 80 
. 
0997 
-. 
0696 
7 Bellhaven Brewery 30 03 80 30 07 80 26 08 80 
-. 
0422 
. 
0656 
8 European Ferries 31 12 79 15 05 80 2 06 80 
. 
0316 
. 
0617 
9 Bassett (G) Hldgs 31 03 80 1 07 80 4 08 80 
-. 
2130 
-. 
0565 
10 Vickers 31 12 79 24 04 80 4 06 80 
. 
0582 
. 
0550 
11 Attock Petroleum 30 06 80 20 10 80 26 10 80 
. 
0230 
-. 
0537 
12 Assocd. Leisure 16 03 80 7 07 80 19 08 80 
-. 
0080 
. 
0519 
13 Borthwick(T) & Sons 30 09 79 11 12 79 7 01 80 
. 
0113 
. 
0513 
14 British Petroleum 31 12 79 13 03 80 10 04 80 
. 
0344 
-. 
0499 
15 Raybeck Ltd 26 04 80 5 09 90 19 09 80 
. 
0360 
. 
0497 
16 Barker & Dobson 29 03 80 29 08 80 3 11 80 
. 
0537 
-. 
0490 
17 London Scottish Marine 0 31 12 79 25 03 80 30 04 80 
-. 
0156 
-. 
0485 
18 Berec Group 1 03 80 16 05 80 16 06 80 
. 
0266 
-. 
0478 
19 Acrow Ltd 31 03 80 29 07 80 10 09 80 
. 
0801 
. 
0445 
20 Comfort Hotels Int Ltd 30 12 79 30 04 80 30 06 80 
. 
0604 
. 
0433 
21 Inveresk Group 31 12 79 18 03 80 8 04 80 
. 
0769 
. 
0424 
22 Hill, Samuel Group 31 03 80 12 06 80 19 06 80 
. 
0359 
. 
0407 
23 Birmid Qualcast 3 11 79 13 02 80 28 02 80 
. 
0569 
. 
0395 
24 Brocks Group Ltd 31 12 79 17 04 80 11 06 80 
. 
0491 
-. 
0386 
25 Assocd. Biscuit Manfrs 31 12 79 10 04 80 22 04 80 
-. 
0334 
. 
0382 
26 Automated Security 30 11 79 14 04 80 19 04 80 
. 
0332 
-. 
0380 
27 Dunlop Hldg Ltd 31 12 79 24 04 80 15 05 80 
. 
0573 
-. 
0379 
28 Hepworth J& Son 31 08 80 30 10 80 27 11 80 
. 
0459 
-. 
0379 
29 Scottish & Newcastle Brewery 27 04 80 3 07 80 30 07 80 
. 
1070 
. 
0378 
Table 30: Dates of Year End, PA and ARA together with PA and ARA residuals 
of the 29 Companies with an ARA Residual > one Standard Deviation from the 
Mean of the 337 ARA Residuals (absolute values) 
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Whatever the ARA contained, for those companies with similar signed residuals, 
the effect of the ARA may be to act as a reinforcement of investors expectations 
formed at the PA. If this is true, we should recall the opinion of Dyckman, Downes 
and Magee(1975), "Information contained in accounting reports may at times re- 
inforce the prior expectations of investors, and hence lead to a decrease in the 
variability of investors expectations. If so, accounting reports provide information 
which existing tests have no hope of finding". 
As the Stock Exchange requires the publication of the PA as soon as possible 
after the draft accounts have been agreed with the auditors, the PA is usually not 
audited. The high information content of the PA may, therefore, be dependent on 
the knowledge that the data contained therein will be confirmed via the audited 
ARA, i. e. PA and ARA may be inextricably linked. For some investors, decisions 
taken at the PA are rather like a marksmans's sighting shot. If the shot hits the 
bullseye no adjustment to the rifle's sights is made. Similarly, if the ARA confirms 
the investors prior expectations, no action may be taken. 
Table 31 lists the minimum information which has to be included in the PA 
under Stock Exchange regulations. 
Table 32 tabulates three sections normally found in the ARA but voluntarily 
disclosed by some companies at the PA. Usually the Boards' report or Chairman's 
statement is brief and the balance sheet summarised. These sections were found 
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(a) Turnover 
(b) Profit before taxation and extraordinary items 
(c) Taxation on profits (UK and if material, 
overseas and share of associated companies) 
(d) Minority interests 
(e) Profit attributable to shareholders, before 
extraordinary items 
(f) Extraordinary items (net of taxation) 
(g) Profit attributable to shareholders 
(h) Rates of dividend(s) paid and proposed 
and amount absorbed thereby (i) Earnings per share expressed as pence per share 
(computed on the figures shown for profits after 
taxation as defined in SSAP3) 
(j) Comparative figures of (a) to (i) inclusive for 
the corresponding previous period (k) Any supplementary information which in the opinion 
of the directors is necessary for a reasonable 
appreciation of the results of the period. 
137 
Table 31: Historic Cost Information required to be included in the Preliminary 
Announcement by the UK Stock Exchange 
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Activity Balance Board/Ch. Man's 
Company analysis sheet statement 
1 Audiotronic Hldgs No No Yes 
2 Hambros Ltd No No Yes 
3 Carrington Viyella No Yes Yes 
4 Hawtin Ltd No No No 
5 Beecham Group Ltd No No No 
6 First National Finance Corp No Yes Yes 
7 Bellhaven Brewery No No Yes 
8 European Ferries No No No 
9 Bassett (G) Hldgs T/0 P No Yes 
10 Vickers T/0 P No Yes 
11 Attock Petroleum No No Yes 
12 Assocd. Leisure T/0 P No Yes 
13 Borthwick(T) & Sons No No Yes 
14 British Petroleum T/0 No Yes 
15 Raybeck Ltd No No Yes 
16 Barker & Dobson T/0 P No Yes 
17 London Scottish Marine 0 No No Yes 
18 Berec Group No No No 
19 Acrow Ltd No No Yes 
20 Comfort Hotels Int Ltd No No Yes 
21 Inveresk Group No No Yes 
22 Hill, Samuel Group P Yes No 
23 Birmid Qualcast Yes No Yes 
24 Brocks Group Ltd No* No Yes 
25 Assocd. Biscuit Manfrs No No Yes 
26 Automated Security No No Yes 
27 Dunlop Hldg Ltd No Yes Yes 
28 Hepworth J& Son No No Yes 
29 Scottish & Newcastle Brewery P No Yes 
Table 32: Items Voluntarily Included in the Preliminary Announcement 
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by Lee and Tweedie(1981) to be highly regarded as a source of information by UK 
investors. 
Table 33 presents a summary of the following detailed analysis of each of the 
29 outlier companies. It sets out those parts of the ARA which, based on evidence 
which is only suggestive and obtained from an ex-post study, could contain poten- 
tially price sensitive information that may explain the magnitude and sign of the 
residual. 
Take for example company number 18, the Berec Group Ltd. At the PA there is 
an abnormal return of 2.66 per cent but on publication of the ARA this was reversed 
to a negative 4.78 per cent. Some new information seems to have changed investors' 
expectations since the PA. The Lex column of the FT(17.5.80), reporting on the 
PA, mentioned that the dividend might not be covered by current cost earnings. 
Following publication of the ARA this point was taken up by the IC(20.6.80). The 
IC said "CC profits are depressing. 
.. 
especially as it is the group's long term policy 
to pay dividends out of c. c. earnings... The crunch is c. c. profits. Unless there is an 
improvement the dividend must be vunerable". No current cost profit statement 
was included in the PA. When the ARA was published, page 34 contained a Group 
Current Cost Profit Statement. Investors must have noted with dismay the fall in 
c. c. earnings before tax from 
. 
£l2m to 
. 
£2.8m. After tax and other deductions there 
was a current cost loss attributable to shareholders of £3.8m before the 
. 
£3.7m 
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Company A B C D E F G H 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 * * 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Key 
A= Auditors' report 
B= Balance sheet 
C= Funds statement 
D= Chairman's statement 
E= Geographical analysis 
F= Activity analysis 
G= Current cost profit statement 
H= Notes to accounts 
Table 33: Sectors of Annual Report and Accounts containing Information used by 
Investors etc 
CHAPTER 6. THE INCREMENTAL INFORMATION OF THE ARA 141 
of dividend payments. The Lex and IC comments are strongly suggestive of the 
reason for the size and direction of the sign of the company's residual. An asterisk, 
is therefore, placed in column 'G' (current cost profit statement) indicating where 
the information would be found. 
Where the information is disclosed in more than one section of the ARA, the 
sections are all indicated in the table but the analysis here is discussed only under 
the first heading. This avoids repetition of analysis, as where there are more that 
one information source even although situated in different parts of the ARA, they 
are generally inter-related. In the analyses that follow, in addition to the company 
name and number, the PA and ARA residuals and their directions are shown in 
brackets. 
6.1.1 Auditors' Report 
The auditors' report may have contained price sensitive information in the case of 
three companies, Audiotronic Hldgs. (No 1), Bellhaven Brewery (No 7) and Barker 
& Dobson (No 16). None of the three PAs was audited. 
Audiotronic Hldgs. No 1. (-. 3344 
-. 
2826) 
As in 1979, the 1980 accounts again carried an auditors' going-concern qualification. 
After the chairman's statement earlier in the year that the company was "in better 
shape than it had been for some time"(FT 18.10.80), the qualification to some 
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observers may have come as a surprise, but to most it would have confirmed their 
worst suspicions. 
There is also a direct reference in the IC(24.10.80) comment to the annual report 
and accounts probably containing price sensitive information. "Before publication 
of the balance sheet next month, it is impossible to estimate the asset/debt ratio". 
The annual report and accounts showed the capital gearing ratio rising from 70.9 
per cent to 102.4 per cent. The higher the gearing ratio the greater the possibility 
of bankruptcy (Ross, 1977). 
The combination of the going-concern qualification and the higher capital gear- 
ing depicting the company's financial deterioration, are strongly suggestive as the 
main causes of the high, negative ARA residual. 
Barker & Dobson. No 16. (. 0537 
-. 
0490) 
The company's results for 1980 were overdue and its share price had come down 
in the year from 32p to 14p (Financial Weekly 30.5.80). Investors may have antic- 
ipated the reported loss but the auditors' going-concern qualification, for the first 
time, may have come as a surprise. Certainly the Times(4.11.80), FT(5.11.80) and 
the IC(21.11.80) all drew their readers attention to it in their comments. Investors 
may have felt with Firth(1979) that "There may be a self-fulfilling prophecy about 
going-concern qualifications". It is fair to deduce, particularly as the preliminary 
announcement was not audited, that the qualification largely contributed to the 
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negative ARA residual. 
Bellhaven Brewery. No 7. (-. 0422 
. 
0656) 
The 1978 accounts for the company carried a going-concern qualification but those 
for 1979 were unqualified. The FT(30.7.80) commenting on the PA wrote, "Belea- 
guered shareholders will be pleased to hear that the forthcoming accounts should 
be unqualified". This proved to be correct. Investors must have been relieved to 
learn that the risk of losing their investment had lessened. It is reasonable to infer 
that this is a contributory factor for the positive ARA residual. 
6.1.2 Balance Sheet 
Table 33 shows the balance sheet potentially as an important information source 
for investors in the companies indicated. This is consistent with the findings of Lee 
and Tweedie(1981). In some cases other sectors of the accounts supplement the 
balance sheet information. There are nine companies tabulated under the balance 
sheet column of Table 33 where there may have been price relevant information 
being disclosed. One company, Audiotronic Hldgs, has already been analysed under 
Auditors' Report. 
Bassett (G) Hldgs. Ltd. No 9. (-. 2130 
-. 
0565) 
At the time of the preliminary announcement the company had a market capitalisa- 
tion of only £5.5m (IC 4.7.80. The preliminary announcement residual shows a fall 
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of 21.3 per cent when the company revealed its disasterous results 
-a pre-tax loss 
of £1.24m(. £1.33m profit). No comment on current trading was made in the pre- 
liminary announcement by the chairman but in the annual report and accounts he 
said, "UK business climate continues to be unfavourable and Sugar Confectionary 
and Biscuit industries are still struggling for increased profitable volume". Gearing 
was featured directly and indirectly in the preliminary announcement comments. 
The FT(2.7.80) reported "... yesterday's figures will have done nothing to help the 
borrowing position", and the IC(4.7.80) spoke of "interest charges (having) almost 
doubled". The annual report and accounts showed gearing to have risen from 31.3 
per cent to 35.8 per cent. More worrying, ß'2m of long-term debt had been replaced 
by short-term loans and overdrafts and shareholders' funds were reduced by ß'1.5m. 
It is arguable that the additional 5.7 per cent fall at the annual report was helped 
by the accounts showing gearing having risen thus increasing investors' risk, and 
the gloomy outlook of the chairman's statement. 
Raybeck Ltd. No 15. (. 0360 
. 
0497) 
A contributory factor behind the small positive abnormal return at the preliminary 
announcement of 3.64 per cent could have been the 10 per cent final dividend 
increase despite a fall in earnings from 
. 
C7.8m to 
. 
C5.6m. Another was revealed 
in the IC(12.9.80) article concerning the company's " 
... 
strong balance sheet with 
net cash of £6m". Publication of the ARA saw a further rise. Commenting on 
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the annual report and accounts the IC(3.10.80) referred to a sale and leaseback 
agreement which netted £16.5m. It said "Such wizardry had transformed Raybeck's 
balance sheet and been a major prop behind the share price as profits tumble". No 
balance sheet was published at the preliminary announcement. 
Acrow Ltd. No 19. (. 0801 
. 
0445) 
At the preliminary announcement both the IC(1.8.80) and the FT(30.7.80) were 
concerned over the company's profit collapse to 
. 
C2.02m(. C13.78m). No balance 
sheet details were given though a revaluation surplus of £13.2m was disclosed. The 
PA included a confident prediction by the chairman that after "a poor first half 
... 
the company will begin to return to a growth pattern in the second term". When 
the balance sheet was published it showed shareholders' funds rising by £10.4m and 
gearing up only to 57.1(55.7) per cent. Commenting on the annual report Lex of the 
FT(13.9.80) wrote, "All the same, this group looks like a survivor. Acrow is strong 
enough to try to sell its way out of its problems". It is fair to assume that the 
factors which led to the positive ARA residual included the information contained 
in the balance sheet which reinforced the chairman's optimistic statement. 
Inveresk Group. No 21. (. 0769 
. 
0424) 
Both the preliminary announcement and the annual report and accounts fell within 
the period of the printing dispute. At the preliminary announcement the chairman 
stated that the company's prospects would benefit by a decrease in indebtedness but 
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the reduction was not quantified. Net interest payable had risen to £1.5m(. C. 5m). 
No balance sheet details were released. The balance sheet in the annual report 
and accounts showed no change in long-term debt but overdrafts had fallen by 
59 per cent to 
. 
£3.2m(. C7.9m). At a time of high interest rates this reduction 
would certainly enhance the profits. In addition the funds statement revealed a 
positive cash flow when previously it had been negative. It is probably fair to sug- 
gest that the balance sheet and funds statement may have contained information 
used by investors in their decision making leading to the further positive residual. 
Birmid Qualcast Ltd. No 23. (. 0569 
. 
0395) 
Although no balance sheet details were published at the preliminary announcement 
the Lex column of the FT(14.2.80) reports "Birmid's balance sheet looks strong 
enough". This point was taken up by the IC(7.3.80) when the annual report and 
accounts was released "The impact of this (purchase of fixed assets) has been re- 
markably slight.... With a strong balance sheet... the shares are a very good 
recovery prospect". The "strong balance sheet", inter alia, may have been noticed 
by investors, (net debt/shareholders' funds was still only 18 per cent), hence the 
further positive residual. 
Brocks Group Ltd. No 24. (. 0491 
-. 
0386) 
The sharp fall in profits of this small company from Lim to £0.3m led the commen- 
tators to focus on the company's borrowings. The commentaries on this company 
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were mixed, some favourable, some unfavourable. The FT(18.4.80) writing on the 
preliminary announcement seemed optimistic. "The accounts will show borrowings 
of 
. 
C2.4m against net shareholders' funds of £5.5m... but it (the company) does 
seem to be over the worst". When the ARA was published the IC(27.6.80) was 
positively bullish "The reverses of last year have left a legacy of sharply increased 
debt. However, the level is far from intolerable... looks an interesting punt on swift 
recovery in fortunes". Onlooker of the FT(19.4.80) was probably more nearer the 
truth when he wrote "Apart from the new companies 
... 
Brocks has very little left". 
The new companies made a profit of £O. 1m. No overall profit forecast was made 
at the preliminary announcement stage but the board said that trading conditions 
in the main marine division were going to be difficult. The new companies were 
on target to achieve greatly increased trading results for 1980. The chairman in 
the annual report gave as the primary objective the reduction of borrowings whilst 
forecasting "further trading losses (in the marine division) during the year". It is 
reasonable to infer that the combination of the higher gearing disclosed in the bal- 
ance sheet and the chairman's statement is the key to the negative residual. 
Automated Security(Holdings)Ltd. No 26 (. 0332 
-. 
0380) 
The PA 3.3 per cent residual can largely be explained by the 53 per cent increase 
in pre-tax profits plus the dividend increase of 48 per cent. The short directors' 
report in the preliminary announcement saw sustained growth for all divisions for 
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the foreseeable future and they, the directors, looked forward to the future with con- 
fidence. No balance sheet details were given. The IC(18.4.80) reported that "the 
(company's) record and prospects are outstanding, but everything has its price. The 
shares may have moved ahead of events". In other words the shares may have 
been over-valued. A comment in the same vein was contained in the FT report of 
15.4.80, "Anything less than 53 per cent jump in pre-tax profits could have taken its 
toll on the 237p share price". The printing dispute limited comment on the annual 
report and accounts, but at a time when highly geared companies carried an unusual 
degree of risk due to the prevailing economic conditions, when the balance sheet 
was published showing gearing still 78%(97%), we may speculate certain investors 
may have taken their profits contributing to the negative ARA residual. 
Scottish & Newcastle Brewery. No 29. (. 1070 
. 
0378) 
It was the interest charge which worried the commentator Onlooker of the FT(5.7.80). 
He wrote "Much higher interest charge in the second half. The interest charge will 
again be high as borrowings rose 
. 
C21m last year and will be up again in 1980/81". 
The positive residual may have reflected the relief of the investors who, when the 
balance sheet was published, saw that gearing had only risen to 35.4 per cent com- 
pared with 28.5 per cent the previous year. 
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6.1.3 Funds Statement 
The Funds Statement may have influenced investors in two companies of which the 
Inveresk Group has already been analysed. 
Carrington Viyella. No 3. (-. 0746 
. 
0923) 
All the financial writers concentrated upon the company's poor results and the 
drastic rationalisation measures being taken. Lex of the FT(21.2.80), commenting 
on the preliminary announcement, summed up the company's results and inten- 
tions with "... the group is battening down the hatches and is concentrating on 
survival.... The target is to cut the cash outflow to zero". The profit fall and the 
more than halved total dividend were factors behind the preliminary announcement 
negative residual. 
Press comment clearly indicated that the annual report and accounts had infor- 
mation content for Lex(10.3.80) wrote "The annual report makes it clear just why 
the group has been forced into a series of plant closures and a dividend cut even 
though trading profits 
... 
were only about a tenth lower for 1979". 
Over the years the company had been heavily dependent on the UK for both 
turnover and profits. In 1979 the UK accounted for 92 per cent of turnover and 90 
per cent of profit. Lex continued with "In the UK alone, the trading profits fall was 
nearer 20 per cent at 
. 
C14.9m. (Note: the preliminary announcement contained no 
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geographical analysis) 
... 
Just as important, a heavy chunk of stock appreciation 
has swollen the trading profit... The underlying picture shows up clearly in the 
flow of funds. Net cash flow from trading was around 
. 
C13m in the last year. The 
final cash outflow was 
. 
C9m". To obtain a picture of the problems which had to 
be overcome by the management of the company, Lex had drawn on the annual 
report and accounts for the geographical analysis, the funds flow statement and the 
current cost profit statement. Clearly for Lex the annual report and accounts had 
incremental information above that contained in the preliminary announcement. 
On publication of the annual report and accounts the company's share price rose 
7.5 per cent from 13 1/2 pence to 14 1/2 pence. The Times(17.3.80) in its "Brokers 
View" column wrote, "Fielding (Fielding Newson-Smith stockbrokers) suggests that 
if the fundamental rationalisation measures by companies like Carrington Viyella 
and Tootal produce the expected benefits, the sector's decline may be reversed". 
Probably a combination of factors plus the stockbrokers' comments fueled the share 
price rise. 
6.1.4 Chairman's Statement 
4 
Although Abbas and Pendlebury (1985) suggested that investors place little reliance 
on the chairman's report, the analyses of 14 companies out of 29 do seem to suggest 
that the statements contain information useful to investors for share evaluation 
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purposes. Three companies, Bassett (G) Hldgs (No 9), Acrow Ltd (No 19) and 
Brocks Group Ltd (No 24) have already been analysed. 
Hawtin Ltd. No 4. (-. 0711 
. 
0767) 
Hawtin Ltd. was a small company not closely followed by analysts. It did not ap- 
pear in the December 1979, Earnings Guide. Being small and not closely followed, 
there would be little information released during the year thus one would expect a 
greater relative information disclosure on the preliminary announcement and annual 
report event days, particularly on the latter with its more detailed analysis of the 
company. Unfortunately both event days fell in the period of the printing dispute. 
The preliminary announcement, which met only the minimum stock exchange re- 
quirements, and contained no chairman's report, was published by the FT without 
comment. No newspaper comment appears to have been made on the annual report 
and accounts. The factors behind the residuals can, therefore, only be surmised. 
Hawtin obtained a listing in 1977 and the profits for 1978 and 1979 increased 
each year by 23 per cent and 39 per cent respectively. 1980 showed only a 16 per 
cent increase on weakened margins. This probably did not meet with investors' 
expectations hence the negative residual. Management were well aware of the need 
to diversify as strikes and the shrinking engineering industry were affecting de- 
mand for the company's main product 
- 
industrial protective clothing. The chair- 
man in his statement mentioned that "Group earnings... have been substantially 
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augmented... (by) the element of diversification introduced in accordance with the 
policy I then outlined". The activity analysis revealed that the new companies 
seemed to have got off to a reasonable start as "Other Activities" now accounted 
for turnover of £3.6m(. C1.1) and pre-tax profit of 
. 
CO. 26m(. CO. 09m), i. e. 29% of 
turnover and 22% of profit against 17% and 9% respectively in 1979. The chairman 
ended his statement on a high note with "the potential for growth through devel- 
opment is high and will be exploited to the fullest extent of available resources". 
It is conceivable that despite higher gearing, lower interest cover (see Table 38) and 
"weaker margins, investors took into account the company's profit record and bol- 
stered by the chairman's statement revised their expectations of the company's 
prospects. These factors are possibly reflected in the positive residual. 
Beecham Group Ltd. No 5. (. 0509 
-. 
0702) 
Beecham incurred its first profit fall for seventeen years. It was not unexpected as 
the first half saw a profit decline 
. 
Reporting on the preliminary announcement, 
Lex of the FT(30.5.80) wrote "... that pre-tax profits had fallen only to ß'136.8m 
from 
. 
£144.0m were greeted with relief". This and the lifting of the net total div- 
idend to 6.13p(5.31p) were probably the factors driving the positive preliminary 
announcement residual. 
Lex went to say "The group's pharmaceutical business is still under very heavy 
pressure, with costs rising fast and price increases almost unobtainable outside the 
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UK.... Unless sterling and interest rates fall far and soon Beecham looks set for 
another year of stagnant profits. Similar comments were made by the IC(6.6.80) 
concerning the pharmaceutical side. 
When the annual report and accounts was released it contained a geographical 
analysis showing Beecham obtained 65 per cent of sales and 66 per cent of profit 
from overseas. It also showed that the pharmaceutical profit margin had fallen from 
28 per cent to 22 per cent. The chairman's statement said "There is no doubt, how- 
ever, that the industry's greatest problems are the effect of inflation on its costs, 
and the reluctance of Governments to make proper allowance for this factor in the 
many countries where they determine or influence prices.... Governments are un- 
likely to allow cost-inflation to be fully reflected in prices when they can prevent 
it. " Reporting on the annual report and accounts the IC(18.7.80) remarked, "The 
short term outlook for the pharmaceuticals side is not good. Price increases are 
subject to government controls in most markets; pharmaceuticals have only shown 
improved results in the UK where price rises were permitted". We may speculate 
the geographical segmental margin report and the tone of the chairman's statement 
emphasising the difficulties of the profitable pharmaceutical side may have been 
associated with the large negative annual report and accounts residual. 
First National Finance Corp. No 6. (. 0997 
-. 
0696) 
No dividend had been paid by this company since 1974 and from 1975 it owed its 
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existence to a Support Group of banks to which it owed £226m, repayable at seven 
days notice. As in the previous year the auditors said, "the withdrawal of such 
facilities would make a going-concern basis inapplicable and further substantial un- 
provided losses may be suffered". The preliminary announcement statement that 
the "results are much better than anticipated in the interim announcement", proba- 
bly accounted for the 9.97 per cent preliminary announcement rise. The IC(18.1.80), 
however, sounded a word of caution, ".... E10m came from activities not likely to 
be profitable in 1980". This was confirmed in the chairman's statement on publica- 
tion of the annual report and accounts, "... profits attributable to the Lending and 
Property Division (. £10.7m) are, to a large extent, more in the nature of surpluses 
on the realisations of loans and properties and the release of provisions thereon 
rather than profits earned from normal recurring lending transactions". He also 
said, ".. it is not possible at this stage to make any reliable forecast as to the even- 
tual outcome for the current year". There was no comment on the annual report 
and accounts but we might arguably be able to surmise that these warnings against 
too high an expectation for the company in the coming year may have contributed 
to the negative annual report and accounts residual. 
European Ferries. No 8. (. 0316 
. 
0617) 
The preliminary announcement contained no board statement. Profits were up by 
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four per cent on 1978 which probably accounted for the positive preliminary an- 
nouncement residual. Commenting on the annual report and accounts the IC(13.6.80) 
said "Chairman Mr Keith Wickenden has confirmed that the Denver project has 
the potential to generate profits near to `the present market capitalisation' of the 
whole group 
- 
ß'161m 
... 
it is the prospect of a burgeoning cash flow that is exciting 
the city". The article went on to recount other parts of the statement forecasting 
possible new ventures using the higher cash flow. The FT(3.6.80) under the heading 
"Euroferries sees `useful' rise for the current year" said "Mr Wickenden states that 
during the next few years profitable use has to be found for the significant cash flow 
the group's business produces". The company's shares had risen 45 per cent in the 
six weeks prior to 13th June. The annual report and accounts was published on 2 
June and from that date to the 13th June the share price rose 12.4 per cent. This 
might arguably reflect the reading of the chairman's statement by investors who 
liked what they read and acted on it. 
Vickers. No 10. (. 0582 
. 
0550) 
Despite the preliminary announcement showing the company experiencing a 38 per 
cent profit fall, Vickers still had its "highly successful lithographic side", Daily Tele- 
graph(25.4.80), and its profitable UK engineering division. The first quarter of 1980 
was reported by the board to be "encouraging and (we) expect trading profits to 
show an improvement over 1979". This and the maintenance of the final dividend 
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may have been sufficient to explain the positive preliminary announcement residual. 
The FT(25.4.80) writing on the preliminary announcement drew attention to the 
company's long drawn-out dispute with the government over compensation for its 
nationalised assets. The newspaper said, "The compensation when it comes will 
probably barely wipe out net debt (58.8 per cent of net worth), reducing the scope 
for further acquisitions". Lex of the FT(4.6.80) said "Vickers' accounts show that 
terms for the nationalisation of its shipbuilding and aerospace assets and the dis- 
posal of its business machines division have both become a matter of some urgency 
.... 
However, the group is confident that the disposal will be completed in a mat- 
ter of weeks and is hopeful that compensation will be agreed within the next few 
months. In that case, the picture will be transformed". Similarly the IC(6.6.80) 
reported "Vickers' problem of rising debt and the long delay in settling nationalisa- 
tion compensation looks like being lifted very shortly 
.... 
Thus Vickers will shortly 
be comfortably placed for the first time for years". Both of these two articles were 
based on the chairman's statement in the annual report and accounts. These op- 
timistic articles most likely reflected the investors favourable expectations of the 
company's prospects. 
Attock Petroleum. No 11. (. 0230 
-. 
0537) 
There was little comment on this company's results. The positive preliminary an- 
nouncement residual was possibly due to the conversion of the previous year's loss 
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of ß O. 034m into a small profit of ß'0.022m. No reason for the non-payment of a 
dividend was mentioned in the preliminary announcement board report. This was 
disclosed in the chairman's statement in the annual report and accounts. According 
to the chairman, the pre-tax profit was due to interest earned on the proceeds from 
the sale of some shares. The company received a total of 
. 
CO. 326m in interest on 
investments. According to the chairman it was company policy to pay dividends 
from oil and gas profits not from short term interest receipts. The IC(14.11.80) 
said, " Last year Attock did a bit better than break even, investment incomebe- 
ing enough to cover outgoings but this year's spending is due to rise and a cut in 
interest rates will affect income". The chairman foretold "further progress ahead" 
but no firm forecast was made. One can only surmise that the possibility of a fall 
in interest rates and the new information provided by the chairman regarding the 
company's dividend policy may have changed investors' expectations and resulted 
in the negative annual report and accounts residual. 
British Petroleum. No 14. (. 0344 
-. 
0499) 
Reported net income rose from ß'444.4m to £1.62bn in 1979, a figure higher than 
the brokers' expectations and the dividend was lifted to 17.5p(6.4p). This alone 
could have been sufficient to account for the small positive preliminary announce- 
ment residual. Lex of the FT(14.3.80) reporting on the preliminary announcement 
drew attention to the company's "loss of former crude sources like Iran and Nigeria 
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and the corresponding need to buy in expensive spot crude were biting into mar- 
gins". Whilst the IC(21.3.80) said "The group has its problems in 1980... oil trading 
margins started to suffer in the second half of 1979 when margins on chemicals were 
hit also by rising costs and by imports". The company revealed in the preliminary 
announcement that it had been "forced to reduce sales to nearly all third party 
customers". The chairman in his statement elaborated on the previous preliminary 
announcement report. He said, "The company has changed in a single year from 
being a major seller of crude oil to other refiners; to being one which must buy 
in the market a large part of the crude oil which it requires to supply products to 
its customers". On 11.4.80 the IC, after reporting the chairman's statement, said 
"... life will be more uncertain for BP in future, and it points to its disadvantage 
compared with other groups that have access to cheaper Saudi oil... The swings of 
1979 emphasize how hard it is to predict BP's performance". It is reasonable to 
infer that it was the new information and element of uncertainty induced by the 
chairman's statement which may have contributed towards the negative annual re- 
port and accounts residual. 
London Scottish Marine Oil. No 17. (-. 0156 
-. 
0485 
There was newspaper comment on the preliminary announcement but little on the 
annual report and accounts due to the printing dispute. Although profits topped 
. 
£23m no dividend was paid. Lex of the FT(26.380) after forecasting earnings for 
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1980 "in the region of ß'30m", went on to suggest "This would be enough to clear the 
accumulated deficit and allow the payment of a maiden dividend". The IC(28.3.80) 
was more circumspect. "There is a wide margin for error on forecasting LASMO's 
1980 earnings". No dividend forecast was made in the preliminary announcement 
but the chairman in the annual report and accounts cautiously predicted paying a 
dividend in 1981. It is reasonable to deduce that the chairman's statement postpon- 
ing payment of a dividend until 1981 is a contributory factor towards the negative 
annual report and accounts residual. 
Assoc. Biscuit Manfrs. No 25. (-. 0334 
. 
0383) 
Although Table 32 shows the majority of companies including either a board report 
or a chairman's statement in the preliminary announcement, it must be remembered 
that such reports are only abridged versions of the reports which subsequently ap- 
pear in the annual report and accounts. Such was the case in this company. In 1979 
the company had raised pre-tax profits by 28.9 per cent. Commenting on the prelim- 
inary announcement the FT(11.4.80) said "ABM's full-year results look disappoint- 
ing" for they were below all the brokers' forecasts contained in the Earnings Guide. 
This was probably the cause of the negative preliminary announcement residual. 
Comment on the annual report and accounts was restricted due to the printing 
dispute. When the full chairman's statement was published in the annual report 
and accounts promising fulfilment of ambitious targets set for the current year, it 
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is reasonable to infer that investors could have regained a degree of confidence in 
the company's prospects, hence the positive residual. 
Dunlop Hldg Ltd. No 27. (. 0573 
-. 
0379) 
Press reports on this company's results were restricted by the printing dispute pre- 
viously mentioned as both the preliminary announcement and annual report and 
accounts fell in that period. Despite a heavy drop in pre-tax profit to ß'29m(. C46m) 
the total dividend was held. This was the most likely factor behind the positive 
preliminary announcement residual. Lex of the FT(25.4.80), however, was not im- 
pressed by the company's results. After commenting on various aspects of the 
company he wrote "but in the process the group gently continues to shrink". The 
company's main problem was the European tyre division. In his annual report and 
accounts statement the chairman said, "At this time last year I said that the major 
task 
... 
was to restore the European tyre business to good health". He went on 
to mention the "over-capacity in tyres in Europe" and that "1979 saw only a little 
respite from severe price competition". The division was still making a loss. The 
geographical analysis revealed UK operating profits down to £2m(. C18m) and also 
that Europe(including the UK) accounted for 67% of turnover but the already mea- 
gre margins had fallen from 2.2% to 1.2%. Employees had been reduced by 4.000 
and there was a net 
. 
C31m outflow of funds. 
The picture shown by the annual report and accounts was of a company not 
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yet at grips with the recession and the chairman's statement offered no hope of a 
quick solution to the company's problems. It is reasonable to infer that the factors 
mentioned above and the chairman's statement played some part in the cause of 
the negative annual report and accounts residual. 
Hepworth J& Son. No 28. (. 0459 
-. 
0379) 
Pre-tax profits were 13 per cent down on 1978 and below the Earnings Guide con- 
sensus brokers' forecast but as the IC(7.11.80) reported, seemingly with some relief, 
"The dividend has been held". The IC(5.12.80) commenting on the activity anal- 
ysis, drew attention to the manufacturing division having turned in a pre-interest 
loss and been "drastically pruned". Four of the company's five factories were closed 
near the end of the financial year. The division accounted for 19% of turnover. 
The figures revealed in the analysis confirmed the Chairman's words that "Clearly 
it is going to be a very hard year 
... 
The immediate economic prospect is indeed 
forbidding". The Chairman's forecast statement coupled with the closure of the 
factories may have been contributory factors to the negative residual. 
6.1.5 Geographical Analysis 
Gray (1981) argues that geographical segregation is different to segregation on the 
basis of business activity as foreign exchange, inflation and interest differentials 
give foreign countries different risk and return profiles. Gray maintains that whilst 
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geographical segregation is widely used, it is not well developed. The words of 
Collins and Simmonds (1979) "geographical breakdowns have different market con- 
sequences" are relevant for companies Carrington Viyella (No 3) Beecham Group 
(No 5) and Dunlop Hldg. (No 27). Prodham (1986) found that geographical seg- 
ment data was likely to have information content. Firms that adopted geographical 
segment disclosure were associated with lower post adoption betas and therefore 
were likely to have lower overall risk. 
The ability of analysts to forecast annual income and sales figures is found to be 
enhanced by the provision of geographically segmented data though its usefulness is 
diminished by company failure to disclose detailed geographic segments and the in- 
accuracy of forecast annual country growth of gross domestic product and exchange 
rates (Balakrishnan, Harris and Sen, 1990). 
All three companies shown under this heading in Table 33 have been analysed 
under previous headings. 
6.1.6 Activity Analysis 
In addition to Lee and Tweedie (1981) other questionnaire studies, Backer and 
McFarland (1968), Mautz (1968) and Stallman (1969), have all found segmental 
or line-of-business data perceived to be useful by investors and analysts. Buzby 
(1974) showed that segment reporting of income and sales were important items 
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of information in investment making decisions. Emmanuel and Pick (1980), a UK 
study, replicated a previous US study carried out by Collins (1976) and similarly 
concluded that segmental sales had additional information content over consolidated 
sales for predicting consolidated profits. The activity analysis seems to have had 
information content used by investors in companies, Borthwick(T) & Sons (No 13) 
and Hepworth J& Son (No 28). See section 6.1.4 above for the analysis of Hepworth 
J& Son (No 28). 
Borthwick (T) & Sons. No 13. (. 0113 
. 
0513) 
The company's pre-tax profits were ß'7.34m in 1979 against 
. 
ß'6.22m in the previous 
year. The IC(14.12.79) drew attention to the cyclical earnings pattern of this meat 
trader then commented "The one bright spot is the retailing side in the UK and 
France, which could have made as much as £3m, around 50 per cent higher". This 
was an area into which the company was continuing to expand. On 11.1.80 the IC 
in its article published the activity analysis shown only in the ARA. In its comment 
on the analysis it restated its previous remark about the ". 
.. 
brighter side (is) meat 
retailing in the UK and France.. 
. 
both (have) made further progress". The article 
went on to say that the company was negotiating to buy two UK butchers chains. It 
is arguable that the year's results may not have moved the investors much when they 
were announced, as they were slightly below the brokers' consensus forecast in the 
December 1979 Earnings Guide, but the brighter prospects indicated by the activity 
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analysis and commented on by the IC could have reinforced investors' expectations 
and resulted in the higher positive residual. 
6.1.7 Current Cost Profit Statement 
Peasnell, Skerratt and Ward (1987) suggest that investors use current cost account- 
ing (CCA) disclosures in their investment decisions but the CCA disclosures may be 
correlated with other disclosures made at the same time. Investors seemed to have 
taken heed of the CCA profit statement of the Berec Group (No 18) and Carrington 
Viyella (No 3). The latter company has already been analysed under the heading 
" Funds Statement". 
Berec Group. No 18. (. 0266 
-. 
0478) 
No policy statement concerning dividends was contained in the PA or ARA and the 
PA did not include a CCA statement. The influential Lex column in the FT(17.5.80) 
reporting on the PA mentioned that the "dividend may not be covered by CC earn- 
ings". The IC(20.6.80) reporting on the ARA said "CCA profits are depressing 
... 
it 
is the group's long term policy to pay dividends out of CCA earnings. The crunch 
is CC profits. Unless there is an improvement the dividend must be vunerable". 
Investors must have been worried when the Current Cost Statement showed profit 
attributable to shareholders as £-3.8m. Hence the share price fall and the negative 
residual. This eventuality was noted by Peasnell et al. 
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6.1.8 Notes, to the Accounts 
Between 67 to 80 per cent of financial experts canvassed by Lee and Tweedie (1981) 
read thoroughly the notes to the accounts. This is not surprising as to completely 
understand some sections of the ARA the notes have to be read as these contain 
supplementary explanatory information. This is true of companies Hambros Ltd 
(No 2), Assocd. Leisure (No 12), Comfort Hotels (No 20) and Hill, Samuel Group 
(No 22). 
Hambros Ltd. No 2. (-. 0306 
. 
1592) 
The two events produced no comments from the financial writers, so what caused 
investors to change their expectations between the two events can only be surmized. 
The PA revealed that earnings had risen to 
. 
£12.1m but they were below the brokers' 
forecasts which probably accounts for the negative PA residual of 
-. 
03. The fall was 
reversed on release of the ARA. The PA showed that the profit from associated 
companies, including Hambo Life Assurance (HLA), had risen by 
. 
ß'1.6m to £4.8m. 
The Notes to the Accounts in the ARA disclosed that the profits of HLA had risen 
by 50 per cent to 
. 
£3.2m, accounting for 67 per cent of the associates profits. Such 
excellent results could have led to investors believing the fall in price had been 
overdone and that the company had reasonable prospects, resulting in the high 
positive residual. 
Assocd. Leisure. No 12. (-. 0080 
. 
0519) 
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There was a small negative residual after the PA was released. 76 per cent of the 
company's profits came from the manufacture, distribution and rental of amusement 
machines. For four years the company had seemed immune to the recession but in 
1979 that division had seen no real increase in profit. New and more complicated 
video games made it necessary to replace the company's video machines if earnings 
were to improve. The IC(2.9.80) said "In practice the two factors that will determine 
profitability this year and next will be (a) the rate of growth and replacement of 
video machines and (b) whether the Gaming Board will allow an increase in the 
maximum stake and payment on fruit machines". Under Capital Commitments in 
the Notes to the Accounts it was revealed that capital expenditure in the current 
year was rising nearly 50 per cent to 
. 
£13.3m. This was noted in the article. One 
factor seemed satisfied. The Gaming Board was making its decision in six months 
time. With little downside risk the inference is that investors were favourably 
impressed which resulted in the positive ARA residual. 
Comfort Hotels. No 20. (. 0604 
. 
0433) 
Ten months prior to the year end the company had purchased City Hotels Group 
Ltd. At the PA the FT(1.5.80) said "Without any indication of the City's contri- 
bution, it is difficult to be precise about Comfort's underlying performance". The 
Notes to the Accounts in the ARA showed City Hotels had contributed a substan- 
tial 
. 
C1.2m to the group's profit before tax of 
. 
C2.5m. There had been a slight 
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improvement in the company's "underlying performance". Taking into account the 
current economic situation the fact could have pleased investors leading to the pos- 
itive residual. 
Hill, Samuel Group. No 22. (. 0359 
. 
0407) 
At the PA the share price had risen strongly and the residual was a positive 3.59 per 
cent. Although pre-tax profits of this merchant banker were static due to losses on 
its insurance broking, banking profits were up 51 per cent. Lex of the FT(13.6.80) 
noted this when, at the PA, he wrote "Still there is encouragement in the 51 per 
cent jump in banking profits. If all goes well Hill Samuel will achieve a substan- 
tial improvement for 1980/81". Although there was no comment on the ARA, due 
probably to the closeness of the two events, it is reasonable to assume that when in 
the Notes to the Accounts it said "The disclosed banking profit reflects the trend 
of the underlying profit", investors felt this strongly reinforced their prior expecta- 
tions. The positive residual reflected the rise in the share price from 94p at the PA 
to 106p after the ARA. 
6.1.9 Summary of Analyses 
Although previous studies have found little evidence that on average the ARA 
contains new information useful to investors for pricing firms' shares, the above 
analyses of the 29 companies with the highest absolute residuals has identified either 
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through inference, in the absence of press comment, or through ex ante and ex post 
press comment surrounding the ARA, certain information disclosed in the ARA 
which may have been used by investors in their decision making process. 
Chapter 7 
Comparison with Control Group 
of Companies 
The analyses in the previous chapter are supportive of the hypothesis that the ARA 
may contain certain information useful to investors in certain cases. The only true 
test, however, is to ascertain whether the information identified as being consistent 
with the magnitude of the outlier residuals and their signs is also present in the 
information set of the control group. If it is we should expect to see a replicated 
Table 33 for the control group of companies. 
Investors are constantly receiving and appraising new announcements and form- 
ing forecasts of future earnings. But as Beaver(1968) was quick to point out, the 
majority are not very good at it, for if they were there would be no volume or price 
169 
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reaction when the earnings reports, the PAs, are released. This observation was 
challenged by a discussant Bates, when commenting on Beaver's paper. Bates felt 
that in the sample used by Beaver there was a predominance of retailers who earned 
nearly all their profit between November and January, so, therefore, at the year end 
of 31 December did not have a clear idea themselves of what their earnings were 
until the January sales were completed. Also other firms released little information 
during the year and what was released is largely unreliable. 
This study, like others, reveals the PA to have the largest effect on share prices. 
Ball and Brown (1968) showed that the PA effect in their study was despite the 
fact that 11 months prior to the earnings announcement there is a drift in the share 
price in the same direction as the earnings revealed by the PA. Positive earnings 
had a positive drift and the converse is true for negative earnings. 
Firth (1976) addressed his work to four main industries, breweries, food retailers 
(supermarkets), shipping and banks. He investigated whether announcements of 
accounting and financial results by a firm give some indication of how well similar 
type companies are doing. He measured the impact of one firm's announcement on 
other members of the industry. Investors, he found, used the financial results of 
one company to appraise the share price not only of the issuing company but also 
of others in the same industry. The amount of fresh information diminishes as each 
new financial result is published. Similar results were found by Foster (1981) and 
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Clinch and Sinclair (1984). 
We need to examine whether the information, we identified in the outlier group 
as likely to be driving the residual, is firm specific. The only true test is to match 
the outlier group with a control group and test whether the control group provides 
related information disclosures in the ARA's. For each of the 29 outlier companies 
a control company was selected which matched it by industry, size and LBS rating. 
Size was measured by market capitalisation. All the control companies had to have 
as low an abnormal return as possible, preferably less than the mean (0.016) of the 
annual report and accounts residuals. The difficulty of meeting the industry etc. 
matching requirements prevented the residual size criteria being fully met. Two 
firms had residuals well above the ARA mean but the size of each firm's residual is 
nearly half that of their outlier company. Each control company was then analysed 
in a manner similar to that of its sister company, by looking at the press comments 
surrounding the PA and ARA to search for an information set resembling that 
suggested to have impacted on the share price of the outlier company. 
Table 34 lists the 29 control companies with low abnormal returns on publication 
of their ARAs. Also shown is the market sector in which the company operated, 
its LBS share marketability rating and market capitalisation. This information 
was taken from the same sources as for the outlier companies. Black & Edgington 
(No 12), Comet Radiovision (No 15), Tricentol (No 17) and Foster Bros. Clothing 
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(No 26), are the only companies with residuals greater than the mean of the ARA 
residuals (0.016). 
It was not always possible to select a control company in exactly the same sector 
as its outlier counterpart. Company No 3, Carrington Viyella is in sector `cotn & 
syn'. The nearest matching company is Dawson Intl. in sector `wool'. In addition 
outlier companies No 10 Dobson Park Industries, No 19 GEI International, No 25 
Tate & Lyle and No 27 Assod. Engineering could not be matched using their LBS 
rating so four matching companies with low residuals were selected but with different 
ratings. The difference in ratings is not material. All four control companies are 
considered close enough to their outlier companies not to make comparisons invalid. 
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LBS Market 
Company Sector Rating Cap. 
1 Ratners (Jewellers) Str Mult 2 17 
2 Guinness Peat Group Mrch Bank 2 69 
3 Dawson Intl Wool 2 63 
4 Boardman (K. O. )Intl Clothing 2 6 
5 Glaxo Holdinggs Ltd Phm Prod 1 501 
6 Provident Fin Gp Hire Purch 2 42 
7 Boddington Brewery Brewery 2 24 
8 P&0 Steam Nav Co Shipping 1 117 
9 Avana Group Food Man 2 20 
10 Dobson Park Inds Mech Eng *2 75 
11 NCC Energy Oil 2 5 
12 Black & Edgington Leisure 2 19 
13 Finlay James Ovse. Tdr 2 41 
14 Shell Transpt & Trdy Oil 1 4029 
15 Comet Radiovision Str Mult 2 37 
16 Assocd. Fisheries Food Man 2 6 
17 Tricentol Ltd Oil 1 55 
18 Electrocomponents Ltd Lgt. Elec 2 86 
19 GEI International Mch. Hand *2 26 
20 Mount Charlotte Hotl & Cat 2 9 
21 Bunzl Pulp & Paper Pack & Pap 2 25 
22 Mercury Securities Mrch Bank 2 65 
23 Adwest Group Mech. Eng 2 28 
24 Kode International Lgt. Elect 2 13 
25 Tate & Lyle Mill& Flour *1 83 
26 Crest Nicholson Unclass 2 15 
27 Assocd. Engineering Mtr Comp *2 90 
28 Foster Bros Clothing Str Mult 2 49 
29 Guinness(A)Son & Co Brewery 1 164 
No te. * Unable to match LBS rating of non-control 
company so this company with a different rating selected 
Table 34: Industry Sector, LBS Rating and Market Capitalisation of 29 Control 
Companies with Low ARA Abnormal Returns 
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Table 35 lists the same control companies and tabulates the dates of their finan- 
cial year ends, the dates of the PAs and publication of the ARAs together with the 
signed residuals for the two events. 
The outlier group has 16 companies with ARA residuals larger than their PA 
residuals whilst there are only four in the control group. It would seem that, with 
the exception of these four companies, investors in the shares of the control group 
had their information requirements largely satisfied by the PA, and the ARA con- 
tained little useful information. This seems to be confirmed by the size of the ARA 
residuals of the control group; one company has a residual of 3 per cent and the 
remainder are all under 1.7 per cent with 21 under 1 per cent. 
Using the absolute residuals, t tests? for the difference between means was con- 
ducted for the PA and ARA residuals for the two groups. For the PAs of the two 
groups, using a two tailed test and a 5% significance level the critical value of t is 
2.04 (56 degrees of freedom) and the calculated value is 1.459. The null hypothesis, 
that there is no difference between the average PA residuals of the groups, is not 
disproved at the 5% level of significance. There is, however, a highly significant 
difference between the average ARAs of the groups. The calculated value of t is 8.3 
and the critical value is 2.04 (56 degrees of freedom). The tests seem to indicate 
that on average the information contained in the PAs is the same for both groups 
7see Applied Statistics: Statistics for the social scientist: Vol 2. K. A. Yeomans. Penguin Books 
Ltd. London. pages 103 and 105 relating to the t test and formula to calculate the degrees of 
freedom when the sample variances are not homoscedastic. 
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but, unlike those for the control group, the ARAs for the outlier companies held 
significant price-sensitive information. 
To test whether one group was more actively followed by investment analysts 
than the other, the Earnings Guide of December 1979 was consulted. The Earnings 
Guide lists a number of brokers' earnings estimates and the statistics for various 
companies. 23 companies in the control sample were listed compared with 24 of 
the outlier group, so the progress of the majority of companies in both groups was 
being closely followed and periodically information would be published about them 
by brokers. 
It could be suggested that the PAs of the control group were more informative 
than those of the outlier group. Table 36 compares the items voluntarily included in 
the PAs by both groups. The number of companies disclosing an activity analysis, a 
balance sheet and a board or chairman's statement for the outlier and control groups 
were 7 and 6,4 and 5, and 23 and 23 respectively. The analysis shows there to be 
little difference between the groups in this respect. Apart from the information 
which has to be published to meet the requirements of the Stock Exchange, the 
amount of other information released by the companies of both groups at the PA 
was negligible. Following this test, an identical analysis for the control group of 
companies was carried out as for the outlier sample. 
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Year PA ARA PA ARA 
Company end dates dates residuals residuals 
1 Ratners (Jewellers) 6 04 80 10 7 80 26 08 80 
-. 
0119 
. 
0030 
2 Guinness Peat Group 30 04 80 11 09 80 8 10 80 
-. 
0107 
. 
0143 
3 Dawson Intl. 29 03 80 16 06 80 23 06 80 
. 
0404 
. 
0003 
4 Boardman (K. O. ) Intl 31 03 80 28 08 80 12 09 80 
. 
2637 
-. 
0090 
5 Glaxo Holdings Ltd 30 06 80 13 10 80 31 10 80 
. 
0591 
. 
0159 
6 Provident Fin Gp 31 12 79 4 03 80 18 03 80 
. 
0135 
. 
0069 
7 Boddington Brewery 31 12 79 20 02 80 18 04 80 
. 
0063 
. 
0156 
8 P&0 Steam Nav Co. 31 12 79 7 05 80 21 06 80 
-. 
0109 
-. 
0097 
9 Avana Group 29 03 80 21 08 80 12 09 80 
. 
0367 
-. 
0070 
10 Dobson Park Industries 29 09 79 11 12 79 28 01 80 
. 
0632 
. 
0008 
11 NCC Energy 31 03 80 16 06 80 2 07 80 
. 
0092 
. 
0119 
12 Black & Edgington 31 12 79 2 04 80 13 05 80 
. 
0413 
-. 
0300 
13 Finlay James 31 12 79 12 06 80 10 07 80 
-. 
0088 
. 
0028 
14 Shell Transpt & Trdy 31 12 79 6 03 80 18 04 80 
-. 
0131 
. 
0129 
15 Comet Radiovision 30 08 80 26 11 80 18 12 80 
-. 
0068 
. 
0251 
16 Assocd. Fisheries 30 09 79 5 02 80 25 02 80 
. 
0739 
-. 
0023 
17 Tricentol Ltd 31 12 79 20 03 80 17 04 80 
. 
0221 
. 
0170 
18 Electrocomponents Ltd 31 03 80 26 06 80 15 08 80 
. 
0473 
-. 
0050 
19 GEI International 31 03 80 17 06 80 30 06 80 
. 
0501 
. 
0076 
20 Mount Charlotte 30 12 79 26 02 80 3 04 80 
. 
0814 
. 
0000 
21 Bunzl Pulp & Paper 31 12 79 29 04 80 12 05 80 
-. 
0321 
. 
0068 
22 Mercury Securities 31 03 80 3 07 80 31 07 80 
-. 
0170 
. 
0000 
23 Adwest Group 30 06 80 29 09 80 13 10 80 
. 
0271 
-. 
0035 
24 Kode International 31 12 79 5 04 80 12 03 80 
-. 
1102 
. 
0027 
25 Tate & Lyle 30 09 79 16 01 80 1 02 80 
. 
0148 
-. 
0096 
26 Crest Nicholson 31 10 79 12 02 80 26 02 80 
. 
0114 
-. 
0003 
27 Assocd. Engineering 30 09 80 11 12 80 30 12 80 
. 
0153 
-. 
0012 
28 Foster Bros. Clothing 29 02 80 15 05 80 16 06 80 
-. 
0485 
-. 
0168 
29 Guiness(A)Son & Co 29 09 79 14 12 79 17 01 80 
. 
0551 
-. 
0006 
Table 35: Dates of Year End, PA and ARA together with PA and ARA residuals of 
the 29 Control Companies with Low Abnormal Returns 
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Company 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Activity 
analysis 
Group A Group B 
No No 
No P 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No P 
No P 
T/O P No 
T/O P T/O P 
No No 
T/O P No 
No No 
T/O No 
No No 
T/O P No 
No T/O P 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
P No 
Yes No 
No No 
No T/O P 
No No 
No No 
No No 
P No 
B 
sheet 
Group A Group B 
No No 
No No 
Yes No 
No No 
No No 
Yes No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No ' Yes 
No Yes 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
No No 
Yes No 
No No 
No No 
No Yes 
No No 
Yes Yes 
No No 
No Yes 
. 
Man's 
statement 
Group A Group B 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Yes No 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes No 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
No No 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes No 
No No 
Yes No 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Table 36: Items Voluntarily Included in the Preliminary Announcement by the 
Outlier Group (group A) and the Control Group (group B) 
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7.1 Analysis of Control Companies 
It is not always possible to make a direct comparison between an outlier company 
and its control company. An example is British Petroleum Ltd and Shell Transport 
and Trading Ltd. British Petroleum is a typical, large company mainly trading in 
oil and oil products. Shell Transport is a holding company deriving all its income 
from its 40 per cent holding in the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of companies. Shell 
Transport will only be affected indirectly by trading problems and its financial 
structure is different to that of British Petroleum. Unfortunately, it is the only 
company in that industry comparable to British Petroleum. 
The detailed analyses of the 29 control companies revealed that in general their 
annual report and accounts contained no new information useful to investors. Thus 
there is no table equivalent to Table 33. 
The following fourteen control companies had positive PA residuals. All four- 
teen increased their pre-tax profits and some their dividends. 
Dawson International 
Boddington Brewery 
Dobson Park Industries 
Tricentol 
Provident Financial Group 
Avana Group 
Assoc. Fisheries 
Electrocomponents 
GEI International Mount Charlotte 
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NCC Energy Tate & Lyle 
Crest Nicholson Guinness(A)Son & Co 
The PA and ARA press comments on these companies ranged from Associated 
Fisheries, IC(8.2.80) "Returned to profits" and IC(29.2.80) "AF has finally turned 
the corner" to Guinness(A) Son & Co., IC(21.12.79) "Shares strengthened on the fig- 
ures" and IC(25.1.80) "Company steamed ahead faster than inflation". On Mount 
Charlotte's PA the IC(29.2.80) wrote "... revaluation of hotel properties should 
more than double book asset values". When the annual reports and accounts were 
published the reaction of the companies' share prices to any new information con- 
tained therein did not exceed 1.7 per cent. Of these 14 companies, only the residual 
of Tricentol (0.017) is marginally greater than the ARA mean. 
The comments on the PAs focused, in practically all the fourteen companies, on 
how well they were trading. There was no evidence, in the subsequent comments 
on the annual report and accounts, of new information which would have come 
as a surprise to investors and others. Unlike the outlier companies, there was 
no comment which suggested that the annual report and accounts contained new 
information which either strongly strengthened or altered the positions investors 
had taken on release of the PA. 
Despite increasing their pre-tax profit the share prices of three companies fell 
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resulting in negative PA residuals. The companies are Ratners(Jewellers) Ltd. (No 
1), Guinness Peat Group Ltd. (No 2), and Foster Bros. Clothing Ltd. (No 28). The 
ARA residual of Foster Bros. (. 0168) was the only one to marginally exceed the mean 
(0.016). 
Ratners (Jewellers) increased its pre-tax profit by 34.5 per cent and its dividend 
by a quarter. The PA residual is only 
-1.2 per cent and the ARA abnormal return 
0.3 per cent. This is in direct contrast with its outlier company Audiotronic Hldgs. 
which had a going concern qualification. It is arguable that this is not a good match 
as Ratners is a retail jeweller and Audiotronic Hldgs. a wholesaler and retailer of 
consumer electronic products. But both companies were trading in the same eco- 
nomic environment, selling semi-luxury goods to similar customers, so macro trading 
information should affect both of them. Only company specific information is likely 
to affect one and not the other. 
Guinness Peat Group had `record' profits and increased its dividend by 12 per 
cent. Unlike its outlier company, Hambros Ltd, it beat the highest broker's forecast 
by £5m but the PA residual recorded a small 1 per cent fall which was recovered 
when the annual report and accounts was published. At the time of the PA there 
was an adverse comment in the IC(19.9.80) which reported a "40 per cent increase 
in interest charges". This was not referred to in the annual report comments. 
Foster Bros. Clothing Ltd. increased its pre-tax profit by 9.5 per cent to £10.7m. 
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but disappointed the brokers who were looking for a minimum of £11.7m. This 
short-fall plus the unsupportive annual report and accounts comment in the IC(4.7.80) 
"As recession hits harder should be relatively secure", could have accounted for the 
PA and smaller ARA negative residual. This is in striking contrast with the outlier 
Hepworth J& Son whose profits were well below the brokers' forecasts and the 
annual report and accounts revealed worse to come. 
Two companies whose pre-tax profits fell but have positive PA residuals are 
Glaxo Holdings(No 5) and the Adwest Group(No 23). Glaxo for the third year 
running announced lower profits though its dividend was increased by 19 per cent. 
Its shares went up from 212p to 230p on the announcement largely, one surmises, 
on the back of the increased dividend. The IC annual report comment of 7.11.80 
probably summed up the position with "Profits for 1980/1 will only be marginally 
up. Share price looking further ahead". 1979/80 saw a profit fall for the outlier 
company, Beecham Group, which had enjoyed increased profitability for a number of 
years (see 6.1.4). Beecham, like Glaxo, had increased its dividend. Both companies 
were encountering similar trading problems but whilst Beecham had a negative 
ARA residual of 
-7.02%, Glaxo had a positive 1.59%. The difference in the investors' 
reactions to the annual report and accounts may possibly be accounted for by the 
differences in the companies' short-term prospective earnings. Glaxo, from the press 
comment, seemed to have stemmed its profit fall while Beecham's had just begun 
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and Beecham's chairman did not hold out the prospect of an immediate recovery 
(see 6.1.4). It was possibly the chairman's statement in the annual report and 
accounts which caused Beecham's shareholders to react so strongly. 
The recession in the UK motor industry and strikes had hit both Adwest and its 
outlier company Birmid Qualcast. Of the two Adwest was the more vunerable as it 
was mainly a "supplier of steering gear to (the) motor industry 
... 
an obvious can- 
didate for trouble" IC(3.10.80). Birmid showed the more likely promise of a swift 
recovery as it was strong in heating products and home and gardening equipment. 
The recovery was dependent on whether the rationalisation measures it had under- 
taken had weakened its balance sheet. The annual report and accounts confirmed 
that its balance sheet was strong (see 6.1.2). 
Both Raybeck and its control company Comet Radiovision saw profits slump 
by 28 and 30 per cent respectively but both raised their dividends. Liquidity of 
both companies was sound. The difference between the two lay in the respective 
strengths of their balance sheets- the difference in their gearing. Whereas Comet 
Radiovision was largely creditor financed IC(2.1.81) "Business is largely financed by 
creditors", in the case of Raybeck, investors were probably surprised and impressed 
by the manner in which the company had strengthened its balance sheet (see 6.1.2). 
Whereas Comet Radiovision's residual is 2.5 per cent that of Raybeck moved up to 
5.0 per cent. 
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Similar to the two companies just analysed, Dunlop Hldg. Ltd. and Associated 
Engineering both announced reduced profits at the PA. Unexpectedly Dunlop held 
its dividend whilst the latter's was cut. When Dunlop published its annual report 
and accounts there was little to soften the poor trading position it revealed whereas 
the balance sheet of Associated Engineering had been strengthened by a property 
revaluation. Both companies had negative residuals but Dunlop's 
-3.8 per cent to 
Associated Engineering's 
-0.12 per cent may have reflected this difference. 
Hawtin and Boardman (K. O. ) Intl. were small companies not closely followed 
by analysts. Investors must have been disappointed when, despite making record 
profits, Hawtin's profit growth had fallen by 59 per cent. The control company 
Boardman, through lower profitability, had taken severe rationalisation measures 
as revealed by the IC PA comment of 29.8.80, "By next month 
... 
the group will have 
axed all manufacturing activities". The same article emphasized that the remaining 
subsidiaries "all made profits and will continue to do so". Whereas Boardman's PA 
residual is a positive 26 per cent with a small ARA correction of 
-0.9 per cent that 
of Hawtin fell by 7 per cent but rose by the same amount when the annual report 
and accounts revealed that the diversification policy appeared to be working. 
The annual report and accounts for investors in Borthwick(T)& Sons certainly 
contained price-sensitive information (see 6.1.6) but a great deal seems to have 
already been made public before the control company Finlay(James) announced its 
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results. This is confirmed by the IC(20.6.80), "J. F. 's nine per cent drop in pre-tax 
profits for 1979 was predicted in its half-time statement". So there were only minor 
share price adjustments at the PA and ARA. The annual report and accounts for 
Finlay(James) appeared to contain little material that was not already known. 
The event residuals of European Ferries and P&0 Steam Nav. Co. contrast 
sharply with each other. European Ferries had high residuals at both the PA and 
ARA, the latter arguably largely due to the chairman's statement (see 6.1.4). The 
results of the control company were in the middle of the brokers' forecasts so a small 
negative 1 per cent residual, at both events, is not out of place in the absence of 
any other information of interest to investors. 
The plight of the outlier company, the Brocks Group, was well known before 
the results were announced as its share price had been falling before the PA. It is 
ironical that what reversed the slide was connected with its control company Kode 
International. IC (27.6.80) "Hopes soared when former Kode International boss 
Colin Banks moved into Brocks with two fledgling electronic companies early last 
year". It was on these two companies that investors pinned their hopes until the 
annual report and accounts showed just how weak was the company's balance sheet, 
then selling of the company's shares recommenced. An increased dividend could 
not stop Kode International's share price falling when it announced lower profits. 
IC(7.3.80) "Shares fell to 205p (previously 226p) on the results". Judging by the 
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press comment we might surmise little relevant information disclosed in the annual 
report and accounts that was not already known at the preliminary announcement, 
so there was negligible abnormal share price movement. 
The high positive residuals of the Inveresk Group reflect the strengthening of 
the balance sheet and improved liquidity (see 6.1.2) at a time when the company's 
share price had fallen by half over the past twelve months. The control company 
Bunzl Pulp 8r Paper produced results in line with brokers' forecasts but did not 
impress. The press comments promised little for investors and the residuals (PA 
-3.21%, ARA . 69%) indicate this. 
It was the expectation of high earnings that lifted the share price of the Hill, 
Samuel Group (see 6.1.7). The results of its control company, Mercury Securi- 
ties, were up 8.5 per cent on the previous year to ß'11.6m but they fell below 
the brokers' expectations by Lim. This may account for the small negative PA 
residual of -1.7. The press comments on both events indicated that the company 
had a "record of strong growth", IC(11.7.80) and that the future held "reasonable 
prospects" IC(8.8.80). There appeared to be nothing to surprise or excite investors 
in the annual report and accounts which seems to suggest the reason for no abnormal 
return. 
Black & Edgington has the highest ARA residual of the 29 control companies. 
Its 
-3 per cent is ranked 47th in size, and the company is almost an outlier in its 
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own right but it is the only one which matched the outlier, Associated Leisure, by 
size and rating. Associated Leisure was in the busines of amusement machines (see 
6.1.7) whereas Black and Edgington manufactured caravans and camping equip- 
ment. Unlike Assoc. Leisure, Black and Edgington had seen pre-tax profits fall by 
47 per cent over two years as interest charges rose 240 per cent. But an unchanged 
dividend and an optimistic chairman's forecast for the second half of 1980 seems, 
initially, to have impressed investors. Publication of the annual report and accounts 
showing the precarious financial position of the company with gearing 89 per cent, 
brought forth the IC comment of 20.6.80 "The yield looks vunerable, and the shares 
are only for the optimistic". The negative ARA residual indicates that investors 
felt likewise. The main problems of the two companies were not related. 
The news in the annual report and accounts which affected British Petroleum 
(see 6.1.5) was not mentioned when the results of the control company Shell Trans- 
port and Trading were released. The latter's results evoked little comment. 
A company's share price is determined by the stock market's expectations about 
that company. Unanticipated price-sensitive news can have a much more damaging 
effect on the share price than a drop in profits about which management have al- 
ready issued a profits warning or a chairman's statement regarding current trading. 
Where there is little comment on a company's results, comparing the actual 
with the consensus brokers' earnings forecast will give some indication whether the 
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results are in line with expectations. There is, however, the possibility that between 
the time of the latest forecast and the PA more news has become available and been 
reflected in the share price, while no further brokers' forecasts have been issued. 
7.1.1 Interpretation of the results 
A number of causes may account for the higher ARA residuals of the outlier com- 
panies. Some, suggested by researchers, may be eliminated by looking at areas of 
similarity between the groups. 
Consider the following: 
1. Researchers have shown that companies which are not closely followed have 
higher abnormal returns than those that are (see Atiase, Bamber and Freeman, 
1988). It has been demonstrated here that both outlier and control groups are 
equally followed by interested parties so the higher outlier residuals cannot be at- 
tributed to this factor. 
2. The factor most consistently reported as being related to a firm's disclosure 
policy is its size. The larger the company the greater the disclosure. As the com- 
panies in the two groups were, as far as possible, matched by market capitalisation 
,a surrogate for size, there should be no difference in the amount of information 
released. This certainly seems the case with the preliminary announcement where 
there is little difference in the amount of voluntary information disclosed by the 
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groups and no significant difference between their average residuals. 
3. The higher residual of the outlier companies cannot be attributed to the sec- 
tors in which they operate being different to that of the respective control companies. 
The control companies, as far as possible, matched their outlier counterparts. 
All the evidence in the chapter points in a different direction. Although the 
movement of dividends and earnings played a major role in the pricing of shares, 
the evidence is supportive of the hypothesis that the annual report and accounts 
residuals of the outlier companies are largely driven by company specific disclosures, 
which have significant information content. There is no evidence of the same in- 
formation sets being present in the releases of the control companies. Even where 
the outlier and control company e. g. Birmid Qualcast and Adwest, were facing 
twin problems of lower profits and difficult trading conditions, the price-sensitive 
information contained in the annual report and accounts of Birmid related only to 
Birmid. There is not one instance where the same piece of information was carried 
in the annual report and accounts of both companies and affected the share price 
of one company more than the other. 
Table 37 summarises the analysis of new information provided in the annual 
report and accounts that might have impacted on market valuation by category. 
The almost complete absence of evidence of new information conveyed in the annual 
report and accounts for the low abnormal return group, i. e. that may have come as 
A 
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a surprise to investors, will be observed. 
In fact the only apparent case of potentially price sensitive information related 
comment at the annual report stage for the control group is Black and Edgington, 
which has a negative residual of 3.0% which is close to the standard deviation cut-off 
point for the outlier group. 
Although the information is contained largely in the chairman's statement and 
the balance sheet, both of which are highly rated by UK financial experts as sources 
of information, no pattern of information appears to be present which could be used 
by investors to obtain abnormal returns. 
The incremental information contained in an outlier company's annual report 
and accounts could not be used to forecast the results of another company in the 
same industry. Nor does there appear to be an overall pattern to the incremental 
information which, if it appeared in another company's annual report, may enable 
an investor to make a decision based on prior knowledge of the result of that infor- 
mation. Generally what comments there were at the annual report and accounts 
stage for the control group did not appear to add to the information released at the 
preliminary announcement. 
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Information Items 
Audit Balance Funds Chairman's Geographical Activity CCA Notes to 
Group Report Sheet Statement Statement Analysis Analysis Accounts Accounts 
Outlier 39 
Control 1 
Outlier Group 
Control Group 
2 14 3224 
0123 
0 20 81 
28 1-- 
Table 37: Potentially Relevant Information Items Identified From Press Comment 
in the Annual Report and Accounts 
7.2 Association between the abnormal return, cap- 
ital gearing and interest cover 
This research study has sought to identify and establish an association between 
information contained in the annual report and accounts and the high abnormal 
returns of some firms. The information identified appears to be firm specific but it 
could be argued that there are other firm specific factors which may confound the 
analyses. A change in a firm's financial characteristics is one such factor. 
Two ratios which feature prominently when assessing a firm's financial structure 
are capital gearing and interest cover. Changes in these two ratios effect the cash 
flow of a firm and the larger the impact on the cash flow, the larger the security price 
revaluation (Foster, 1986, page 376). Tests are therefore constructed to ascertain 
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any difference in the average gearing level and interest cover of the two groups and 
whether the control group's higher residuals can be partly attributed to a change 
in a firm's ratios over the event year. 
The market, according to Ross (1977), perceives rather than knows the stream 
of earnings (or dividends) for a firm and values the firm on the basis of the market's 
value of this earnings (or dividends) stream. When a firm changes its financial 
structure (or dividend payment) the firm alters its perceived risk class even if the 
actual risk class has not changed. Management use an increase in financial leverage 
to signal an optimistic future for the firm. But as the proportion of debt in a firm's 
capital structure is increased, the probability of bankruptcy also increases. 
The objective of gearing is to maximise the total value of equity plus debt so 
that the optimal' ratio increases shareholders' wealth and divides the firm's total 
income between them to the advantage of the shareholders. If debt is increased 
beyond what is conventionally considered normal for the industry, the shareholders 
may feel that the firm will be forced into bankruptcy by being unable to meet these 
heavy prior charges. 
There are two ratios which generally evaluate the credit worthiness of a firm. 
The first is interest cover and the second is debt to net worth. If the ratio of debt 
to net worth is too high, the firm will have difficulty in raising further capital as the 
costs attached to it will be higher. The possibility of bankruptcy is increased the 
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higher the interest rates. The more profitable firms tend not to be highly geared. A 
firm can be profitable but still be insolvent as insolvency is defined by Section 222(e) 
of the Companies Act, 1948 as `unable to pay its debts'. This definition implies 
a lack of liquidity rather than a shortage of profit. Interest cover is a liquidity 
measure. 
Although there are other factors which add to a firm's risk class e. g. quality 
of management, profit history, size of firm etc. one would expect to find outlier 
companies having a higher debt to net worth ratio and a lower interest cover than 
the control companies. Table 38 tabulates the gearing and interest cover ratios for 
both groups. In addition to the current year the previous year is also shown. Only 
26 of the 29 companies in both groups are listed because two companies, Hambros 
Ltd and the Hill, Samuel Group, their ratios could not be calculated due to their 
banking activities and the First National Finance Corporation is omitted as it had 
a shareholders' deficiency of £38m. 
The capital gearing ratio is net debt/shareholders' funds. Net debt is borrowings, 
including all debentures and loans plus bank overdrafts (less liquid assets) as a 
percentage of shareholders' funds less intangibles. Interest cover is loan interest 
(net of interest received) divided into earnings before interest and tax. 
To check whether capital gearing and interest cover had altered over the year 
before the ARA was published, for both groups difference between means, two 
CHAPTER 7. COMPARISON WITH CONTROL GROUP OF COMPANIES193 
tailed tests, were conducted using the means of the previous year(PY) ratios for 
capital gearing and interest cover and the means of the same ratios for the current 
year(CY). The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the means of. 
the PY and CY ratios. The calulated t statistics and degrees of freedom(D of F) 
are shown, together with the related 5% critical value, in Table 39. 
For both groups the results do not indicate any significant change in the level 
of gearing and interest cover between the two years. 
Similar tests were carried out to uncover the difference, if any, of the capital 
gearing and interest cover of the outlier and control groups of companies, for the 
previous and current year. Table 40 tables the results. 
The t tests show no significant difference between the level of capital gearing 
and interest cover of the two groups for the previous and current year. 
Taking the two tests together, that is the first to establish whether the ARA 
under review showed any movement in gearing and interest cover from that shown 
in the prior year's ARA, and the second to ascertain any difference between the two 
groups' gearing and interest cover, it would seem that the average gearing level of 
both groups is similar and that liquidity, as measured by interest cover, is no more 
of a problem for the outlier group of companies than it is for the control group. 
The results of the tests outlined in this chapter suggest that capital gearing and 
interest cover, at the time the ARA is published, may not explain the higher ARA 
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residuals of the outlier group as compared with those of their control counterparts. 
This is not to say that capital gearing and interest cover are not among the "at- 
tributes valued by capital markets" (Foster, 1986, page 376) only that the tests 
are unable to capture the alterations the price-sensitive information, suggested as 
perceived by investors, had on these two ratios. 
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Company Capital Gearing 
Outlier Control 
Interest Cover 
Outlier Control 
P C P C P C P C 
1 70.9 102.4 4.9 14.1 
- 
NIL NIL 16.1 21.3 
2 Not calculated 
3 44.7 50.3 NIL NIL 3.1 1.7 22.9 13.5 
4 52.5 76.4 79.6 116.6 21.1 5.4 1.2 1.3 
5 NIL 15.0 10.9 8.3 11.4 9.9 10.0 8.0 
6 Not calculated 
7 70.6 69.2 1.6 4.6 0.7 1.3 39.2 29.8 
8 38.8 39.6 50.6 61.1 6.5 7.3 1.3 1.6 
9 31.1 35.8 NIL NIL 2.2 0.2 19.6 23.9 
10 50.6 55.8 NIL NIL 1.8 1.4 NIL 57.2 
11 NIL NIL 13.1 NIL NIL NIL 0.3 0.9 
12 43.4 37.1 68.4 78.8 14.1 15.2 3.3 1.7 
13 232.0 313.2 16.9 20.9 1.6 0.2 6.7 3.6 
14 66.7 36.7 NIL NIL 5.7 11.7 NIL NIL 
15 36.9 NIL NIL NIL 15.3 8.8 32.1 5.4 
16 203.0 159.0 33.1 34.9 3.5 NIL NIL 4.5 
17 9009.8 1196.7 75.5 19.4 0.1 2.3 18.0 31.1 
18 2.2 21.4 NIL NIL 12.1 6.9 NIL NIL 
19 55.7 57.1 NIL NIL 5.5 1.5 13.1 9.6 
20 122.4 116.2 29.0 18.1 3.3 2.9 4.4 4.6 
21 48.9 26.8 22.1 22.0 3.2 1.3 4.7 5.1 
22 Not cal culated 
23 11.9 18.0 3.1 0.6 
-5.9 5.4 22.7 24.3 
24 11.1 39.4 NIL NIL 26.9 2.8 548.8 462.2 
25 30.9 56.4 53.7 43.4 4.4 3.3 2.3 1.9 
26 97.2 78.4 11.5 24.4 4.2 4.1 14.2 7.5 
27 71.4 64.2 37.0 58.6 1.8 2.3 3.5 2.1 
28 19.3 15.8 0.4 0.7 6.2 4.6 98.9 39.1 
29 28.5 35.4 42.1 42.9 6.9 4.8 5.4 4.2 
Mean 401.9 104.5 21.3 21.9 6.4 4.1 34.2 29.4 
S. Dev. 1756.5 231.4 25.8 29.6 6.7 3.9 106.9 89.4 
C=Current year P=Previous year 
Interest cover 
- 
NIL 
- 
either the co mpany paid no inte rest 
or it had no profit 
Table 38: Gearing and Interest Cover Ratios for the Outlier and Control Groups of 
Companies 
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Outlier Control 
Capital Gearing 
t calc. 0.856 0.079 
D of F 26 26 
to. os 2.056 2.056 
Outlier Control 
Interest Cover 
t calc. 1.572 0.175 
D of F 42 26 
to. os 2.018 2.056 
Table 39: Student's t Statistics for Tests of Difference Between Means of Previous 
and Current Year Ratios for Capital Gearing and Interest Cover of the Two Groups 
Previous Year Current Year 
Capital Gearing 
t calc. 1.105 1.805 
Interest Cover 
t calc. 1.320 1.443 
Degrees of Freedom 26 
to. os 2.056 
Table 40: Student's t Statistics for Tests of Difference Between Means of Outlier 
and Control Group for Capital Gearing and Interest Cover 
Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study evaluates the informational content of the annual report and accounts. 
Similar to previous studies the preliminary announcement and interim report, which 
contain earnings and dividend announcements, are found to contain highly valued 
information while little information, in aggregate, appears to be conveyed to the 
financial market by the annual report and accounts and the annual general meeting. 
There appears to be no unusual activity preceding any event and only a small 
reaction the following day. On stockmarket day two the share price resumes its 
normal relationship with the market. This share price behaviour is consistent with 
the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
Tests of the information content of event disclosures and the degree of association 
between the information content of different events using daily and weekly data were 
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broadly similar. The PA and IR were found in both tests to contain considerable new 
information. There were positive relationships between more events using weekly 
data than there were using daily data. The difference between the results is possibly 
attributable to weekly data capturing more of the information impact of the ARA 
which was not accomplished using daily data. We may also speculate on the presence 
of a neglected firm effect, but such hypothesis requires further investigation. 
On the whole the market seems to treat "good" and "bad" news as of equal 
informational value, although there is a sharper reaction to "bad" news on release 
of the interim report. Significance tests were unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that the average abnormal returns for "good" and "bad" news are equal. 
In all the tests using combinations of size, information content and risk, the 
annual general meeting was not statistically significant. This is consistent with 
previous findings for if only marginal information is being conveyed then little rela- 
tionship with size can be expected. The following findings, using the three variables, 
relate only to the other three events, the preliminary announcement, the annual re- 
port and accounts and the interim report. 
An inverse relationship between size and information content was found in this 
study. As 9.5% of the 337 companies used in this work are considered to be small, 
it is necessary to determine if it is size which is driving the residuals or whether size 
is only a surrogate for risk. 
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For all three events there is a significant association between the three variables, 
firm size, abnormal return, and variance of returns, but whereas a change in com- 
pany size leads only to a marginal effect on the return, a small alteration in risk, 
measured by variance of return, produces a substantial change. Variance is largely 
related to beta, which has a systematic relationship with the market movement. 
The evidence suggests that size is probably a surrogate for absent firm specific 
variables. 
Further support for the inverse relationship is the finding that of the 36 PA 
and 26 ARA company residuals more than one standard deviation from the sample 
mean of the PA and ARA residuals, small companies were two and three times over 
represented compared with their proportion in the whole sample. 
The evidence so far appears to confirm the lack of apparent value of the annual 
report to market participants as an information source in aggregate. However, such 
results may still be consistent with price sensitive information being conveyed in 
the case of certain individual firms by the ARA. This is confirmed by the analysis 
of the 29 outlier companies with residuals greater than one standard deviation from 
the ARA mean. 
Identical analyses were conducted on the outlier group and a matched control 
group with low abnormal returns. The outliers' high abnormal returns cannot be 
attributed to lack of market coverage as both groups appeared to be closely followed 
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by financial analysts. The matching by size and sector rules out these two factors 
as probable causes. There is little difference in the amount of voluntary information 
disclosure by the groups in their PAs and no significant difference in their average 
PA residuals. There is, however, a highly significant difference in the groups' average 
ARA residuals which lends support to the hypothesis that for some companies, e. g. 
the outlier group, their ARAs contain price sensitive information. 
Tests of the association between information content of the events produced 
conflicting results but the press comments at the PAs looking to the ARA to confirm 
for example, in the case of the Berec Group, the size of the current cost profit, and 
for Vickers, the date of settlement of the nationalisation compensation seems to 
furnish evidence of an informational relationship between the PA information and 
the ARA information for the outlier group not observed in the analysis of the control 
group. Market participants seem to use the annual report and accounts partly in a 
confirmatory role. This finding suggests that at least for the outlier companies, the 
annual report and accounts may contain incremental information. 
One section of the annual report found to contain price-sensitive information is 
the balance sheet. Gearing is calculated using balance sheet numbers. Although 
in aggregate tests showed no significant differences in the two groups gearing and 
interest cover, all nine of the balance sheet related comments either directly or 
implicitly referred to a firm's gearing. We can only speculate that investors viewed 
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the information as affecting future cash flows and the tests were unable to capture 
these future effects. 
Using comments made by the financial press surrounding the PA and ARA 
events and detailed analyses of the ARAs, all the evidence suggests that the ARAs 
of the outlier group contain information used for share evaluation purposes. The 
information is apparently company specific as a similar information set is not evident 
in the control company group. 
Two sections of the annual report apparently used by investors in their decision 
making are the balance sheet and the chairman's statement, both of which are 
known to be highly rated as information sources by expert users. Information 
found in other sections, such as the auditors' report, the activity analysis and the 
geographical analysis etc. which may to be contributing to the causes driving the 
outlier residuals, has been noted by previous researchers to contain price sensitive 
information. 
The focus of this study is on the usefulness of the annual report and accounts 
as a source of information for share evaluation purposes. The annual report and 
accounts is one of the major information sources as it provides a 'snapshot' of the 
company, issued by the company. It is comprehensive and detailed. 
Previous studies of the information content and usefulness of the annual report 
can be classified into three groups. The first group examines the annual report 
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and accounts as a whole for incremental information and the second analyses spe- 
cific parts of the, annual report for information content. Neither group is looking 
at individual companies to ascertain whether a firm's annual report and accounts 
contains incremental information. The groups' results confirm or otherwise whether 
the annual report and accounts, in aggregate, contains information useful for share 
evaluation purposes. 
The third group by interview and questionnaire or questionnaire alone, deter- 
mine respondents use of the annual report and accounts in their decision making 
process and which parts of the report they find most useful. Respondents are usually 
divided into sophisticated users e. g. financial analysts and institutions and unsophis- 
ticated users i. e. the general public. The limitations of the methods adopted are 
well documented e. g. lack of response to questionnaire, difficulty of designing ques- 
tionnaire and respondents supplying answers they feel are generally regarded as 
correct rather than relating to their actual behaviour. 
The value of this study is in having found the annual report and accounts, in 
aggregate, may not contain material incremental information, it provides evidence 
consistent with some individual firms' annual reports containing price-sensitive in- 
formation and goes on to identify those parts of the report containing the price- 
sensitive information which may be driving the abnormal return. No previous study 
has directly examined individual firm's annual report and accounts for information 
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Perhaps it is the element of surprise surrounding the information which gives it 
its importance. If this is true, then the annual report and accounts is compulsory 
reading for all active participants in the financial market. Unless the stockmarket 
has access to this financial statement potential adverse valuation consequences may 
be missed. On this basis this study would suggest summary accounts are unsuitable 
for active stockmarket participants. 
One final point that should be noted is that chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis use ex 
post tests i. e. examination of press comments, the preliminary announcement and 
the annual report and accounts to explain the large abnormal returns experienced 
by some firms on publication of their annual report and accounts. This method can 
serve as a foundation for further research. 
It is probably impossible to predict ex ante both the magnitude and the direction 
of a firm's share price change on publication of its annual report. Nonetheless a less 
ambitious but useful extension of this study may be possible. 
Following on from the research reported in this thesis we may identify a coherent 
set of factors associated with both the firm per se (size, industry, analyst coverage 
etc) and the new price sensitive information potentially reported in the annual re- 
port and accounts (e. g. account items, asset revaluations, audit report etc). We 
may speculate that a cross-sectional multiple regression approach with abnormal 
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return on ARA publication regressed on the above factors may serve as an appro- 
priate methodological approach to identify those specific parts of the annual report 
and accounts of potential value to the analyst in a more formal manner. 
APPENDIX A. Sample Companies with Classifications 
Blackwood Hodge Mch. Hand. 
Boardman(K. O. )Intl Clothing 
BOC International Gen. Chem 
Boddington Brews Brewery 
Booker McConnell Ind. Hold 
Boots Co. Ltd Str. Mult 
Border &,. Southern 'Stk' Inv Trst 
Borthwick(T) & Son Ovse. Trd 
Boulton(W)(Hldgs) Ind. Plnt 
Bowater Corpn. Pack & Pap 
BPB Industries Ltd Build Mat 
BPC Pub & Prnt 
Bridon Ltd Wre & Rope 
Britannic Assce. Co. Ins. Life 
British Assets Trust Inv. Trst 
British Car Auction Mtr Dist 
British Elect Tr 'Dfd' Ind Hold 
British Home Stores Str. Mult 
British Petroleum Oil 
British Sugar Corp Food Man 
Brittania Arrow Hdgs Fin. Trst 
Brocks Group Ltd Lgt. Elec 
Brook Bond Leibig Food Man 
Brown(John) & Co Mech. Eng 
B. S. G. Intl. Ltd Mtr. Comp 
BSR Ltd Lgt. Elec 
BTR Ltd Plas Rub 
Bunzl Pulp & Paper Pack Pap 
Burmah Oil Co. Ltd Oil 
Burton Group Str. Mult 
Cadbury-Schweppes Food Man 
Capital & Counties Prop. Property 
Capper-Neill Ltd Stl & Chem 
Carpets International Flr. Cover 
Carrington Viyella Cotn & Syn 
Cement Roadstone Cement 
Central & Sherwood Ltd Ind Hold 
Century Oils Oil 
Charter Consolidated(Reg) Mine Fin 
Charterhall Fin Oil 
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Charterhouse Group Mrch. Bnk 
Chloride Group Ltd Electrcl. 
Christies Intl Unclass 
Chubb & Sons Ltd Mech Eng 
Coalite Group Transport 
Coats Patons Ltd Msc. Text 
Combined English Stores Str. Mult 
Comet Radiovision Str. Mult 
Comfort Hotels Int. Ltd Hotl & Cat 
Commercial Union Assce Ins. Comp 
Cope Allman Intl Ind Hold 
Coral Leisure Grp Leisure 
Costain Group Constrct 
Courtaulds Limited Cotn & Syn 
Cress Nicholson Unclass 
Croda International Gen-Chem 
Curry's Limited Str. Mult 
Dalgetty Limited Food Man 
Davy Corporation Stl & Chem 
Dawson Intl Wool 
Debenhams Limited Str. Dept 
De La Rue Co-Ltd Ind. Hold 
Dickinson Robinson Pack Pap 
Distillers Co. Ltd. Wine Spr 
Dixons Photo Str. Mult 
Dobson Park Inds Mech. Eng 
Dowty Group Ltd Mech. Eng 
Drake & Scull Hldgs Constrct 
Dubilier Limited Electrical 
Dunlop Hldgs Ltd Mtr. Comp 
Duport Ltd Mech. Eng 
Eagle Star Hldgs Ltd Ins. Comp 
Edinburgh American Asset Inv. Trst 
Edinburgh Inv. Tr. Inv. Trst 
Electrocomponents Ltd Lgt. Elec 
Electronic Rentals T-V. Rent 
Elswick-Hopper Mech. Eng 
English China Clay Unclass. 
Equity & Law Life Ins. Life 
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European Ferries Shipping 
Fine Art Developments Str. Mail 
Finlay (James) Ovse. Trd 
First Nat. Fin. Corp Ltd Hire Pch 
Fisons Ltd Gen. Chern 
Fitch Lovell Ltd Food Ret 
Foreign &,. Colonial Inv. Trst 
Fostr. Bros Clothing Str. Mult 
French Kier Hldgs Constrct 
GEI International Mech. Eng 
General Accident Ins. Comp, 
General Electric Electrcl 
Gestetner Hldgs 'A' Offc. Eqp. 
Gill &,, Duffus Grp Ltd Ovse. Trd 
Glaxo Holdings Ltd Phm. Prod 
Globe Inv Trust Inv. Trst 
Glynwed Limited Metl. Frrn 
Granada Grp Ltd 'A' Ord T. V. Rent 
Grand Metropolitan Hotl & Cat 
Grattan Warehouses Str. Mail 
Great Nthn Inv Trst Inv Trst 
Great Portland Estates Property 
Great Univ-Stores 'A' Str. Mult 
Greenall Whitley Brewery 
Grindlay's Hldgs For. Bank 
Guardian Ryl Exchange Ins Comp, 
Guest Keen & Ntlfid Metl. Frm, 
Guiness(A) Son & Co Brewery 
Guiness Peat Group Mrch. Bank 
Guthrie Corpn. Ltd Rubber 
Hambro Life Assurance Ins. Life 
Hambros Ltd 25p Mrch. Bank 
Harrison Crosfield Ovse. Trd 
Harris Queensway Group Str. Furn 
Haslemere Estates Property 
Hawker Siddeley Grp Mech. Eng 
Hawley Leisure Ltd Leisure 
Hawtin Ltd Clothing 
Heath(C. E. ) & Co Ins. Brkr 
Henlys Ltd Mtr. Dist 
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Hepworth Ceramic Buildmat 
Hepworth J& Son 'A' Ord Str. Mult 
Hestair Limited Ind. Hold 
Hewden-Stuart Constrct 
Higgs and Hill Ltd Constrct 
Highland Distilleries Co Wine &,, Spr 
Hill (P) Inv. Tr. Ltd Inv Trst 
Hill, Samuel Group Mrch. Bnk 
Hoover Ltd 'A' NV Hse. Appl 
House of Frazer Str. Dept 
Howard Machinery Mech. Eng 
Howard Tenens Services Transport 
Howden(A. )Group Ins. Brkr 
ICL Ltd Electrcl. 
IMI Ltd Metallgy 
Imperial Chemical Indust Gen. Chern 
Imperial Group Tobacco 
Inchape &, Co. Ltd Ovse. Trd 
Industrial & Gen Tr Ltd Inv. Trst 
Inveresk Group Pack & Pap 
Johnson & Firth Brown Spec. Stl 
Kalamazoo Ltd Offc. Eqp. 
KCA International Oil 
Kleinwort 7Benson Mrch Bnk 
Kode International Lgt. Elec 
Kwik Fit Hldgs 
, 
Mtr. Comp 
Kwik Save Discount Food Ret 
Ladbroke Group Leisure 
Laird Group Mech. Eng 
Land Securities Property 
Laporte Inds (Hds) Gen. Chem 
Law land Co Ltd Property 
L. C. P. Holdings Ind. Hold 
Lee Cooper Ltd Clothing 
Legal & Gen Group Ins. Life 
Lennons Group Food Ret 
Letraset Ltd Offc. Eqp 
Lex Service Group Mtr. Dist 
Lloyds Bank Ltd Bank 
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London Brick Co. Ltd Brick 
London Freighters Shipping 
London Merchant Securities Ind. Hold 
London Midland Inds Ind. Hold 
London Northern Grp Constrct 
London Scottishb Marine 0 Oil 
London Trust Co Inv. Trst 
L. R. C. International Phm. Prod 
Lucas Industries Mtr. Comp 
Mallinson Denny Timber 
Marks & Spencer Str. Mult 
Merchants Trust Inv. Trst 
Mercury Securities Mrch Bnk 
Metal Box Ltd Pack & Pap 
Meyer(M. L. ) Ltd Timber 
MFI Furniture Group Str. Furn 
Midland Bank Ltd Bank 
Minet Holdings Ltd Ins. Brkr 
Minster Assets Ltd Fin. Trst 
Mitchell Cotts Mech. Eng 
Moben Group Furn & Bed 
Morgan Crucible Ind. Hold 
Morrison(W) Supermkts Food. Ret 
Mothercare Limited Str. Mult 
Mount Charlotte Hotl & Cat 
Muirhead Ltd Electrcl 
Myson Group Heat & Vnt 
Natl. Westminster Bank 
NCC Energy Oil 
Newman Inds. Ltd Ind. Hold 
Norcross Limited Ind. Hold 
Northern Engineering Ind Eng. Cont 
Northern Foods Food Man 
Northn. American. Tr Inv. Trst 
Nottingham Manufg Clothing 
Ocean Transport & Trd Shipping 
Pearl Assurance Co Ins. Life 
Pearson(s) & Son Ind. Hold 
Pegler-Hattersley Pump & Val 
Pentos Ltd Ind. Hold 
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Phoenix Assurance Ins. Comp 
Pilkington Bros Buildmat 
Platignum Ltd Offc. Eqp 
Pleasurama Limited Leisure 
Plessey Co. Limited Electrcl 
P&0 Steam Vav Co 'Dfd' Shipping 
Powell Duffryn Ltd Ind. Hold 
Premier Consolidated Oil 
Provident Financial Grp Hire Pch 
Prudential Corporation Ins Life 
Rank Organisation Offc. Eqp 
Ranks Hovis MacDougall Mill & Flr 
Ransome Hoffman Mech. Eng 
Ratners (Jewellers) Str. Mult 
Raybeck Ltd Str. Mult 
Ready Mixed Concrete Cement 
Reckitt & Colman Phm. Prod 
Redland Brick 
Reed International Pack & Pap 
Renold Limited Mech. Eng 
RIT Ltd Inv. Trst 
Rothmans Int Ltd 'B' Tobacco 
Rowntree- Mackintosh Food Man 
Royal Bank Scotland Bank 
Royal Insurance Co Ins Comp 
Savoy Hotel Ltd 'A' Ord Hotl & Cat 
Scottish Amer Inv Co Inv. Trst 
Scottish Inv. Trst Co Inv Trst 
Scottish Mortg & Trust Inv Trst 
Scottish & N'csle Brews Brewery 
Scottish Utd Investors Inv. Trst 
Sears Holdings Ltd Str. Mult 
Selincourt Ltd Clothing 
Serck Limited Mech. Eng 
Shell Trnspt & Trdg 'Regd' Oil 
Silverrrýines Ltd $IR Msc. Mine 
Simon Engineering Eng. Cont 
Six Hundred(600)Grp Mech. Eng 
Sketchley Limited Laundrey 
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Slough Estates Ltd Property 
Smith &,. Nephew Assd Phm. Prod 
Srniths Industries Mech. Eng 
Smith WH& Son 'A' Str. Mult 
Sotheby Parke Unclass 
Spring Grove Services Ltd Laundry 
Stakis (Reo) Orgn Hotl & Cat 
Standard Chartered Bank For. Bank 
Staveley Inds. Ltd Ind. Hold 
Steetley Co. Ltd Ind. Hold 
Stock Conversion & Inv. Property 
Stone-Platt Inds. Ind. Plnt 
Sumner(F. ) (Hldgs. ) Ind. Hold 
Sun Alliance &,, Lon Ins Ins. Comp 
Sun Life Assce Society Ins. Life 
Supra Group Ltd Mtr. Comp 
Tarmac Buildmat 
Tate & Lyle Ltd Food Man 
Taylor Woodrow Ltd Constrct 
Telephone Rentals Offc. Eqp 
Temple Bar Inv. Tr Inv. Trst 
Tesco Stores (Hldgs) Food Ret 
Thorn EMI Lgt. Elec 
Tilling (T) Limited Ind. Hold 
Tootal Msc. Text 
Town & City Props Property 
Tozr, Kemsly & Milbrn Ovse. Trd 
Trafalgar House Ltd Ind. Hold 
Transport Dev-Grp Transport 
Tricentrol Ltd Oil 
Trident TV Ltd 'A' NV Leisure 
Trusthouse Forte Hotl & Cat 
Tube Investments Mech. Eng 
Tunnel Holdings 'B' Cement 
Turner & Newall Ind. Hold 
UBM Group Buildmer 
UDS Group Str. Mult 
Ultramar Co Ltd Oil 
Unigate Limited Food Man 
Unilever Limited Food Man 
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Unitech Ltd Lgt Elec 
United Biscuits Mill & Flr 
United City Merchants Ovse Trad 
United Scientific Instrmnt 
United State Debentr CP Inv. Trst 
Valor Company Ltd Hse. Appl 
Vickers Limited Mech. Eng 
Viking Resources Inv Trst 
Vinten Grp Instrmnt 
Ward (T. W. ) Limited Metl. Frm 
Ward White Group Footwear 
Wedgwood Limited Ktchn & Tb 
Weir Group Ltd Mech. Eng 
Westland Aircraft Mech. Eng 
Whitbread & Co 'A' Ord Brewery 
Willis Faber Ltd Ins. Bkr 
Wimpey (George) Ltd Constrct 
Witan Inv Co Inv. Trst 
Wolverhampton & Dud Brew Brewery 
Wood Hall Trust Ind-Hold 
Woolworth (F. W. ) Ltd Str. Mult 
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This appendix contains the method used for calculating the Student's t-statistics 
for the average absolute abnormal returns shown in Tables 8-11 and the results of 
the significance tests for Tables 
Adopting the Cready and Mynatt (1991) method to test for price invariance the 
absolute value of the abnormal return (ABUR) is estimated on a daily basis as: 
ABUR, t = 
(JUjtl 
- 
ABURj) 
SABR., 
where: 
ABURj: the mean absolute value of the residuals for firm j from the 
non-event period of 252 days; and 
SABRj: the standard deviation of the absolute values of the residuals 
for firm j from same non-event period. 
The 252 non-event days are the 260 day period less day 0, the event day, and 
day +1 for each of the four events. 
The absolute value standardised abnormal returns are calculated to have an 
expected value of zero where there is no price response. The t-statistic is calculated 
using the conventional t-test with y=0 and n= 337. 
APPENDIX B. Significance tests of Tables 8-11 
Absolute Value Abnormal Returns 
Standard 
Mean Deviation t-value 
-9 -0.049 0.89 -1.011 
-8 -0.042 0.95 -0.800 
-7 -0.015 0.98 -0.280 
-6 -0.004 0.95 -0.073 
-5 0.000 0.95 0.001 
-4 0.004 0.96 0.067 
-3 0.172 1.28 2.461 
-2 0.177 1.26 2.587 
-1 0.064 1.08 1.098 
0 2.189 3.58 11.227 
1 0.798 1.71 8.548 
2 0.147 1.11 2.423 
3 0.019 0.97 0.353 
4 0.093 1.10 1.549 
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Table 41: Preliminary Announcement Mean Absolute Value Standardised Abnormal 
returns 
Absolute Value Abnormal Returns 
Standard 
Mean Deviation t-value 
-4 0.056 1.00 1.03 
-3 0.071 1.11 1.18 
-2 0.081 1.09 1.37 
-1 0.053 1.09 0.89 
0 0.266 1.37 3.56 
1 0.093 1.09 1.57 
2 0.163 1.23 2.43 
3 0.125 1.18 1.95 
4 0.144 1.22 2.18 
5 
-0-013 0.95 -0.26 
Table 42: Annual Report and Accounts Mean Absolute Value Standardised Abnor- 
mal Returns 
APPENDIX B. Significance tests of Tables 8-11 
Absolute Value Abnormal Returns 
Standard 
Mean Deviation t-value 
-9 0.110 1.16 1.75 
-8 0.094 1.14 1.52 
-7 -0.048 0.92 -0.95 
-6 0.033 0.96 0.64 
-5 -0-002 1.04 -0.04 
-4 0.090 1.22 1.35 
-3 0.061 1.06 1.06 
-2 -0.008 1.07 -0.14 
-1 0.039 1.06 0.68 
0 0.438 1.60 5.03 
1 0.438 1.55 5.17 
2 0.126 1.15 2.00 
3 0.089 1.11 1.47 
4 0.086 1.12 1.41 
5 
-0-011 0.98 -0-. 21 
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Table 43: Annual General Meeting Mean Absolute Value Standardised Abnormal 
Returns 
APPENDLY B. Significance tests of Tables 8-11 
Absolute Value Abnormal Returns 
Standard 
Afean Deviation t-value 
-9 0.077 1.0-1 1.313 
-8 -0.005 1.10 -0.076 
-7 -0.014 0.95 -0.2 715 
-6 -0.004 0.97 -0.084 
-5 -0.020 0.95 -0.382 
-4 -0.087 0.87 -1.839 
-3 0.202 1.11 3.360 
-2 0.157 1.22 2.351 
-1 0.134 1.20 2.049 
0 2.105 3.66 10.567 
1 0.7158 2.01 6.909 
2 0.239 1.36 3.225 
3 0.102 1.00 1.867 
4 
-0-062 0.94 -1.205 
5 
-0-013 1.08 -0.227 
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Table 44: Interim Report Mean Absolute Value Standardised Abnormal Returns 
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